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ABSTRACT
This dissertation consists of three papers that, together, analyze the role of
healthcare institutions in rural economies and evaluate how access to health
insurance for low-income individuals impacts mortality and risky behavior.
In Chapter 1, I study the local economic impacts of rural hospital closures
in the United States. The analysis begins with a difference-in-differences
approach using county-by-year panel data on all hospital closures from 2003
through 2017. The results indicate that closures adversely affect employ-
ment, income, labor force participation, establishments, population, housing
prices, and the unemployment rate. Estimated effect sizes grow over time
and are explained largely by rural counties that lose their only hospital and
in counties where hospitals occupy a large share of the local labor market.
While there is little or no evidence of pre-trends, I estimate a range of ro-
bustness checks designed to further address endogeneity concerns, such as
forward-looking behavior among hospital owners. The results are consistent
across these specifications. I also document spillovers, as evidenced by a
1.8 percent decrease in non-hospital employment, an effect that explains 40
percent of the total employment loss. To characterize the significance of the
adverse effects, I combine the reduced-form estimates with a spatial equi-
librium model of various agents in a local economy. Analysis of the model
indicates that rural hospital closures significantly harm welfare, an outcome
that is internalized by workers, older residents no longer in the labor force,
and landowners.
In Chapter 2, co-authored with Mark Borgschulte, we estimate the effect
of the Affordable Care Act Medicaid expansion on county-level mortality in
the first four years following expansion using restricted-access microdata cov-
ering all deaths in the United States. To adjust for pre-expansion differences
in mortality rates between treatment and control, we use a propensity-score
weighting model together with techniques from machine learning to match
ii
counties in expansion and non-expansion states. We find a reduction in all-
cause mortality in ages 20 to 64 equaling 11.36 deaths per 100,000 individuals,
a 3.6 percent decrease. This estimate is largely driven by reductions in mor-
tality in counties with higher pre-expansion uninsured rates and for causes of
death likely to be influenced by access to healthcare. A cost-benefit analysis
shows that the improvement in welfare due to mortality responses may offset
the entire net-of-transfers expenditure associated with the expansion.
In Chapter 3, I investigate the causal relationship between access to health
care and crime following state decisions to expand Medicaid coverage after
the Affordable Care Act. I combine state-level crime data from the Federal
Bureau of Investigation Uniform Crime Reports with variation in insurance
eligibility generated by state decisions to expand Medicaid between the years
2009 and 2018. Using a difference-in-differences design, my findings indicate
that states that expanded Medicaid have experienced a 5.3 percent reduction
in annual incidents of violent crime relative to non-expansion states. This
effect is explained by decreases in aggravated assaults and corresponds to 17
fewer incidents per 100,000 people. The estimated decrease in reported crime
amounts to an annual cost savings of approximately $4 billion.
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CHAPTER 1
RURAL HOSPITAL CLOSURES AND
LOCAL ECONOMIC DECLINE
That’s sad for the community around here in Bennettsville. All of
the surrounding counties have places. . . what’s a community without
a hospital?
– Regina Brown of Bennettsville, South Carolina (Hospital closed May
2015)1
1.1 Introduction
Most of the rural United States has experienced declining economic activ-
ity and negative population growth over the last several decades. Given
this trend’s important implications for economic opportunity and the over-
all well-being of rural residents, understanding the causes of rural decline
is crucial. Research highlights labor sorting and mobility, technological ad-
vancements, and higher wages in more populated areas as explanations of this
phenomenon.2 Much less work has analyzed the role of local labor demand
shocks in rural areas or their impact on desirable amenities that directly
impact residents’ quality of life (Autor et al. (2013), Bartik et al. (2019)).
Considering that rural economies typically support only a small number of
firms that generate demand for labor and facilitate consumption of goods
and services, these channels appear especially important to understand in
explaining rural decline in the U.S.
This paper evaluates how negative local labor demand shocks and amenity
1Baker, Ken. “Marlboro Park Hospital will close.” WMBF News. April 29 2015.
https://www.wmbfnews.com/story/28924714/marlboro-park-hospital-will-close/
2See Glaeser et al. (2001), Lee (2010), Chetty et al. (2014), Diamond (2016), and
Acemoglu and Restrepo (2019). Research has also documented that employment growth
(Rappaport, 2018) and worker productivity (Henderson, 1974) are significantly higher in
medium-sized and large metropolitan areas compared with less populated locations.
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losses affect rural communities. Specifically, I estimate the causal impact of
rural hospital closures on local labor markets using county-level data on all
hospital closures in the U.S. from 2003 through 2017, together with detailed
measures of local economies and populations. Hospitals constitute a unique
industry in that they produce both high- and low-skilled jobs and serve as an
important amenity to residents and potential migrants. These elements are
critical for sustained economic growth. The trend in closures also epitomizes
rural economic decline. Figure 1.1 shows that nearly 100 rural hospitals have
closed since 2003 and it has been suggested that one in five operating facilities
are at risk of closing (Mosley and DeBehnke, 2019).
The analysis begins with a difference-in-differences approach that exploits
variations in hospital closures over time and space. I document flat pre-
trends, consistent with theories that emphasize operating inefficiency, man-
agement practices, and government reimbursement rates as the key causes of
closure.3 To further address endogeneity concerns, such as forward-looking
behavior on the part of hospital owners, I estimate several variations of
the baseline model, including adjusting for industry mix, linear trends, and
propensity score re-weighting, as well as models that compare contiguous
county-pairs. The results I derive are consistent across these specifications,
evidence that any endogeneity bias captured in the estimates is likely small.
The estimates then serve as input into a spatial equilibrium model of house-
holds, landowners, and establishments. The framework provides theoretical
guidance for understanding the reduced-form results and aids in estimating
the distribution of welfare consequences within a local economy.
In the first set of results, I find that rural hospital closures lead to large and
statistically significant reductions across a multitude of economic outcomes.
Specifically, closures cause a 4.3 percent reduction in employment and a 2.7
percent reduction in per capita income as well as a 2.8 percent reduction in
labor force participation and an 3.1 percent increase in local unemployment
rates. Hospital closures also negatively impact population counts and local
housing markets, as evidenced by estimated 1.2 percent, 1.3 percent, and
2.0 percent reductions in total population, median rents, and median home
values, respectively. Population reductions occur across all ages, including
among individuals 65 years of age and older, a demographic that faces rel-
3See Mobley and Frech III (1994), Bazzoli and Andes (1995), Succi et al. (1997), Deily
et al. (2000), Lindrooth et al. (2003), Ciliberto and Lindrooth (2007).
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atively high moving costs and uses hospitals twice as often as younger age
groups (Healthcare Cost Utilization Project, 2018).4
Three key insights emerge from the reduced-form analysis. First, the im-
pacts of rural hospital closures are sustained with estimated effect sizes that
grow over time, a finding that underscores the importance of hospitals as
a factor in rural economic decline. Second, the effects are largest when a
county loses its only hospital and in counties where closing hospitals make
up a larger component of local labor markets, evidence that negative shocks
to more important industries in rural areas are especially harmful. Third,
I find evidence that closures cause significant employment reductions in the
non-hospital sector. Specifically, closures lead to a 1.8 percent reduction in
non-hospital employment, a decrease in workers that explains 40 percent of
the total employment reduction. The spillovers are concentrated in service-
providing industries, mainly in counties that lose their sole hospitals and
where hospitals compose a substantial share of local employment.
I conclude the analysis by presenting a spatial equilibrium model that
builds on the work of Kline and Moretti (2014) and other recent studies
(Suárez Serrato and Zidar (2016), Zou (2018), Bartik et al. (2019)). The
goals behind incorporating the model are twofold: the first is to provide
a conceptual structure for understanding the effects of rural hospital clo-
sures on earnings, prices, amenities, and population size. The second is to
characterize local welfare impacts and understand how they are distributed
across agents within the local economy. The framework includes many lo-
cations, each a small economy, populated by households, landowners, and
establishments. Households are composed of two types: young workers and
older residents who are out of the labor force. This setup is similar to spa-
tial models that assume a heterogeneous labor supply comprising high- and
low-skilled workers (Moretti (2011), Diamond (2016)). Those papers, how-
ever, do not consider households that are out of the labor force. Consistent
with findings from previous studies, older residents face higher moving costs
than younger workers do. As a result, the model allows for heterogeneity
in amenity and utility changes across household types. Hospital closures
are treated as exogenous, shift demand for labor and housing, and impact
4Numerous studies find older residents face higher moving costs compared to younger
individuals, including Chen and Rosenthal (2008), Sánchez and Andrews (2011), and Bar-
tik (2018).
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household utility through changes in earnings, consumption, and amenities.
The amenity component is important when considering that rural hospital
closures may cause changes in utility that do not occur through changes in
income or consumption, such as longer travel times to out-of-county hospi-
tals. Incorporating the reduced-form results and parameter estimates from
previous research, analysis of the model shows that rural hospital closures
decrease household welfare by 0.5 percent, a significant effect equal to $1.5
million per county. For landowners in closure counties, welfare is reduced by
2.5 percent, or approximately $37,000 in annual profits. These reductions fall
within the range of estimates reported in other research that has examined
welfare responses to local labor demand shocks (e.g. Zou (2018) and Bartik
et al. (2019)).
This paper contributes to several bodies of literature, including the broad
literature that studies how local economies respond to local labor demand
shocks.5 First, this study focuses on hospitals, an industry that has yet
to be rigorously examined in the context of local labor market shocks. The
setting is particularly unique considering that hospitals not only act as major
employers but also contribute in an important way to residents’ location
preferences and quality of life. Thus, hospital closures affect both local labor
demand and local labor supply. This is unlike other local labor market
shocks, such as manufacturing plant closures, that impact local economies
predominately through labor demand. Second, I contribute to the broader
literature by focusing on rural communities. Previous work has focused very
little attention on the idea that responses to local labor market shocks may
vary considerably across place, particularly between urban and rural areas.
Given the stark differences in earnings and labor mobility between urban and
rural areas, the implications of major labor market adjustments presumably
manifest themselves quite differently in urban and rural settings, a conjecture
for which I find evidence when analyzing the effects of hospital closures.
Unlike closures in rural areas, I document no evidence that urban hospital
closures significantly impact local labor markets.
This study also contributes to the literature that has analyzed the re-
5See Topel (1986), Bartik (1991), Blanchard and Katz (1992), Bound and Holzer (2000),
Black et al. (2005), Feyrer et al. (2007), Greenstone et al. (2010), Notowidigdo (2011),
Autor et al. (2013), Busso et al. (2013), Kline and Moretti (2013), Suárez Serrato and
Zidar (2016), Chirakijja (2018), Weinstein (2018), and Zou (2018).
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lationship between rural hospitals and local economies. First, I improve
upon previous work by carrying out a quasi-experimental analysis, making
it a priority to address potentially confounding factors, and provide evidence
supporting a causal interpretation of the results. Previous research that has
studied the effects of rural hospital closures on local economies generally
consist of case studies, where numerous confounding factors exist that can
impose bias on the results. Using a rich dataset, this paper is also the first
to explore spillover effects caused by rural hospital closures. Previous work
that has attempted to quantify the economic contribution of rural hospitals
have focused on the aggregate economy. This study goes one step further by
estimating effects in sectors of the economy that operate outside of hospi-
tals. Finally, this study provides new insights into the effects of rural hospital
closures by incorporating a spatial equilibrium model that helps ground the
reduced-form estimates in theory and evaluate the distribution of welfare
effects.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: In Section 1.2 I provide
background information on rural hospital closures and review the related
literature. In Section 1.3 I describe the data. In Section 1.4 I detail the
sample construction, describe the identification strategy, and present econo-
metric models used to estimate the effects of rural hospital closures on local
economies. In Section 1.5 I report the main reduced-form results. In Sec-
tion 1.6 I discuss robustness and alternative specifications. In Section 1.7
I analyze spillovers into non-hospital sectors. In Section 1.8 I present the
spatial equilibrium model and welfare analysis and conclude in Section 1.9.
1.2 Background and Related Literature
1.2.1 Rural Hospital Closures in the United States
Nearly 15 percent of hospitals in the U.S. have closed since 1990 and clo-
sure rates have increased over the last decade (Carroll, 2019). This trend
has generated concern among workers in the healthcare industry and public
policy leaders. Beginning in 1989, The Office of the Inspector General (OIG)
of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services published a series of
reports on both urban and rural hospital closures within the United States.
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It was of particular interest to determine the causes and impacts of the clo-
sures on local communities, especially in rural areas. The OIG found that
208 rural hospitals closed between 1990 and 2000, approximately 8 percent
of all rural hospitals nationally. The OIG also attributed the closures to mul-
tiple contributing factors. Rural hospitals that closed averaged fewer beds,
lower occupancy rates and annual revenues, and slightly lower Medicare and
Medicaid use rates compared with the national average of rural hospitals
(Rehnquist, 2003).
In response to concerns about rural hospital closures, Medicare created a
new program under the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, allowing certain rural
facilities to convert to “Critical Access Hospitals” and thereby receive more
generous, cost-based reimbursements (U.S. Congress, 1997). The rate of
rural closures slowed and interest declined until more recently, when closures
began to increase again, particularly in the years after the Great Recession.
The market for hospital operations also has shifted during this time. The
trend towards high-tech services, changes in demand, increases in the rate of
hospital mergers, and new models of care have all impacted the landscape
on which rural hospitals operate. As a result, hospital closures have regained
the attention of researchers.6
Factors associated with rural hospital closures have been studied exten-
sively. The literature has highlighted two main predictors of closure. The
first is operating efficiency. Several papers have found evidence that ineffi-
cient hospitals are more likely to close (Mobley and Frech III (1994), Deily
et al. (2000), Lindrooth et al. (2003), Ciliberto and Lindrooth (2007)). In-
efficiency has been found to be negatively correlated with hospital size and
the number of services offered.7 Indeed, the closed hospitals in my sample
feature fewer beds, lower admission rates, and fewer employees than the ru-
ral hospitals that do not close (See Appendix Table A.1). Closures do not,
however, disproportionately close in less populated rural areas. The second
predictor of closure is cost reimbursement and uncompensated care. There
is much evidence characterizing the relationship between hospital closures,
higher rates of uninsured patients, and lower reimbursements from Medicare
6For example, the Cecil G. Sheps Center for Health Services Research at
the University of North Carolina, has kept a record of rural hospital closures
since 2010. See https://www.shepscenter.unc.edu/programs-projects/rural-health/rural-
hospital-closures/.
7See Lindrooth et al. (2003) for a review of this literature.
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and Medicaid (Bazzoli and Andes (1995), Succi et al. (1997), Ciliberto and
Lindrooth (2007)). Given the considerable fixed costs associated with oper-
ating hospitals, their finances are particularly sensitive to insurance coverage
and uncompensated care. Increases in the uninsured population shrink hos-
pital profit margins, implying that hospitals do not pass along related costs
to hospital employees or privately insured patients (Garthwaite et al., 2018).
Recently, a number of papers have highlighted the potential effects of the
Affordable Care Act (ACA) and state decisions to expand Medicaid on hos-
pital closures. The hypothesis is that expanding Medicaid eligibility reduces
uncompensated care expenditures and strengthens hospitals’ financial posi-
tions, two changes that could reduce hospital closures. Lindrooth et al. (2018)
tested this hypothesis using data on hospital closures and financial perfor-
mance from 2008 through 2016 and found that the ACA Medicaid expansion
was associated with improved hospital financial performance and substan-
tially lower likelihoods of closure, especially in rural markets and counties
with large numbers of uninsured adults before the Medicaid expansion. Sim-
ilarly, Duggan et al. (2019) found that the Medicaid expansion in California
produced a substantial increase in hospital revenue and profitability, with
larger gains for government-operated hospitals.
1.2.2 Effects of Rural Hospital Closures
Research on the effects of hospital closures has focused largely on how closures
impact patient health status. This question is particularly salient in rural
communities, where hospital closures create a distance-quality trade-off for
patients. While closures increase travel time to healthcare facilities, patient
health status may not significantly diminish and may even improve if patients
affected by a hospital closure receive treatment at higher-quality facilities.
The focal point of such work focuses on understanding the relationship be-
tween closures and mortality. The evidence pertaining to this relationship is
inconclusive. For example, Buchmueller et al. (2006), Avdic (2016), Carroll
(2019), and Gujral and Basu (2019) find that closures increase mortality for
individuals who reside in areas near where hospitals close. Other work, such
as Rosenbach and Dayhoff (1995), Joynt et al. (2015), and Yang (2018), has
found no causal relationship between closures and mortality.
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A stream of literature that is more closely related to this study has at-
tempted to estimate the contributions of hospitals to local economies. The
majority of such papers are observational case studies that use input-output
analysis to compare outcomes in one or a handful of closure communities with
outcomes in control groups. The takeaways from this literature are mixed.
Several papers that attempt to quantify the contributions of hospitals to
local economies indicate that hospitals are relatively important businesses
(Christianson and Faulkner (1981), McDermott et al. (1991), Cordes et al.
(1999), Mandich and Dorfman (2017)). Papers that directly investigate the
economic consequences of hospital closures also provide evidence of the im-
portance of hospitals to rural economic health. For example, Doeksen et al.
(1990) simulated the effect of a hospital closure in rural Oklahoma and esti-
mated that, over a five-year period, approximately 78 jobs and $1.7 million
in income would be lost because of the closure.
On the other hand, a number of papers have reported little or no associa-
tion between rural economic health and hospital closures. Probst et al. (1999)
compared counties that experienced hospital closures between 1984 and 1988
with a group of non-closure counties and failed to find a statistically signif-
icant difference in income trends. Pearson and Tajalli (2003) examined 24
rural counties in Texas that experienced hospital closures between 1987 and
1989 and found no differences in five economic measures relative to a group of
control counties. Similarly, Stensland et al. (2002) examined how income per
capita, population, and employment growth rates changed in 42 rural Ap-
palachian communities following hospital closures and concluded that local
economies were resilient to such closures. More recently, Holmes et al. (2006)
used closure data from 1990 through 2000 and found that hospital closures
do not negatively affect the long-run economic health of local communities.
The study reported some evidence of negative economic impacts during the
year in which a hospital closed, but these effects were not sustained over a
longer time period. Finally, Miller et al. (2015) estimated the impact of one
hospital closure in rural Illinois on local housing values. The study found
that the change in value of houses that sold before and after the closure were
not affected by the distance from the house to the closed hospital.
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1.3 Data Sources
1.3.1 Hospital Closures and Characteristics
To construct hospital closure status, I combine information from a number
of sources. The primary data come from the American Hospital Association
(AHA) Annual Survey Database for the years 2003-2017. The AHA database
provides information on all types of hospitals in the U.S. and their associated
facilities, services, staffing patterns, and reimbursement structures. Most
importantly, the data include information pertaining to hospital closures in
the U.S. by location (state, county, city, zip-code) and year.
The AHA data, while they are comprehensive, suffer from two limitations
that I needed to address here. First, the AHA data does not specify the
exact date on which a hospital closes. If a hospital is classified as having
closed in survey year t, it is not apparent whether the hospital actually
closed in year t or the closure occurred during the final year the hospital
responded to the AHA survey, t − 1. Second, the AHA survey does not
specify whether a hospital closed permanently. For example, Central Texas
Hospital in Cameron, Texas is classified as closed in the 2015 AHA survey.
According to the Texas Organization of Rural and Community Hospitals,
however, Central Texas Hospital re-opened in October 2014 under a new
name, Little River Healthcare.
To address these limitations, I hand-checked each of the hospitals that
appeared to have closed during the sample period according to the AHA
data. Specifically, I used information from online sources such as media
articles and state reports as well as data from the Cecil G. Sheps Center.
This verification exercise enabled me to obtain exact dates of closure and
thereby rule out hospitals that appeared to have closed in the AHA survey
but were actually existing facilities that had reopened and reappeared in the
AHA under a new identification code. As a result, I have an accurate list of
closures to use in my analysis.
1.3.2 Employment, Earnings and Establishments
The Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW) serves as my
source for county-level annual outcomes in employment, earnings, and num-
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ber of establishments. The QCEW is based on unemployment insurance
records and constitutes a near-census of employment and earnings by sec-
tor (e.g. private vs. government) and by industry (e.g. service-providing vs.
goods-producing), covering more than 95 percent of all jobs in the United
States. The QCEW excludes members of the armed forces, self-employed
individuals, proprietors, and railroad employees. In many cases, employ-
ment and earnings data are suppressed to prevent identification of sensi-
tive information from individual industries. My analysis focuses therefore
on published totals of higher-level aggregations that include the suppressed
lower-level data.
1.3.3 Labor Force Participation and Unemployment
County-level labor force participation and unemployment data come from
the Local Area Unemployment Statistics (LAUS) published by the Bureau
of Labor Statistics (BLS). The LAUS estimates for counties are produced
through a building-block approach that uses data from several sources, in-
cluding the Current Population Survey, the Current Employment Statistics
survey, state unemployment insurance systems, and the Census Bureau’s
American Community Survey (ACS).
1.3.4 Population and Migration
County population data are gathered from the Surveillance, Epidemiology,
and End Results (SEER) Program of the National Cancer Institute. SEER
data are constructed using a modification of the Census Bureau’s intercensal
and Vintage 2017 annual time-series estimates. Population data are avail-
able by age, sex, race, and Hispanic origin. I merge the population data
with county-to-county migration flows from the IRS’s Statistics of Income
(SOI) program. The SOI migration data are based on year-to-year address
changes reported on individual income tax returns filed with the IRS, which
are available for all years from 2003 through 2016.
10
1.3.5 Housing and Rental Prices
The Zillow Home Value Index (ZHVI) from Zillow.com serves as my source of
county-level housing price data. The ZHVI is a seasonally adjusted, dollar-
denominated measure of median estimated home values by housing size and
type. The ZHVI, although convenient in its county-year panel construction,
has shortcomings when used in an analysis focusing on rural communities.
Most importantly, the ZHVI is absent for many counties in my sample period.
As Appendix Figure A.1 shows, there are substantial coverage gaps across
the U.S., particularly in low-populated counties.8 To compensate for the
shortcomings of the ZHVI, I also use median rental prices from the U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). HUD uses rental
data from the U.S. Census Bureau, the ACS, and telephone surveys. These
data are available at the county-level for the entire U.S. during each year in
my sample and include median rental prices separately for one-, two-, three-,
and four-bedroom units. To calculate the aggregate median rental price for
each county-year cell, I weight by the proportion of occupied units for each
bedroom size using county-level data from the 2000 census.
1.4 Estimation Methodology
1.4.1 Sample Construction
The geographic unit of analysis for this study is the county, but classifying
counties as “rural” or not can be challenging. The federal government uses
two major definitions of rural areas. The first is produced by the U.S. Cen-
sus Bureau. This definition does not directly classify rural areas. Rather,
rural areas are defined as all populations, housing, and territory not included
within an urban area. What is more problematic for my setting is that the
Census Bureau’s definition does not follow city or county boundaries, making
it difficult to determine whether a particular county is considered rural or
urban. The second definition comes from the Office of Management and Bud-
8It is possible to use housing data from the National Historical Geographic Information
System (NHGIS) as an alternative to the ZHVI. The NHGIS, however, is available at the
annual level only for counties with populations of 65,000 or more and is available only
every three years for counties with at least 20,000 people.
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get (OMB). The OMB designates counties as metropolitan, micropolitan, or
neither. A metropolitan area contains a core urban area with a population
of 50,000 or more while a micropolitan area contains an urban core of at
least 10,000 but fewer than 50,000 people. All counties that are not part of
a Metropolitan Statistical Area are considered rural.
The Census Bureau and OMB rural classifications are both imperfect. The
former defines quite a bit of suburban area as rural while the latter includes
several rural areas in metropolitan counties. Consequently, the Census Bu-
reau classification includes an over-count of rural areas whereas the OMB
classification represents an under-count (Health Resources & Services Ad-
ministration, 2018). To address these imperfections, this paper borrows its
classification standard from Albouy et al. (2018). Specifically, counties are
defined as “rural” if (1) more than 50 percent of the population live in a
rural area or (2) the population density is under 64 per square mile for the
entire county (10 acres per person) and the total population of the county
is less than 50,000. This definition is particularly useful in that it includes
counties that have small urban clusters surrounded by large tracts of sparsely
populated land.9
After defining rural counties, I use the AHA data to further clean the
analysis sample. First, I exclude rural counties that do not have at least one
hospital in operation during the beginning of the sample period. These coun-
ties make no contribution to the counterfactual outcomes. Second, I focus the
analysis on general, short-term acute hospitals and exclude specialty facili-
ties, such as substance abuse treatment centers and psychiatric institutions. I
do this to clarify the definition of the treatment and ease interpretation of the
estimates. The number of specialty hospitals that close is small and includ-
ing these hospitals in the analysis does not substantially change the results.
I also exclude hospitals that are operated by larger institutions, including
hospitals associated with military bases and prisons. Closures of these hos-
pitals coincide with closures of the parent institutions and including them
would certainly add bias to the estimates. Finally, I do not include hospitals
that close after the first half of 2017 due to insufficient post-closure outcome
data. The effects of this decision are evident in Figure 1.1, as indicated by
the drop in hospital closures in 2017.
9The results are largely unchanged when using alternative definitions of “rural”, such
as non-metropolitan counties as defined by the OMB.
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Figure 1.2 illustrates the sample classification, including treatment, con-
trol, excluded, and urban counties. The sample consists of 1,830 counties
during the period running from 2003 through 2017. Table 1.1 provides sum-
mary statistics. There are 97 hospital closures, 58 operating as non-profit
hospitals and 39 operating as for-profit hospitals. Of the 97 closures, 41 are
the only hospitals in their counties of operation. Hospitals in the sample
employ an average of 406 workers in each county with an average payroll
of $1.66 million. The remainder of the table provides means and standard
deviations of the county level variables used in the analysis.
1.4.2 Identification
The main goal of this paper is to estimate the causal impact of rural hospi-
tal closures on local labor markets. In an ideal experiment, hospital closures
would be randomly assigned to observably similar rural communities. As con-
ducting such an experiment is not feasible, applying a causal interpretation
using a difference-in-differences approach requires outcomes within treatment
and control counties to have evolved smoothly in the absence of the closure.
This standard “parallel trends” condition must be satisfied in any setting
that uses a difference-in-differences design to estimate causal effects.
There are three main threats to the identification strategy. The first I
denote as endogenous trends. It may be the case that counties where hospi-
tal closures occur are experiencing adverse economic conditions that counties
without closures avoid. If true, identifying causal effects using a difference-in-
differences strategy is complicated by any correlation between the treatment
and local economies, potentially leading to biased estimates that capture
both the effects of the closure and trends in local economic conditions. For-
tunately, evaluating this threat by estimating models that include interac-
tions between treatment status and the years before and after a closure is
a straightforward exercise. Such an “event-study” exercise provides both a
visual and an empirical test to indicate whether differences in the dynamics
of the outcome variables appear between the treatment and controls prior
to the occurrence of a closure.10 Failure to find such differences would pro-
vide evidence that hospital closures are orthogonal to determinants of the
10This identification exercise has been used in other papers that study the effects of
hospitals, including the health effects caused by entry and exits of hospitals (Petek, 2018).
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outcomes, strengthening the causal interpretation of my estimates.11
In the absence of pre-trends, a second identification threat is that hos-
pital closures and the outcomes are systematically correlated with unob-
served shocks. This is a threat in any quasi-experimental difference-in-
differences analysis. For this scenario to be a confounding factor, the un-
observed shock(s) would have to occur in the same county and time period
as a given hospital closure and not be captured in county-specific demograph-
ics or aggregate shocks for which I adjust in the model. As hospital closures
are measured using variations across space and time, it is unlikely that this
is a threat to causal identification.
I call the third main threat anticipation bias. In this scenario, hospitals
on the margin of staying open or closing anticipate poor future economic
conditions at time t+ n, where n > 0, but choose to close at time t to avoid
continued financial distress. Anticipation bias is directly related to the ques-
tion why hospitals close and there is little evidence in the literature that is
relevant to understanding this question that would indicate hospitals close
in response to future economic conditions (Lindrooth et al., 2003). Rather,
hospitals use forecast models to predict demand for services and reimburse-
ment. Anecdotal evidence also supports this point. For each hospital in the
sample, I searched for reasons cited for closure using media and government
reports. Of the 97 hospitals that closed, I found only three cases where hos-
pital management cited the local economy as a reason for closure, and in zero
cases were future economic conditions mentioned. Consistent with findings
reported in studies discussed in Section 1.2.1, nearly all hospitals in the sam-
ple cited financial distress and poor reimbursement as reasons for closure.
Furthermore, it appears that the closed hospitals had forecast horizons that
were relatively short, i.e. calculated in days, not years. Services continued to
operate as long as possible and, in several cases, some employees were not
paid for several weeks prior to when hospitals closed their doors.
11The instrumental variable approach represents another avenue through which to ad-
dress potential endogeneity. This approach would be especially challenging to adopt in
my setting. To the best of my knowledge, no studies use instruments to identify causal
impacts of hospital closures. Although some studies have highlighted Medicare and Med-
icaid reimbursement rates as important predictors of closures, these variables likely do
not satisfy the necessary exclusion restriction. Shift-share instruments (Bartik, 1991) are
useful for estimating the effects of changes in hospital employment, but they would not
identify all the effects of hospital closures.
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1.4.3 Econometric Models
I begin the formal analysis by estimating event study models designed to
test for the presence of confounding pre-trends and capture the evolution of
treatment effects over time. The specification takes the following form:
yct = αc + δst +
+5∑
k=−5
βkI{t = hc + k}+ βI{t < hc − 5}
+ βI{t > hc + 5}+ γXct + εct,
(1.1)
where yct represents the outcome of interest in each observation cell indexed
by county c and year t. The coefficients of interest are the βk’s on the
interaction between the indicator for a hospital closure, hc, and the indicator
function I{t = hc + k}, where k indexes time relative to a hospital closure.
The effect window includes five years of leads and lags and the endpoints
are binned for years outside of this window, represented by βI{t < hc − 5}
and βI{t > hc + 5}. Specifying the event window in this way introduces
parameter restrictions that help to separate trends in the dynamic treatment
and secular time effects, even in the absence of never- and always-treated
units (Schmidheiny and Siegloch, 2019).
Included in equation 1.1 are a full set of county and state-by-year fixed
effects, indicated by αc and δst, respectively. The county fixed effects adjust
for time-invariant variations in county labor market outcomes while the state-
by-year effects capture time-varying changes at the state level, such as in
aggregate business cycles or public-policy initiatives, that may be correlated
with the outcomes. In addition to the fixed effects, the model includes a
small number of time-varying demographic covariates, represented by Xct.
These include county-specific population percentages in four age groups (1-
19, 20-39, 40-64, and 65+ years), two racial groups (white, non-white), the
percentage of population that is male, and the percentage of population that
is Hispanic. The covariates are intended to reduce standard errors and offer
additional controls for any time-varying differences between treatment and
control counties. Standard errors are clustered at the county level to account
for within-county correlations.
I then estimate a pooled difference-in-differences model that effectively
averages the year-specific effects estimated in equation 1.1. The model is
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specified as follows:
yct = αc + δst + βClosurect + γXct + εct. (1.2)
The indicator variable Closurect takes the value one if county c experiences a
hospital closure in year t (and all subsequent years) and zero otherwise. The
primary coefficient of interest, β, represents the causal effect of a hospital
closure on outcome y.
Lastly, I estimate a modified version of equation 1.2 to capture short and
long-run impacts of hospital closures. The model is defined as follows:
yct = αc + δst + β1ClosureShortct + β2ClosureLongct + γXct + εct, (1.3)
where the coefficients of interest are β1 and β2 on the variables ClosureShortcs
and ClosureLongcs. These variables correspond to effects that occur within
five years of a closure and after five years, respectively.
1.5 The Effects of Rural Hospital Closures on Local
Economies
This section presents the baseline reduced-form results. I first assess the va-
lidity of the difference-in-differences design using an event study analysis and
proceed by discussing average and heterogeneous treatment effects of rural
hospital closures on local labor markets, populations, and housing prices.
1.5.1 Local Labor Markets
I begin the analysis of local labor markets by assessing pre-trends and treatment-
effect dynamics using the event study model shown by equation 1.1. Fig-
ure 1.3 illustrates the results. The outcomes at event time t are measured
relative to the conditions that were in place the year before the hospital closes
(t = −1), conditional on including county fixed effects, state-by-year fixed
effects, and covariates in the model specification.
The results of the event study analysis are striking. In Figures 1.3(a)
and 1.3(b), the reported findings for log employment and log per capita in-
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come show point estimates that are near zero and flat in the years prior to
hospital closures. This pattern suggests that the empirical model is ade-
quately adjusting to changes in local economies that may be correlated with
hospital closures. The figures show no evidence that hospital closures oc-
curred disproportionately in rural counties suffering from worse economic
trends, lending credibility to the idea that my identification strategy is cap-
turing causal effects. Moving to the post-closure period, we see that in both
figures there is an obvious break in the flat pre-trend and a notable reduction
in the magnitudes of the estimates. There is an immediate decrease in em-
ployment and per capita income by approximately 2 percent. The effects do
not diminish with time. Rather, the effect sizes grow over time, suggesting
that, on average, rural local labor markets do not revert back to pre-closure
conditions. The long-run effect sizes following hospital closures (“+5 and
later”) are approximately twice as large as the estimated effects during the
year of the closure. This finding conflicts with previous work discussed in
Section 1.2.2 that document no evidence of long-run local labor market effects
following rural hospital closures.
Figure 1.3(c) shows that rural hospital closures cause an immediate in-
crease in the unemployment rate. The effect begins to fall back to the
pre-closure average within two years but the long-run unemployment rate
remains about 0.3 percentage percent higher in counties that experienced a
hospital closure. This pattern is dissimilar to that documented in the analy-
sis of Blanchard and Katz (1992) and Feyrer et al. (2007), who suggest that
unemployment rates recover from negative local labor demand shocks rela-
tively quickly as a result of population and labor force adjustments. Rather,
the sustained response found here implies that population and labor-force
adjustments are not large enough to fully alleviate the increases in unem-
ployment rates. One possible explanation for this is that hospital closures
lead to employment responses in other sectors of local economies that do not
occur immediately after closures.
Turning to log labor force participation, as shown in Figure 1.3(d), the
results mirror the findings for employment and per capita earnings. The
pattern exhibits flat pre-trends with immediate and sustained reductions fol-
lowing hospital closures. The effects for total establishments reported in
Figure 1.3(e) are near zero until three years after closures occur, when the
number of establishments begins to fall. Quantitatively, the long-run reduc-
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tion corresponds to there being more than 2 percent fewer establishments
in counties with hospital closures, a pattern that is consistent with long-run
responses for employment, income, labor force participation, and the unem-
ployment rate.
In Table 1.2 I report the pooled difference-in-differences estimates derived
from equation 1.2. As seen in column (1), I find that hospital closures re-
duce total employment by 4.4 percent relative to what occurs in control
counties. Adding time-varying controls to the model changes the estimate
only slightly, to 4.3 percent. When compared with the average employment
level, the estimates imply a reduction in employment of between 467 and 478
workers. The results for per capita earnings are shown in columns (3) and
(4). Hospital closures cause a reduction in per capita earnings of between
2.6 and 2.9 percent, with and without controls. These estimates correspond
to a reduction in annual earnings of between 322 and 359 dollars. Like those
for employment, the earnings estimates are statistically significant at the 1
percent level.
It is informative to consider how the estimated employment and earnings
reductions compare with total employment and payrolls in hospitals that
close. On average, the closed hospitals in the sample account for 2.72 and
2.47 percent of total county employment and earnings, respectively. Fig-
ure 1.4 shows that these percentages are smaller than the corresponding
employment and earnings estimates. The difference is most pronounced for
employment, where the estimated effect is 1.58 percentage points greater than
the percentage of workers employed by the closed hospitals. This comparison
suggests that the aggregate employment effects are not fully accounted for
by hospital employment, evidence that the impacts of hospital closures spill
over to other industries. I explore spillover effects directly in Section 1.7.
In columns (5) and (6), I find that hospital closures are associated with a
marginally significant 0.2-percentage-point increase in the county unemploy-
ment rate. This effect translates to an approximately 3.1 percent increase,
or 30 more unemployed individuals.12 The estimated reduction in labor force
participation shown in columns (7) and (8) is between 2.9 and 2.8 percent,
equating to approximately 438 individuals. The estimated unemployment
12I also used data from the Regional Economic Information System to estimate un-
employment insurance spending. The results are positive but not statistically significant
(coefficient= 0.012, s.e.= 0.014).
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rate and labor force participation responses largely explain the total employ-
ment effect. While rural hospital closures directly cause some individuals
to transition from employment to unemployment, over 90 percent of the es-
timated employment reductions come through labor force participation ad-
justments in closure counties. In the final two columns I find negative but
insignificant reductions in total establishments. The 95 percent confidence
interval does not rule out a more than 2 percent reduction, but the large
standard errors limit statistical precision.
Table 1.3 shows results from equation 1.3, where estimates are disaggre-
gated by short-run and long-run impacts. These results essentially summarize
the patterns depicted in the events study figures. In all outcomes, the esti-
mates become more pronounced over time, indicating that rural labor market
conditions do not recover after local hospitals close. This finding is partic-
ularly notable for the unemployment rate and total establishments, where
statistically significant effects appear several years after hospitals close. The
event study figures show that the post-treatment estimates evolve relatively
smoothly. Nevertheless, relative to what occurs in the short run, interpreting
the long-run estimates is more speculative because other unobserved factors
might affect the outcomes as time passes after hospital closures.
In sum, the results from my analysis have so far provided evidence that
rural hospital closures adversely impact local labor markets. The effects
appear immediately for most outcomes and grow over time. Importantly,
the event study figures provide no evidence of differing trends prior to the
years in which hospitals close. The estimated employment impact is larger
than the closed hospitals’ contributions to the county totals, suggesting that
rural hospital closures generate negative spillovers into other parts of local
economies.
1.5.2 Population and Housing Prices
Figure 1.5 plots results for total population, per capita migration, and me-
dian rental and home prices. Population effects are shown in Figure 1.5(a).
The pre-closure estimates are flat and near zero, evidence that hospital clo-
sures do not coincide with changes in local population counts. During the
post-closure period, there is an immediate 0.5 percent reduction in popula-
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tion that gradually grows over time, similar to the estimated employment,
labor force participation, and total establishment responses. The long-run
effects corresponds to almost a 2 percent population reduction in rural clo-
sure counties. The results for per capita in and out migration flows shown
in Figures 1.5(b) and 1.5(c) are not particularly informative with regards
to the population response. The estimates in both figures are insignificant
and suggest a zero net-migration response. The results reported in Table 1.4
quantify the event study findings. The point estimates reported in column
(1) imply that hospital closures reduce total county populations by 1.2 per-
cent relative to what occurs in control counties. The estimate is significant
at the 95 percent level and corresponds to a reduction of approximately 393
people. The results for migration flows reported in columns (2) and (3) are
negative but not statistically significant.
To further investigate the negative population effect of hospital closures, I
estimate population responses across several age groups. The results appear
in Table 1.5 and indicate that population reductions are distributed across all
ages. The estimated 1.5 percent decrease of adults 65 years of age and older is
particularly interesting. On the one hand, large reductions in the population
among older residents is unexpected given the numerous studies that show
older individuals face higher moving costs relative to younger people (Chen
and Rosenthal (2008), Sánchez and Andrews (2011), Bartik (2018)). On the
other hand, older residents arguably place the highest value on residing in
a community with an operating hospital nearby. Indeed, hospital inpatient
rates for adults 65 years of age and older are twice as large as rates of younger
adults (Healthcare Cost Utilization Project, 2018). One possible explanation
that is consistent with both elements is that hospital closures cause a decrease
in in-migration among older residents.13
SEER assigns population counts based on place of residence while the
QCEW assigns employment and earnings data to a county based on place
of work. This is important to consider when comparing the population re-
sponses to the estimated employment effect. The finest-grained geographi-
cal unit available for population counts is the county, so I cannot directly
estimate within-county population responses. The results suggest that a
13I also examined total payments of retirement and disability benefits data from the
Regional Economic Information System. I find a negative but statistically insignificant
decrease of 0.7 percent.
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substantial fraction of the change in employment caused by a rural hospi-
tal closure is composed of workers who do not change their residences. The
population decrease in levels among adults 20 to 64 years of age, a good
proxy for the number of employed adults, accounts for approximately half
of the employment effect (228
478
= 0.48).14 This finding is reinforced by the
results for in and out migration, which imply a zero net-migration response.
I conjecture that a substantial fraction of the workers who do change resi-
dence outside of closure counties are composed of workers in the hospitals
that close. Employment at other hospitals or healthcare facilities may be
located far away and require workers to change residence and move outside
of the counties in which they resided when their hospitals closed.
Event study plots for median rents and home values are shown in Fig-
ures 1.5(d) and 1.5(e), respectively. The patterns are flat during the pre-
closure period, with estimates that are not statistically different from zero.
Median rental prices in a given county fall during the first four years after
a closure but converge back to pre-closure levels. The estimated reductions
in home values are largest several years after a hospital closure occurs. The
long-run effect corresponds to a nearly 4 percent reduction, but the smaller
sample size as a result of using the ZHVI reduces statistical precision. Point
estimates appear in columns (4) and (5) in Table 1.5. Rural hospital clo-
sures lead to a 1.3 percent decrease in median rental prices. This effect is
not overly large, only a $8.45 decrease relative to the mean. The estimate for
home prices shows a marginally significant reduction of 2 percent, or about
$2,900 dollars.15
1.5.3 Heterogeneity
I next investigate heterogeneous treatment effects in four ways. This analysis
serves to identify patterns and provide evidence of the underlying mechanisms
that drive the adverse effects discussed above. In the first heterogeneity ex-
ercise, I separate closure counties by whether they lose their sole hospitals.
14According to BLS statistics, 90 percent of the employed population fall within this
age group. Therefore this calculation is best interpreted as a lower bound of the fraction
of the employed population that moves to another county.
15I also estimated a “long-difference” specification using (log) median home values re-
ported in the 2000 and 2010 Census, and from the 5-year ACS for the years 2013-2017.
The results are similar to the baseline estimate: coefficient=-0.018, standard error=0.011
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Previous research has suggested that local economic and population effects
may be most responsive when a community loses it only hospital (Holmes et
al., 2006), although other studies have failed to reach the same conclusions
(Stensland et al., 2002). These effects may be more pronounced in counties
that lose their only hospitals for either of two reasons, as follows: First, hos-
pitals themselves act as major purchasers of local goods and services (e.g.
laundry, food, construction materials and projects, etc.). Losing the only
hospital in a community will presumably cause larger adverse effects on local
firm production and employment. This point is especially relevant for em-
ployees of a closed hospital, who are less likely to find similar employment in
the same county if there are no other facilities in operation. The correspond-
ing loss in hospital employment may be particularly devastating to the local
economy, considering that many hospital workers are highly skilled and well
paid.
Second, the closure of a county’s sole hospital may cause larger employment
and population losses because of the greater distance to healthcare services.
Research has highlighted the adverse effects of delayed treatment on health
outcomes (De Luca et al. (2004), Buchmueller et al. (2006), Terkelsen et al.
(2010), Emberson et al. (2014)) and it has been well documented that pa-
tients typically choose hospitals based on proximity and reduced travel time
(McGuirk and Porell (1984), Cohen and Lee (1985), Dranove et al. (1993),
Hadley and Cunningham (2004)). Of course, this concern is not limited to
individuals currently residing in counties that lose their only hospital. Po-
tential residents may be discouraged from locating in a county that lacks a
hospital, further impairing future economic growth.
The results for main local labor market, population, and housing outcomes
are shown in Table 1.6. I find that the effects are considerably larger in rural
counties that lose their sole hospital. Estimated employment and per capita
income reductions exceed 7 and 5 percent, respectively. Similarly, decreases
in labor force participation, total establishments, population, and median
rents are also much larger relative to counties with at least one other operat-
ing hospital. Interestingly, results show slightly larger reductions in median
home prices in counties that have at least one hospital still operating, al-
though this finding could very well reflect a much smaller sample size from
using the ZHVI. Note that counties with at least one operating hospital fol-
lowing a closure still experience adverse effects on local labor markets, namely
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for employment and labor force participation. Still, a substantial portion of
the total effect of losing a hospital on local economies seems attributable to
counties that lose their only hospital.
I next explore heterogeneity sorted by the importance of a hospital to local
economies. I expect to find larger effects in counties where closing hospitals
make up a greater component of the local labor market. To perform this
exercise, I first calculated the median share of employment that the closing
hospitals contribute to total county employment. This calculation yielded
a value of 2.19 percent. I then divided closure counties by whether the
percentage of total county employment in hospitals lies above or below the
median value. As Table 1.6 shows, I find that adverse effects are considerably
larger in counties where hospitals that close make up a larger share of the local
economy. The estimates for counties with above-median hospital employment
explain the entire aggregate county response.
I also estimate heterogeneous impacts by ownership. Hospitals are sep-
arated by whether they operate as for-profit or non-profit facilities. Fig-
ure A.2 shows the trend in closures by ownership across my sample period.
The trends appear to move in parallel with each other. Although for-profit
hospitals are likely more susceptible to local economic conditions and face
fewer administrative barriers to closure, differences in effects on the local
labor market following a closure are unclear, a priori. The results are pre-
sented in Table 1.8. The effects are estimated more precisely for non-profit
hospitals given the larger number of closures in the sample, but standard er-
rors rule out large differences in effect sizes between for-profit and non-profit
ownership.
Lastly, I interact the indicator variable for whether a county experiences a
hospital closure with county square-miles. As Figure 1.2 highlights, there is
considerable heterogeneity in the geographic size of counties in the sample,
particularly between counties in the western and eastern portions of the
U.S. From a prediction standpoint, it is ambiguous how geographic size may
translate into differences in local economic effects. On the one hand, residents
and firms residing in smaller counties where hospitals close may be closer
to another hospital (in a bordering counties, for instance), leading to less
severe employment and population effects for reasons similar to having at
least one hospital in operation after a closure. On the other hand, hospital
closures in spatially larger counties may translate into less severe adverse
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impacts by virtue of higher rates of within-county employment and migration
adjustments. The results are shown in Table 1.9. The term Closure x County
sq. Miles shows the estimated coefficients on the interaction between hospital
closures and county square miles (multiplied by 1000).16 The results suggest
that geographically larger closure counties experience less adverse economic
impacts, consistent with the notion of higher rates of within-county responses
than smaller counties.
1.6 Robustness and Alternative Specifications
In this section, I estimate a range of robustness checks and alternative spec-
ifications to compare the results with those of my baseline analysis. I divide
the discussion into sub-sections and present the results in the Appendix.
1.6.1 Decomposing the Difference-in-Differences Estimator
In the standard difference-in-differences model, the estimated treatment ef-
fect is equal to the difference between the change in outcomes in the treat-
ment and control groups before and after the treatment occurs. When the
treatment, such as the rural hospital closures analyzed in this study, vary
over time, however, the difference-in-differences estimator is, as Goodman-
Bacon (2018a) shows, equal to a weighted average of all possible two-group/
two-period (2x2) estimators in the data. Furthermore, if the treatment effect
changes over time, estimates derived from timing variations in the treatment
bias the single coefficient estimator away from the sign of the true treatment
effect.
To investigate the possibility of bias, I decompose the baseline difference-
in-differences model into five groups of 2x2 estimators.17 In Appendix Ta-
ble A.2, I summarize the results of the decomposition exercise for the main
outcomes. Each row corresponds to a 2x2 estimator with corresponding
16I first demean the variable for county square-miles before constructing the interaction
in order to correct for multicollinearity and define the parameter of interest to be the ATE
(Wooldridge, 2010). The base-variable for county square-miles falls out of the regression
by including county-fixed effects.
17The decomposition was derived using the Stata package bacondecomp (Goodman-
Bacon et al., 2019).
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weights reported in brackets below the estimates. The results reported in
the table provides two key insights: first, approximately 94 percent of the
baseline estimate is explained by comparisons between rural counties where
no hospitals close and rural treatment counties. This finding is consistent
with the large number of counties in the sample that do not experience a
closure. As a result, it is not surprising that the estimates I derive from the
baseline difference-in-differences model closely resemble the results from the
event study specification, which is comparably more robust to problems per-
taining to variations in the treatment status across time (Abraham and Sun,
2018). Second, only 2 percent of the baseline estimator for each outcome is
explained by timing variation among treatment groups, i.e. using counties
with closures that occur later in the sample serving as the control group for
an earlier treatment group and using counties treated earlier as the control
group for later-closure counties. Thus, any bias in the overall difference-in-
differences estimate caused by comparing late and early closures is small.
The remaining 4 percent of the baseline estimator is explained by the
“residual component” that compares counties with the same treatment status
but different predicted treatment based on the include covariates. Nearly all
of the weight on the residual component comes from variation that is captured
by state-by-year dummies included in the regression. The weights attributed
to time-varying controls are less than 1 percent for each outcome, consistent
with the fact that the point estimates derived using the baseline model move
only slightly when controls are included. For most outcomes, the share of
the baseline estimate that is explained by the residual component is small
and consistent with the fixed-effects absorbing variation that may overstate
the true treatment effect.
1.6.2 County-Industry Mix, Balanced Panel, and Population
Weights
In Appendix Table A.3, I show results derived from models that include a rich
set of county-industry controls. Specifically, I adjust the baseline model by in-
cluding the fraction of total employment and earnings for several industries,
including education and health, business, natural resources, construction,
manufacturing, trade, finance, and leisure. The estimates obtained including
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these controls closely resemble the results obtained from the baseline specifi-
cation, evidence that the baseline results are not biased by unaccounted-for
differences in the composition of local labor markets.18
I next estimate balanced-panel fixed-effects models. A concern with the
baseline specification is that it includes counties that experienced a hospital
closure in early or late years in the sample period. This un-balanced panel
structure around closure years may give rise to composition bias in the esti-
mates. To assess this concern, I exclude closure counties that do not include
estimates for at least five years before and after the year of the closure. The
results are presented in Appendix Table A.4. I find similar effects to those
indicated by the baseline estimates, suggesting that composition bias is not
a key factor driving the main results.
In addition to including controls for county-industry mix and estimating
balanced-panel models, I also estimate specifications that include county-
population weights. The weighted least-squares (WLS) specification serves
two main purposes. It serves first as a diagnostic check for model misspecifi-
cation by simply comparing the WLS estimates with those obtained with the
baseline ordinary least-squares (OLS) model. As Solon et al. (2015) note, es-
timates that contradict each other using OLS and WLS often signal teh pres-
ence of an underlying problem in the functional form of the model. Second,
including population weights is an informative way of gauging whether hos-
pital closures have heterogeneous effects based on local population size. For
example, if hospital closures have larger effects in more populated counties,
then WLS estimation that places greater weight on more populous counties
will tend to estimate larger effects than the OLS model. Appendix Table A.5
shows the WLS results. The main takeaway is that the point estimates and
standard errors are very similar to those of the baseline specification. This
suggests that the OLS model is a good approximation of the true form of
the conditional means of the outcome variables and that there is relatively
little underlying heterogeneity in the treatment effects that are attributable
to population size in counties where hospitals close.
18Note that the smaller sample sizes relative to those used with the baseline model
results from QCEW data suppression for specific industries.
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1.6.3 County-Specific Linear Trends
As discussed in Section 1.4.2, a key identifying condition that must be satis-
fied for estimating unbiased, causal effects of rural hospital closures on local
labor markets is that underlying variations in outcome trends are not corre-
lated with the treatment. Neither studies exploring why hospitals close nor
the event study analysis provide evidence that correlations between outcome
trends and hospital closures introduce significant bias to the results. Nev-
ertheless, a common approach used to test for pre-treatment variations in
outcome trends is to adjust for unit-specific linear trends in the regression
models. Including unit-specific trends makes it possible to control for unob-
served heterogeneity in the outcome that evolves linearly over time and that
might be correlated with the treatment status.
There is, however, a potentially high cost associated with including unit-
specific trends. In the context of this study, if a hospital closure affects the
growth rate rather than the level of the outcome variable, then specifications
that include county-specific trends will mechanically attenuate estimates of
the closure effect, leading to higher probabilities of type II error. This is a
particularly relevant problem when the treatment effects appear gradually
after treatment, for which I find evidence for total establishments, popula-
tion, and housing values. Indeed, there is now a substantial body of literature
that recommends against including unit-specific trends, especially when us-
ing event study and difference-in-differences estimation strategies.19
As an alternative to including county-specific trends, I follow the sug-
gestion of Meer and West (2016) and control for pre-reform trends in each
county rather than for an average trend.20 Specifically, I construct county-
level trends by extrapolating estimated linear pre-reform trends to the post
reform years and including the predicted time trends as controls. The results
are shown in Table A.6 and are consistent with the baseline estimates. This
is not surprising considering the flat pre-trends derived from the event study
analysis.
19See Wolfers (2006), Baum-Snow and Lutz (2011), Lee and Solon (2011), Fadlon and
Nielsen (2015), Meer and West (2016), Borusyak and Jaravel (2017).




To improve balance between closure and non-closure counties and provide
robustness checks of the results based on the full analysis sample, I also es-
timate difference-in-differences models in combination with propensity-score
reweighting. The first step is to estimate the propensity score for hospital
closures. I follow Imbens and Rubin (2015) and use an iterative procedure
to select covariates and second-order terms from a rich set of pre-treatment
county characteristics measured in 2000 to include in the propensity score.21
The selection procedure starts with a logit propensity-score model with just
an intercept and adds each of the remaining covariates, one at a time, to
the model.22 I then estimate the model and calculate the likelihood ratio
statistics, assessing the null hypothesis that the newly included covariate has
a zero coefficient. After repeating this exercise for all potential covariates, I
add the covariate with the highest likelihood ratio statistic to the specifica-
tion and start the process again with the remaining covariates and continue
until all the likelihood ratio statistics are less than 1. For quadratic terms
involving the first-order covariates, the iterative procedure is repeated and
includes an additional second-order term until all of the remaining likelihood
ratio statistics are less than 2.71.23
21The first- and second-order covariates chosen for potential inclusion in the propensity-
score model include the average unemployment rate, total employment, average household
income, total wage and salary income, total establishments, labor force participation,
percentage of residences below the poverty level, total population and in four age groups
(1-19, 20-39, 40-64, 65 and over), total male population and in four age groups (1-19,
20-39, 40-64, 65 and over), total female population and in four age groups (1-19, 20-39,
40-64, 65 and over), total white population and in four age groups (1-19, 20-39, 40-64,
65 and over), total black population and in four age groups (1-19, 20-39, 40-64, 65 and
over), total population of other races and in four age groups (1-19, 20-39, 40-64, 65 and
over), total Hispanic population and in four age groups (1-19, 20-39, 40-64, 65 and over),
total county square miles, population density, percentage urban population, percentage of
rural population, total occupied housing units, total vacant housing units, average rent,
and average housing value.
22The selection procedure also allows for automatic inclusion of covariates in the propen-
sity score model that are viewed as essential for explaining the treatment and related to
outcome measures. I did not choose to automatically include any covariates.
23The selected covariates include the percentage of residences below the poverty level,
the percentage of rural population, total vacant housing units, total female population
1-to-19 years of age, total non-white and non-black population 1-to-19, 20-to-39, and
40-to-64 years of age, the quadratic of the percentage of residences below the poverty
level, total non-white and non-black population 1-to-19 years of age interacted with the
percentage of residences below the poverty level, and the quadratic of total non-white and
non-black population 20-to-39 years of age.
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Once the procedure has selected the covariates, the propensity score is
estimated using the following logistic regression model:
Logit(Pr(HospitalClosurec)) =β0 + β1X2000c, (1.4)
where the dependent variable is an indicator of whether county c experi-
ences a hospital closure during my sample period. Appendix Figure A.3
illustrates the distribution of the estimated propensity scores using kernel
density and histogram plots. I trim observations with propensity scores out-
side the overlap region (.007, .346), as they have no comparable counterparts
in the closure sample. After trimming the sample, I re-estimate equations 1.1
and 1.2 and weight the estimates by T + (1− T )× p
(1−p) , where T is an indi-
cator for the treatment and p is the estimated propensity score. Weighting
in this way provides a consistent estimator of the average treatment effect
on the 97 treated counties in my sample (ATT). The results obtained using
the trimmed, reweighted sample are shown in Appendix Table A.7 and are
very similar to my baseline results.
1.6.5 County Border-Pair Design
To further control for county-level economic conditions, I estimate the effects
of rural hospital closures using a county border-pair specification following
Dube et al. (2010) and Borgschulte and Cho (2019). To implement the
county border-pair specification, I drop all non-border rural counties and add
border-pair-by-year fixed effects. I weight the specification by the inverse of
appearances in the sample to account for the fact that closure counties can
pair with multiple other control counties. Following Cameron et al. (2011),
standard errors are two-way clustered at the county and pair level. The
results are shown in Appendix Table A.8 and closely resemble the baseline
results, further evidence that the estimated impacts of hospital closures are
not confounded with changes in local economic conditions. The one exception
is the estimate for median home values, which is considerably smaller than
the baseline effect. This difference is likely explained, at least in part, by the
small sample size, particularly given the robustness for median rents.
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1.6.6 Effects of Urban Hospital Closures
It is informative to compare how the effects of hospital closures on local
labor markets differ between urban and rural areas. In the final alternative
specification, I estimate the effects of hospital closures in urban counties. I
am unaware of any studies that have focused on the local labor market effects
of urban hospital closures.24 There is reason to believe that urban hospital
closures should have a much smaller effect on a local labor market than rural
hospital closures. In particular, urban areas have a greater capacity to absorb
employees and patients as a result of having a larger number of proximate
surrounding hospitals.
I use two specifications to estimate the effects of urban hospital closures.
The first is a baseline fixed-effects model that mirrors the rural hospital anal-
ysis described in Section 1.4. Urban counties are defined as all counties in the
sample that are not classified as rural. Appendix Table A.9 shows the results.
I find little evidence that urban hospital closures have a significant impact on
a local economy. The majority of the estimates are near zero and statistically
insignificant. I do find contradicting estimates for unemployment and hous-
ing prices, although these effects could very well be attributable to chance.
To account for differences between closure and non-closure counties, I also
estimate models using propensity-score reweighting in the manner described
in section 1.6.4. The estimates, shown in Appendix Table A.10, are similarly
small and not statistically different from zero. Unlike rural hospital closures,
it appears that urban hospital closures have no statistical or economically
meaningful relationship with local labor markets.
1.7 Spillover Effects on Non-Hospital Industries
The analysis has thus far focused on the impacts of hospital closures on an
aggregate local economy. It is important to understand whether the adverse
effects reported in the previous sections are limited to the closing hospitals or
if closures create spillovers that are internalized by other economic sectors.
The results reported so far provide suggestive evidence that rural hospital
24There are, however, several papers that study the relationship between urban hospital
closures and other outcomes, such as hospital efficiency (Lindrooth et al., 2003), welfare
(Capps et al., 2010), and mortality (Buchmueller et al., 2006).
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closures lead to substantial employment reductions over and above what can
be explained by hospital employment. In this section, I return to the analysis
of spillovers and estimate direct effects of hospital closures on non-hospital
economic sectors.
I first estimate employment, earnings, and establishment spillovers of hos-
pital closures using hospital-level data from the AHA annual survey. The
AHA data are particularly useful for this analysis because they allow hospital
employment, payroll, and establishments to be subtracted from the QCEW
data. Formally, I define the outcomes for county c in year t as follows:
log(Net Employct) = log(Employct −Hospital Employct), (1.5)




log(Net Establishmentsct = log(Establishmentsct −Hospitalsct). (1.7)
Defining net employment and establishments is straightforward, as shown
by equations 1.5 and 1.7. To represent net income in equation 1.6, I use
employee payroll data available in the AHA annual survey for the hospitals
in the sample. I first subtract payroll from total earnings and then divide
by the difference between total population and hospital employment.25 The
regression specifications are the same as presented in Section 1.4.
In Table 1.10 I report the results. I find that hospital closures lead to a
1.8 percent reduction in non-hospital employment, a decrease in workers that
explains approximately 40 percent of the total employment loss. Income and
establishment reductions are consistent with the non-hospital employment
effect but are not statistically significantly different from zero. Importantly,
I find no evidence of confounding pre-trends for any of the outcomes prior to
closure, as illustrated by Appendix Figure 1.6. Furthermore, the event study
figures provide compelling evidence that the spillovers are indeed caused by
25Because total population is defined by place of residence and hospital employment
corresponds to hospital locations, defining per capita income in this way may remove
some hospital employees who do not reside in the counties where the hospitals are located.
However, the results do not change if I divide only by total population.
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hospital closures and that the closures themselves are not driven by trends
in other local economic sectors.
To better understand the estimated employment spillovers, I next de-
construct the non-hospital sector into private service-providing and goods-
producing (manufacturing, construction, and natural resources) industries.26
Hospitals are considered service-providing establishments, so estimating ef-
fects for goods-producing industries is straightforward using the QCEW. For
service-providing industries, I follow the same approach outlined above to
net-out hospitals. The results are shown in Table 1.11. I find that the
spillover effects are entirely concentrated in the service sector. The results
reported in Panel A closely resemble the effects found in the baseline spillover
analysis, with point estimates that are slightly larger across each outcome,
most notably the 2.6 percent reduction in employment. This is not surpris-
ing given that the vast majority of rural economies are composed of service
establishments. I find no significant effects in the goods-producing sector, as
shown in Panel B.
I further explore spillovers by performing the same heterogeneity exercises
presented in Section 1.5.3. The results appear in the Appendix. I first exam-
ine the non-hospital sector in its entirety. The heterogeneity estimates follow
the same pattern as seen in aggregate local economies. I find statistically
significant reductions in non-hospital employment in counties that lose their
sole hospital (Appendix Table A.11), in counties where hospitals compose a
higher share of employment (Appendix Table A.12), and in counties that lose
a non-profit hospital (Appendix Table A.13). Finally, I disaggregate the non-
hospital sector into service-providing and goods-producing industries. The
results are shown in Appendix Tables A.14, A.15, and A.16. Consistent with
the above mentioned findings, the heterogeneous effects are concentrated in
service-providing industries.
One shortcoming of this analysis is that I do not observe the extent to
which non-hospital industries are related to the closing hospitals’ labor de-
mand. In the AHA survey, each hospital is asked to report only the number
26An alternative approach is to follow Black et al. (2005) and divide the economy be-
tween “tradable” industries, whose products are nationally or internationally traded, and
“non-tradable” industries, whose products are traded mainly locally. This approach is
again complicated by data suppression in the QCEW public-use file for many specific in-
dustry types. Aggregating goods-producing and service-providing industries avoids this
issue.
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of personnel on the facility’s payroll. This excludes private-duty nurses, vol-
unteers, personnel whose salaries are financed entirely by outside research
grants, and employees who are paid on a fee basis. These workers are largely
absent from the QCEW and, therefore, from the spillover results as well.27 It
is possible,however, that part of the employment decrease in non-hospital in-
dustries is explained by reductions in demand from the hospitals that close, as
opposed to effects that diffuse throughout the economy. Analyzing spillovers
by industry type is an obvious avenue for investigating this question more
carefully. This approach is complicated, however, by data suppression in the
QCEW for many individual industries. Still, the results discussed above do
provide some insights. In particular, goods-producing industries like agri-
culture and manufacturing are presumably unrelated to hospitals. The lack
of response in these industries provides suggestive evidence that diffusion
spillovers are either limited to service-providing firms or small in magnitude.
1.8 Evaluating Welfare Impacts of Rural Hospital
Closures Using A Spatial Equilibrium Model
This section presents a dynamic spatial equilibrium model that follows the
framework of Kline and Moretti (2014) and other recent work (Suárez Ser-
rato and Zidar (2016), Zou (2018), Bartik et al. (2019)). There are two
main goals for incorporating the model. The first is to provide a theoretical
structure for understanding the effects of rural hospital closures on earnings,
prices, amenity values, and population size. The second is to characterize
local welfare impacts of rural hospital closures and understand how they are
distributed across agents and locations. Hospital closures are assumed to be
exogenous, shift demand for labor and housing, and impact household util-
ity through changes in earnings, consumption, and amenities. The amenity
component is important when considering that hospital closures may cause
changes in utility that do not occur through changes in income or consump-
tion.
The main ingredients of the model are as follows: First, the model in-
cludes many locations, indexed by c, each a small economy that is populated
by households, landowners, and establishments. While many workers in rural
27The QCEW excludes self-employed individuals, proprietors, and railroad employees.
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areas own their residences, differentiating between households and landown-
ers allows welfare changes to occur through separate channels, namely (1)
changes in labor income and amenities and (2) changes in landowner prof-
its.28 In every time period t, households derive utility from consuming goods
and housing, and exhibit heterogeneous preferences over locations. Hetero-
geneity in preferences is a feature in virtue of which the model differs from
the canonical Rosen-Roback framework (Rosen (1979), Roback (1982)). The
Rosen-Roback model, with homogeneous preferences, perfectly mobile work-
ers, and an inelastic housing supply, predicts that the entire incidence of
local labor demand shocks will be capitalized into land rents. By taking a
less restrictive stance and including household mobility frictions, the model I
use in this paper allows some of the welfare incidence of local labor demand
shocks to fall on inframarginal households.
Second, I divide households into two types: young workers who inelasti-
cally supply a single unit of labor in each time period, and older residents
who are out of the labor force. This setup resembles spatial models that as-
sume a heterogeneous labor supply of high- and low-skilled workers (Moretti
(2011), Diamond (2016)). Both types of households have access to the same
housing market and local amenities. The key difference is that workers and
older residents have different location preferences and moving costs. Specifi-
cally, I assume that older residents have more severe mobility frictions than
younger workers do. This assumption is consistent with research findings that
document the fact that retirees in rural areas face higher moving costs and
place a higher value on local social networks than younger workers do (Chen
and Rosenthal (2008), Glasgow and Brown (2012)). Importantly, differences
between location preferences and moving costs give rise to heterogeneity in
terms of willingness-to-pay (WTP) for local amenities and the incidence of
welfare changes associated with local hospital closures.
I begin by describing the separate agents in the model and characterize
the equilibrium conditions of the economy. I then discuss the welfare im-
plications of hospital closures for each agent in the economy and conclude
by estimating welfare impacts using the reduced-form estimates presented
28According to the U.S. Census, the homeownership rate in ru-
ral areas is approximately 80 percent, compared with only 60 percent
in urban areas. See https://www.census.gov/newsroom/blogs/random-
samplings/2016/12/homes on the range.html.
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earlier and parameter values taken from the literature.
1.8.1 Household Problem
The local economy is populated by two types of households: young workers,
indexed by i, and older residents, indexed by o, who are out of the labor
force. The total number of households is denoted by Nct. In each time
period, workers inelastically supply one unit of labor.29 Both workers and
older residents have heterogeneous preferences for locations and are free to
reside and work in any location. For both types, the problem is to maximize
utility in each time period t, defined in Cobb-Douglas form, subject to their
budget constraint. Formally:
max uict = αlnhict + βlnXict + ηlnAict + εict
s.t. wct = rcthict + pctXict,
max uoct = αlnhoct + βlnXoct + ζlnAoct + εoct
s.t. wc = rcthoct + pctXoct.
The variables hict and hoct represent the amount of housing consumed by each
type at cost rct, while Xict and Xoct denote the amount of goods consumed at
cost pct. The variables α and β denote the shares of income spent on housing
and goods, respectively. Unlike workers, incomes are assumed to be constant
for older residents across each time period.30
The Aict and Aoct terms represent local amenities, including hospitals, that
are available to workers and older residents, respectively. The amenity com-
ponent is important when considering that hospital closures likely induce
changes in utility that do not appear in income measures or changes in con-
sumption. For example, suppose that a hospital closure increases the distance
to the nearest hospital by 30 minutes in travel time. This may not lead to
changes in worker output (and therefore earnings) if the time it takes travel-
ing to the next closest hospital is subtracted from leisure time. However, the
29For simplicity, the model does not allow for household transitions between workers
and older residents.
30In the model, older residents are out of the labor market, so I assume their fixed
income comes from government insurance programs like social security and Medicare.
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extra time needed for traveling may reduce happiness and adversely impact
quality of life. Longer travel times to a hospital may also translate into high
psychic costs if workers and older residents are concerned about the distance
to a hospital and its relationship to time-sensitive conditions, such as heart
attacks and strokes.31
Finally, εic and εoc represent idiosyncratic location preferences. To ease the
model’s tractability, preferences are assumed to be independently and iden-
tically distributed (i.i.d) according to a Type-I Extreme Value distribution
with scale parameter s and mean zero. Larger values of εic and εoc imply that
workers and older residents have stronger preferences for residing in a given
location owing, for example, to the desire to live close to family members or
highly valued local amenities.
Solving the maximization problem for both workers and older residents
yields expressions for their indirect utility:
vict = a+ lnwct + ηlnAct − αlnrct − βlnpct + εict, (1.8)
= uict + εict, (1.9)
voct = a+ lnwc + ζlnAct − αlnrct − βlnpct + εoct, (1.10)
= uoct + εoct, (1.11)
where a is a constant equal to α(lnα − lnλ) + β(lnβ − lnλ).32 Households
choose to live in location c at time t if it maximizes their indirect utility, which
depends on real income, local amenities, and individual location preferences.
The i.i.d Type-I Extreme Value assumption for εict and εoct implies that the









31There is credible evidence that rural hospital closures result in significant changes in
travel times for healthcare, particularly for time-sensitive conditions (Carroll, 2019).
























where the total population of each type depends on real income and ameni-
ties, a constant, and scale parameter s, which represents moving costs and
governs the strength of idiosyncratic preferences for location c.33 Intuitively,
if s is large, households are more inelastic to local labor shocks. In the ex-
treme case where s = 0, workers are perfectly mobile (Roback, 1982). A
key assumption of the model is that s is larger for older residents than for
workers, i.e. so > si. This assumption is consistent with research findings
that document retirees face higher moving costs and place a higher value on
local social networks than workers do (Chen and Rosenthal, 2008).
1.8.2 Housing Market
Housing Supply
Housing is supplied competitively at the marginal cost, is upward sloping,
and varies across locations. Land is assumed to be fixed, so the price of





where HS denotes the total housing supply and rc is the price of housing.
The kc term is a location-specific productivity factor that is assumed to
be exogenous and constant over time. Local housing supply elasticity is
denoted by θc > 0 and governs the strength of housing supply responses to
33Note that aict = ln(
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changes in productivity and prices. Housing supply elasticity is exogenously
determined according to location-specific factors, such as geography and local
land regulations. Outside of the fixed land supply, there are relatively few
barriers to supplying new housing in rural areas. Therefore, θc is non-zero
and small.
Landowners’ profits depend negatively on housing supply elasticity, and






Total spending on housing in each location is given by Nctαwtc, where Nct and




denote the exogenous shift in housing demand caused






It is straightforward to see that housing demand increases with population
and the expenditure share of income spent on housing, while it decreases
when local housing costs are higher. When ψHc > 1, housing demand de-
creases in response to a hospital closure. Likewise, ψHc = 1 in locations that
do not experience a hospital closure.
Housing Market Equilibrium
The local housing market equilibrium is determined by setting the housing
supply in equation 1.14 equal to housing demand in equation 1.16. After
















where aH = lnα − lnkc. Intuitively, housing prices increase when the local
population is larger, income is higher, the share of income spent on housing
is higher, and when the productivity of the housing supply is lower. Local
housing prices decrease when a local hospital closes. The strength of these
relationships depends on the housing supply elasticity. Large values of θc
imply that the housing supply is more elastic, corresponding to more mod-
est changes in local housing values in response to changes in, for example,
population or income. For small values of θc, local housing prices will move
proportionally to changes in population and income.
1.8.3 Establishments Problem
Each establishment j faces a perfectly competitive market and operates with
fixed productivity Bjc that varies across locations. This assumption implies
that establishments earn zero economic profits.34 Each establishment’s pro-




where Njct and Kjct denote labor and capital with the labor share equal to
y. The price of each good is determined by the local equilibrium. Estab-
lishments maximize profits by choosing the amount of labor and capital that
solves the following problem:
max πjct = pctXjct − wctNjct − δKjct,
= pctBjc(Njct)
y(Kjct)
1−y − wctNjct − δKjct,
where wct and δ are the cost of labor and capital, respectively. Solving the
maximization problem yields an equation for labor demand,
lnXjct = lnNjct + (1− y)lnwct + aj, (1.18)
34It is straightforward to allow establishments the ability to make positive economic
profits. However, the perfect competition assumption is guided by the economic envi-
ronment in rural communities. According to the QCEW, most firms in rural areas are
small service providers, homogeneous, and face few entry barriers, features that fit the
environment of perfect competition.
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denote the exogenous shift in demand for goods caused by a hospital
closure, where ψjc ≥ 1. Local demand for goods mirrors the demand for







Demand increases when the population is larger and when the expenditure
share of income spent on goods is larger. Demand decreases when the cost
of goods is higher and when a local hospital closes.
After substituting equation 1.19 into the equation for labor demand and
rearranging the components, the equilibrium condition of the goods market
is expressed as:
lnNjct − lnNct = ylnwct − lnψjc − lnpct + bj, (1.20)
where bj = lnβ − aj. The zero-profit condition is derived by plugging the
optimal choice of labor into the profit-maximization equation, setting profits
equal to zero, and taking the logs of both sides, i.e.
ylnwct = lnpct + cj, (1.21)
where cj = lnBjc + (1− y)ln(1− y) + ylny − (1− y)lnδ.
1.8.4 Equilibrium Conditions
After substitution and differentiating, the local equilibrium can be charac-
terized using equations 1.12, 1.13, 1.17, 1.20, and 1.21:
(1) Local Labor Supply
si∆lnN
i
ct = ∆lnwct + η∆Act − α∆lnrct − β∆lnpct (1.22)
35Derivation details are presented in Appendix B.
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(2) Older Resident Population
so∆lnN
o
ct = ζ∆Act − α∆lnrct − β∆lnpct (1.23)











(4) Local Labor Demand
∆lnNjct −∆lnNct = y∆lnwct −∆ψjc −∆lnpct (1.25)
(5) Zero-Profit Condition
y∆lnwct = ∆lnpct (1.26)
1.8.5 Welfare Conditions
(1) Households: The total welfare effect of a local hospital closure on house-
holds is the sum of the changes in the utility of workers and older residents
that the closure causes. Figure 1.7 illustrates this result. The x- and y-
axes represent the marginal preferences and utility of households who live
in location c, respectively. The upward-sloping solid red line shows that the
utility of living in location c increases with εct. Similarly, the solid blue
line slopes downward because the taste for location c′ decreases from left
to right. The equilibrium utility is equal to u∗ct with the preferences of the
marginal household denoted by ε∗ct. When a hospital closes in location c,
household utility shifts down to the red dashed line by an amount equal to
the change in real income and amenities. The new equilibrium utility level
is denoted by u∗∗ct . The population in location c drops, as households with
preferences between ε∗ct and ε
∗∗
ct move away. The change in household welfare
is shown by the shaded purple area. This area is approximately equal to the
change in population in location c multiplied by the change in utility, i.e.
(1 − 1
2
∆lnNct) × ∆uct. After sorting into the two types of households, the
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total welfare change is given by
∆V H = (1− 1
2
∆lnN ict)×∆uict︸ ︷︷ ︸
Welfare change for workers
+ (1− 1
2
∆lnN oct)×∆uoct︸ ︷︷ ︸
Welfare change for older residents
(1.27)
Recall that uict = a+ lnwct + ηlnAct − αlnrct − βlnpct and uoct = a+ lnwc +
ζlnAct − αlnrct − βlnpct. Differentiating and substituting these expressions
into equation 1.27 for ∆uict and ∆u
o
ct yields
∆V H =(1− 1
2
∆lnN ict)× [∆lnwct + η∆lnAct − α∆lnrct − β∆lnpct]
+ (1− 1
2
∆lnN oct)× [ζ∆lnAct − α∆lnrct − β∆lnpct].
Substituting once more for ∆lnpct using the zero-profit condition in equa-
tion 1.26 implies
∆V H =(1− 1
2
∆lnN ict)× [∆lnwct(1− βy) + η∆lnAct − α∆lnrct]
+ (1− 1
2
∆lnN oct)× [ζ∆lnAct − α∆lnrct − βy∆lnwct].
(2) Landowners: The change in welfare for landowners is equal to the
change in profits, denoted by
∆V L = ∆lnrct + ∆lnHct. (1.28)
(3) Establishments: The zero-profit assumption implies that establish-
ments bear no welfare effects.
1.8.6 Amenity and Welfare Estimates of Rural Hospital
Closures
Decomposing equation 1.27 shows that, to estimate the total welfare change
for workers, I must first estimate the effects of rural hospital closures on
local amenities. Differentiating and rearranging equations 1.22 and 1.23, and
substituting for ∆lnpct using the zero-profit condition, provides equations for
the full set of amenity changes associated with a local hospital closure for
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workers and older residents:
ηln∆Act = si∆lnN
i
ct − (∆lnwct − α∆lnrct − βy∆lnwct) (1.29)
ζln∆Act = so∆lnN
o
ct + α∆lnrct + βy∆lnwct (1.30)
These expressions imply that the change in amenities, expressed as a percent-
age of income, is equal to the difference between the percentage change in the
population, adjusted for the magnitude of location preferences and moving
costs, and the percentage change in real income. The intuition behind this
result reflects the fact that, in spatial equilibrium, the marginal household
must be indifferent to relocating, which means that local prices will respond
to changes in local income. The strength of this response will depend on
both the elasticity of the local housing supply and individual preferences.
To estimate equations 1.29 and 1.30, I combine the empirical results for
population (∆lnN ict and ∆lnN
o
ct), income (∆lnwct), and rental prices (∆lnrct),
with parameter estimates drawn from previous research. I assume β=0.65,
the share of household wage and salary income spent on locally produced
goods, following Bartik et al. (2019) and set α=0.268, the share of income
spent on housing, using estimates from The Bureau of Labor Statistics.36 The
labor share of income, y, is set to 0.71 following Albouy et al. (2018). The key
parameter difference between workers and older residents resides in the id-
iosyncratic location preferences and moving costs, where so > si. To capture
this heterogeneity, I set si=0.3 and so=0.6 following Diamond (2016) and
Bartik et al. (2019).37. Putting everything together, the estimated changes
in amenities are as follows:38
ηln∆Act = 0.005 (0.001) ζln∆Act = −0.026 (0.011)
The estimates suggest that rural hospital closures impact local amenities
36See https://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2016/urban-and-rural-household-spending-in-
2015.htm.
37Specifically, si is equal to the population-share weighted average of the idiosyncratic
location preferences/moving costs for non-college educated and college-educated workers
estimated by Diamond (2016).
38ηln∆Act = (0.3 × −0.012) − [−0.026 − (0.268 × −0.020) − (0.65 × 0.71 × −0.026)] =
0.005 (0.001)
ζln∆Act = (0.6×−0.015) + (0.268×−0.020) + (0.65× 0.71×−0.026) = −0.026 (0.011)
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differently for workers and older residents. For workers, the reduction in
real income exceeds the decrease in population. This suggests that, at the
margin, workers are exchanging reductions in real incomes for higher amenity
levels. For older residents, higher values of location preferences and moving
costs imply that population adjustments are less responsive to changes in
real income. As a result, amenities fall for this household type following a
rural hospital closure. Using the mean per capita income, it is possible to
calculate a back-of-the-envelope estimate of the WTP for local amenities.
The estimates imply an annual WTP of $62 per worker and -$321 for older
residents. The standard errors, calculated using the Delta Method, show that
both effects are precisely estimated. For workers, the 95 percent confidence
interval ranges between $37 and $87. The standard error for older residents
rules out values greater than -$50 and less than -$594. In principle, these
estimates capture all of the changes in amenities following a rural hospital
closure, including changes in travel time to healthcare facilities and household
beliefs regarding expected health impacts.
With the amenity estimates in hand, I can now calculate the welfare
changes associated with rural hospital closures for households and landown-
ers using equations 1.27 and 1.28. The reduced form estimates and parameter
values discussed above again are used as inputs into the calculations. I do
not observe changes occupied housing units for landowners, so I proxy for
changes in this variable by assuming that the change in occupied units moves
in proportion with the change in population. The estimated welfare effects
for each household type and for landowners are as follows:
∆V Hi = −0.004 (0.002)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Welfare change for workers
∆V Ho = −0.009 (0.004)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Welfare change for older residents
∆V L = −0.013 (0.006)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Change in rental price
+ −0.012 (0.005)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Change in occupied units
= 0.025 (0.011)
I estimate the welfare change for workers, older residents, and landowners
following a rural hospital closure to be -0.4 percent, -0.9 percent, and -2.5
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percent, respectively. All three estimates are statistically significant at the
5 percent level, with standard errors shown in parentheses. For households,
two-thirds of the welfare change appears to be driven by reductions in wel-
fare for older residents. To properly calculate the total household welfare
reduction, however, it is important to weight the change in welfare and stan-
dard errors for each household type by the associated population share for
workers (0.79) and older residents (0.21) in the economy. This implies a total
household welfare effect of:
∆V H = −0.003 (0.001)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Weighted change for workers
+ −0.002 (0.001)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Weighted change for older residents
= −0.005 (0.002)
I estimate the total household welfare reduction to be -0.5 percent. In terms
of average income, the welfare response represents about -$62 per household,
or approximately -$1.5 million per county. For landowners, the estimate
represents a $37,000 reduction in aggregate profits when weighted by share
of income spent on housing. The results in Appendix Table A.17 provide a
different set of amenity and welfare estimates derived using alternative values
of the location preference parameter. The qualitative patterns do not change,
suggesting that values of these key parameters do not explain the results. It
must be kept in mind, however, that the exact magnitude of the amenity and
welfare effects depend on the unknown true values of the model parameters.
The welfare effects fall within the range of estimates reported in previous
research that has examined local labor demand shocks. For example, the
change in homeowner welfare after a hospital closure is larger and more pre-
cise than the estimates found by Zou (2018), who studied how local labor
markets respond to military base contractions. On the other hand, the wel-
fare effect for homeowners is significantly smaller than the estimated welfare
changes that are attributable to the initiation of hydraulic fracturing in the
U.S. (Bartik et al., 2019). It should be noted, however, that neither of these
papers focuses on shocks to rural areas. To the best of my knowledge, the
welfare impacts presented here are the first to be estimated using local labor
shocks exclusively to rural communities.
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1.9 Conclusions
This paper evaluates how negative local labor demand shocks and amenity
losses affect rural communities. Specifically, I estimate the causal impacts of
rural hospital closures on local labor markets. Hospitals are a unique com-
ponent of local economic stability. Beyond providing healthcare services,
hospitals produce both high- and low-skilled jobs and serve as an important
amenity for residents and potential migrants. The results show that rural
hospital closures adversely impact local employment, per capita income, la-
bor force participation, establishments, population, and housing and rental
prices. The impacts are not transitory and are explained by reference to rural
counties that lose their sole hospital and in counties where hospitals compose
a higher share of local labor markets. The analysis also shows that rural hos-
pital closures lead to spillovers in other sectors of the economy, including
a 1.8 percent decrease in non-hospital employment, an effect that explains
40 percent of the total employment loss. To ground the estimates in theory
and characterize the welfare impacts created by hospital closures, I develop
a spatial equilibrium model of various agents in a local economy. Analysis of
the model shows that rural hospital closures reduce welfare significantly for
households and landowners.
While this paper makes a number of important contributions to the lit-
erature, it is subject to limitations that may provide guidance for future
work. First, more work is needed to understand how spillover impacts in
non-hospital industries are explained by changes in demand from hospitals
that close as opposed to diffusion effects that spread throughout the econ-
omy. Analyzing spillovers by industry type using more detailed local-level
data is one possible way to investigate this question more carefully. Sec-
ond, the extent to which spillovers caused by rural hospital closures may be
dispersed across space remains unclear. For example, closures may create
spillovers into neighboring counties. These spillovers may be positive, if the
neighboring counties absorb employment losses from counties that experience
a closure, or negative, if a closing hospital was also a contributing industry
to the neighboring local economy. Understanding the diffusion of spillovers
and their relationship to the distribution of nearby hospitals would represent
an local labor markets is an interesting next step in this literature.
Third, this paper address whether rural hospital closures are a socially
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efficient consequence of the operating market or if interventions to keep hos-
pitals open, such as monetary bailouts, are warranted. Research that has
examined whether hospital closures improve social welfare offer mixed find-
ings. On the one hand, there is evidence that the cost savings associated
with hospital closures more than offsets the loss in patient welfare (Capps et
al., 2010). On the other hand, research has shown that rural hospital clo-
sures may reduce Medicare spending and increase mortality among enrollees
hospitalized for time-sensitive conditions (Carroll, 2019). As rural hospitals
continue to close across the U.S., it appears increasingly important to have a
better understanding of this question. Moreover, the closing hospitals stud-
ied in this paper are smaller than rural hospitals that remain in operation,
implying that the estimated impacts can be interpreted as a lower bound for
what rural communities can expect as more, larger hospitals close. Based on
the findings reported in this paper, to fully account for all welfare changes
associated with rural hospital closures any analysis should ideally incorporate
not just the cost-savings involved in closing a hospital and the corresponding
patient health outcomes, but also local economic impacts as well.
Finally, more research is needed to understand how similar local labor
market shocks impact rural communities. The estimates presented in this
paper are likely to be most relevant for the many rural communities that
will experience hospital closures in the near future. This setting is unique,
however, given the importance of hospitals to local residence and the fact that
health jobs tend to pay more in rural areas than most occupations, making
them particularly painful to lose for rural economies that are already suffering
from resource scarcity (Lee, 2010). It remains unclear how the effects of
hospital closures compare with other shocks that occur in rural areas, such
as manufacturing plant closures, school consolidations, and hospital mergers.
Understanding the relationship between local labor market shocks in rural
communities and potential ways to address negative externalities created by
these shocks remains an important area of work for researchers and public
policy leaders.
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Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics
Variables Mean (SD)
Hospital Closures and Characteristics
Total Hospital Closures 97
Non-Profit Closures 58
For-Profit Closures 39
Only Hospital in County 41
Total Hospital Employment 406.37 (503.19)
Total Hospital Payroll (millions, $2017) 1.66 (2.39)
County Economic and Housing Variables
Total Employment 10,857.46 (11,851.26)
Per Capita Income ($2017) 12,365.59 (7,125.41)
Unemployment Rate 6.48 (2.81)
Labor Force Participation 15,640.68 (17,223.60)
Total Establishments 816.64 (869.99)
Median Home Values ($2017) 139,048 ( 81,091.10)
Median Rent ($2017) 649.91 (135.98)
Private Service-Providing Employment 5,851.42 (7387.71)
Private Service-Providing Income ($2017) 5,486.22 (5,697.86)
Private Service-Providing Establishments 591.57 (680.21)
Private Goods-Producing Employment 2,521.53 (2,800.14)
Private Goods-Producing Income ($2017) 3,700.60 (2,885.80)
Private Goods-Producing Establishments 162.88 (172.54)
County Population Variables
Total Population 32,765.56 (34,719.15)
Ages 0-19 8,218.64 (8,946.81)
Ages 20-39 7,862.09 (8,531.24)
Ages 40-64 11,104.33 (12,035.95)
Ages 65 + 5,185.93 (5,631.02)
% Male 50.02 (2.08)
% White 88.33 (15.74)
% Hispanic 7.58 (12.51)
% Per Capita In-Migrants 4,606.17 (1,704.49)
% Per Capita Out-Migrants 4,566.07 (2,253.86)
Notes: The above table presents means and standard deviations of variables measured for 2003-2017.
Hospital data are collected from the AHA Annual Survey of Hospitals. Employment, income, and estab-
lishment data are gathered from the Quarterly Census of Earnings and Wages. Labor force participation
and unemployment rate data comes from the Local Area Unemployment Statistics program through
the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Median home values and rents are gathered from Zillow.com and the
Department of Housing and Urban Development Office of Policy Development and Research, respec-
tively. Population data comes from the Surveillance, Epidemiology, and End Results Program through
the National Cancer Institute. Finally, migration data are gathered from the Internal Revenue Service
Statistics of Income database.
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Table 1.2: County Income and Employment Effects of Rural Hospital Closures
Log Log Per Capita Unemployment Log Log Total
Employment Income Rate Labor Force Establishments
Baseline Controls Baseline Controls Baseline Controls Baseline Controls Baseline Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Hospital Closure -0.044*** -0.043*** -0.029*** -0.026*** 0.002* 0.002* -0.029*** -0.028*** -0.011 -0.010
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.001) (0.001) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008)
Mean Dependent Variable 10,857 12,366 0.065 15,641 817
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
State x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 1830 1829 1829 1829 1830 1829 1830 1829 1830 1829
Observations 27444 27429 27429 27429 27448 27433 27448 27433 27448 27433
Notes: This table shows estimated impacts of rural hospital closures using data from the AHA Annual Survey between the years
2003 and 2017. All specifications include county and state-by-year fixed effects. Controls include the county population percentages
of the 1 to 19, 20 to 39, 40 to 64, and over 65 years age ranges, the county population percentages of two racial groups (white,
non-white), the county population percentages of males, and the county population percentages of Hispanics. Standard errors are
clustered at the county level. *, **, and *** indicate significance levels of .10, .05, and .01., respectively.
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Table 1.3: Income and Employment Dynamics of Rural Hospital Closures
Log Log Per Capita Unemployment Log Log Total
Employment Income Rate Labor Force Establishments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Within 5 Years After Closure -0.040*** -0.025** 0.002 -0.025** -0.006
(0.010) (0.010) (0.001) (0.010) (0.008)
> 5 Years After Closure -0.053*** -0.033* 0.003** -0.040*** -0.024**
(0.016) (0.017) (0.001) (0.014) (0.012)
Mean Dependent Variable 10,857 12,366 0.065 15,641 817
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 1829 1829 1829 1829 1829
Observations 27429 27429 27433 27433 27433
Notes: This table shows estimated impacts of rural hospital closures within five years
and after five years using data from the AHA Annual Survey between the years 2003 and
2017. All specifications include county and state-by-year fixed effects. Controls include
the county population percentages of the 1 to 19, 20 to 39, 40 to 64, and over 65 years
age ranges, the county population percentages of two racial groups (white, non-white),
the county population percentages of males, and the county population percentages of
Hispanics. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. *, **, and *** indicate
significance levels of .10, .05, and .01., respectively.
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Table 1.4: Population and Housing Effects of Rural Hospital Closures
Log Log Per Capita Log Per Capita Log Median Log Median
Population In-Migrants Out-Migrants Rents Home Values
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Hospital Closure -0.012** -0.006 -0.014 -0.013** -0.020*
(0.005) (0.010) (0.012) (0.006) (0.011)
Mean Dependent Variable 32,765 4,606 4,566 650 145,509
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 1829 1829 1829 1819 1289
Observations 27435 25577 25590 26968 18016
Notes: This table shows estimated impacts of rural hospital closures using data from the
AHA Annual Survey between the years 2003 and 2017. All specifications include county
and state-by-year fixed effects. Controls include the county population percentages of the
1 to 19, 20 to 39, 40 to 64, and over 65 years age ranges, the county population percentages
of two racial groups (white, non-white), the county population percentages of males, and
the county population percentages of Hispanics. Standard errors are clustered at the
county level. *, **, and *** indicate significance levels of .10, .05, and .01., respectively.
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Table 1.5: Detailed Population Effects of Rural Hospital Closures
Log 0-19 Log 20-64 Log 65 + Log Retire/Dis
Population Population Population Insur. (per capita)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Hospital Closure -0.013*** -0.012** -0.015** -0.005
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
Mean Dependent Variable 8,219 18,966 5,186 3,161
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
State x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 1829 1829 1829 1817
Observations 27435 27435 27435 27255
Notes: This table shows estimated impacts of rural hospital closures using data from the
AHA Annual Survey between the years 2003 and 2017. All specifications include county
and state-by-year fixed effects. Controls include the county population percentages of the
1 to 19, 20 to 39, 40 to 64, and over 65 years age ranges, the county population percentages
of two racial groups (white, non-white), the county population percentages of males, and
the county population percentages of Hispanics. Standard errors are clustered at the
county level. *, **, and *** indicate significance levels of .10, .05, and .01., respectively.
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Table 1.6: Heterogeneous Effects by Number of Hospitals in County After Closure
Log Log Per Capita Unemployed Log Log Total Log Total Log Median Log Median
Employment Income Rate Labor Force Estabs. Population Rents Home Value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
0 Hospitals After Closure -0.073*** -0.050*** 0.002 -0.043** -0.029*** -0.019** -0.026*** -0.016
(0.017) (0.017) (0.002) (0.019) (0.011) (0.007) (0.010) (0.021)
> 0 Hospitals After Closure -0.024** -0.011 0.002 -0.018* 0.003 -0.007 -0.005 -0.022*
(0.010) (0.011) (0.001) (0.010) (0.011) (0.006) (0.007) (0.013)
Mean 0 Hospitals 5,585 8,837 0.077 8,992 432 22,251 640 107,367
Mean > 0 Hospitals 15,101 13,286 0.069 20,769 1084 44,862 694 133,482
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 1829 1829 1829 1829 1829 1829 1819 1289
Observations 27429 27429 27433 27433 27433 27435 26968 18016
Notes: This table shows estimated impacts of rural hospital closures by whether a county loses its sole hospital. Data from the AHA
Annual Survey between the years 2003 and 2017. All specifications include county and state-by-year fixed effects. Controls include
the county population percentages of the 1 to 19, 20 to 39, 40 to 64, and over 65 years age ranges, the county population percentages
of two racial groups (white, non-white), the county population percentages of males, and the county population percentages of
Hispanics. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. *, **, and *** indicate significance levels of .10, .05, and .01.,
respectively.
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Table 1.7: Heterogeneous Effects by Hospital Share of County Employment
Log Log Per Capita Unemployed Log Log Total Log Total Log Median Log Median
Employment Income Rate Labor Force Estabs. Population Rents Home Value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Above Median -0.106*** -0.065*** 0.003 -0.057*** -0.050*** -0.033*** -0.019** -0.034**
(0.015) (0.016) (0.002) (0.018) (0.010) (0.007) (0.009) (0.014)
Below Median 0.006 0.005 0.002 -0.003 0.016 0.005 -0.011 -0.012
(0.011) (0.013) (0.001) (0.012) (0.013) (0.007) (0.008) (0.016)
Mean Above Median 4,542 8,247 0.078 7,018 391 17,465 609 105,048
Mean Below Median 15,919 12,398 0.070 23,437 1,147 52,675 715 120,877
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 1829 1829 1829 1829 1829 1829 1819 1289
Observations 27429 27429 27433 27433 27433 27435 26968 18016
Notes: This table shows estimated impacts of rural hospital closures by whether a closed hospital lies above or below the median
contribution to the local economy. Data from the AHA Annual Survey between the years 2003 and 2017. All specifications include
county and state-by-year fixed effects. Controls include the county population percentages of the 1 to 19, 20 to 39, 40 to 64,
and over 65 years age ranges, the county population percentages of two racial groups (white, non-white), the county population
percentages of males, and the county population percentages of Hispanics. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. *, **,
and *** indicate significance levels of .10, .05, and .01., respectively. Median employment=2.19 percent.
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Table 1.8: Heterogeneous Effects by Hospital Ownership
Log Log Per Capita Unemployed Log Log Total Log Total Log Median Log Median
Employment Income Rate Labor Force Estabs. Population Rents Home Value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
For-Profit Closure -0.036** -0.014 0.000 -0.033* -0.016 -0.014 -0.029*** -0.002
(0.018) (0.017) (0.002) (0.020) (0.013) (0.009) (0.008) (0.020)
Non-Profit Closure -0.048*** -0.034*** 0.003** -0.024** -0.006 -0.010* -0.003 -0.025*
(0.011) (0.012) (0.001) (0.010) (0.010) (0.005) (0.007) (0.014)
Mean For-Profit 10,617 10,582 0.073 15,893 745 36,627 659 104,164
Mean Non-Profit 12,981 12,650 0.070 17,751 957 38,408 688 138,588
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 1829 1829 1829 1829 1829 1829 1819 1289
Observations 27429 27429 27433 27433 27433 27435 26968 18016
Notes: This table shows estimated impacts of rural hospital closures by whether the closing hospital is for-profit or non-profit.
Data from the AHA Annual Survey between the years 2003 and 2017. All specifications include county and state-by-year fixed
effects. Controls include the county population percentages of the 1 to 19, 20 to 39, 40 to 64, and over 65 years age ranges, the
county population percentages of two racial groups (white, non-white), the county population percentages of males, and the county
population percentages of Hispanics. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. *, **, and *** indicate significance levels
of .10, .05, and .01., respectively.
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Table 1.9: Heterogeneous Effects by County Geographic Size
Log Log Per Capita Unemployed Log Log Total Log Total Log Median Log Median
Employment Income Rate Labor Force Estabs. Population Rents Home Value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Hospital Closure -0.042*** -0.026*** 0.002* -0.027*** -0.009 -0.011** -0.014 -0.021*
(0.010) (0.010) (0.001) (0.010) (0.008) (0.005) (0.006) (0.011)
Closure x County sq. Miles 0.006* 0.001 -0.0008*** 0.004* 0.002 0.002** -0.003 -0.016
(0.003) (0.003) (0.0002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.014)
Mean Dependent Variable 10,857 12,366 0.065 15,641 817 32,765 650 145,509
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 1829 1829 1829 1829 1829 1829 1819 1289
Observations 27429 27429 27433 27433 27433 27435 26968 18016
Notes: This table shows estimated impacts of rural hospital closures using data from the AHA Annual Survey between the years
2003 and 2017. Closure x County sq. Miles represents the interaction between the indicator for a hospital closure and county square
miles (multiplied by 1000). All specifications include county and state-by-year fixed effects. Controls include the county population
percentages of the 1 to 19, 20 to 39, 40 to 64, and over 65 years age ranges, the county population percentages of two racial groups
(white, non-white), the county population percentages of males, and the county population percentages of Hispanics. Standard
errors are clustered at the county level. *, **, and *** indicate significance levels of .10, .05, and .01., respectively.
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Table 1.10: Effects of Rural Hospital Closures on the Non-Hospital Sector
Log Log Per Capita Log Total
Employment Income Establishments
(1) (2) (3)
Hospital Closure -0.018** -0.014 -0.007
(0.009) (0.010) (0.008)
Mean Dependent Variable 10,452 12,148 815
Controls Yes Yes Yes
State x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 1829 1829 1829
Observations 27416 27418 27433
Notes: This table shows estimated impacts of rural hospital closures on the non-hospital
sector using data from the AHA Annual Survey between the years 2003 and 2017. All
specifications include county and state-by-year fixed effects. Controls include the county
population percentages of the 1 to 19, 20 to 39, 40 to 64, and over 65 years age ranges,
the county population percentages of two racial groups (white, non-white), the county
population percentages of males, and the county population percentages of Hispanics.
Standard errors are clustered at the county level. *, **, and *** indicate significance
levels of .10, .05, and .01., respectively.
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Table 1.11: Effects of Rural Hospital Closures on the Service-Providing
and Goods-Producing Sectors
Log Log Per Capita Log
Employment Earnings Establishments
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Private Service-Providing Sector
Hospital Closure -0.026** -0.016 -0.009
(0.011) (0.010) (0.010)
Mean Dependent Variable 5,851 5,486 592
Observations 27361 27361 27431
Panel B: Private Goods-Producing Sector
Hospital Closure -0.004 0.009 0.002
(0.020) (0.022) (0.011)
Mean Dependent Variable 2,521 3,700 163
Observations 27320 27315 27427
Controls Yes Yes Yes
State x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table shows estimated impacts of rural hospital closures on the service-
providing and goods-producing sectors using data from the AHA Annual Survey between
the years 2003 and 2017. All specifications include county and state-by-year fixed effects.
Controls include the county population percentages of the 1 to 19, 20 to 39, 40 to 64, and
over 65 years age ranges, the county population percentages of two racial groups (white,
non-white), the county population percentages of males, and the county population per-
centages of Hispanics. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. *, **, and ***
indicate significance levels of .10, .05, and .01., respectively.
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Notes: The above figure shows the trends in rural hospital closures from 2003 through
the first half of 2017. Data are collected from the AHA Annual Survey of Hospitals.
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Notes: The above map shows rural and non-rural classifications of all U.S. counties.
Counties are classified as rural if (1) more than 50 percent of the population live in a
rural area or (2) the population density is under 64 persons per square mile for the entire
county (10 acres per person) and the total population of the county is less than 50,000.
Dropped rural counties are counties that do not have a hospital during the sample period.
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Notes: The above figures show event study plots of county-level economic effects of
rural hospital closures. The sample includes rural counties for 2003-2017. The longest
vertical line indicates the end of the year before a hospital closure. Bands indicate 95
percent confidence intervals. All specifications include county and state-by-year fixed
effects. Controls include the county population percentages of the 1 to 19, 20 to 39,
40 to 64, and over 65 years age ranges, the county population percentages of two racial
groups (white, non-white), the county population percentages of males, and the county
population percentages of Hispanics. Standard errors are clustered at the county level.
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Figure 1.4: Employment and Income Effects Relative to the Contributions
of Closed Hospitals to County Totals
Notes: The above figure shows (1) the average employment and payroll of closed rural
hospitals as a percentage of county totals and (2) the estimated employment and per
capita income losses caused by hospital closures.
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Figure 1.5: Population and Housing Market Effects of Rural Hospital
Closures
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Notes: The above figures show event study plots of county-level population and housing
market effects of rural hospital closures. The sample includes rural counties for 2003-
2017. The longest vertical line indicates the end of the year before a hospital closure.
Bands indicate 95 percent confidence intervals. All specifications include county and
state-by-year fixed effects. Controls include the county population percentages of the 1
to 19, 20 to 39, 40 to 64, and over 65 years age ranges, the county population percentages
of two racial groups (white, non-white), the county population percentages of males, and
the county population percentages of Hispanics. Standard errors are clustered at the
county level.
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Notes: The above figures show event study plots of county-level non-hospital economic
effects of rural hospital closures. The sample includes rural counties for 2003-2017. The
longest vertical line indicates the end of the year before a hospital closure. Bands indicate
95 percent confidence intervals. All specifications include county and state-by-year fixed
effects. Controls include the county population percentages of the 1 to 19, 20 to 39,
40 to 64, and over 65 years age ranges, the county population percentages of two racial
groups (white, non-white), the county population percentages of males, and the county
population percentages of Hispanics. Standard errors are clustered at the county level.
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Figure 1.7: Changes in Household Utility After Rural Hospital Closure
Utility in county c before closure
Utility in county c after closure







Notes: The above figure illustrates how household utility changes after a rural hospital
closure in location c. The x-axis represents marginal preferences for living in location c.
The y-axis represents the utility of each household in location c. Preferences for location
c are increasing from left to right.
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CHAPTER 2
DID THE ACA MEDICAID EXPANSION
SAVE LIVES?
2.1 Introduction
Medicaid is the largest means-tested social insurance program in the U.S.,
providing publicly-funded health insurance for low-income families and in-
dividuals. Evidence from recent studies has shown that Medicaid reduces
financial risk to beneficiaries while also increasing access to healthcare ser-
vices.1 Far less evidence links Medicaid access to long-run improvements in
health and mortality, particularly among adults.2 Prior to the Affordable
Care Act (ACA) expansion, estimation of the mortality effects of access to
the present Medicaid program relied on a small number of state-level ac-
tions in the early to mid-2000s (Sommers et al., 2017) and suggestive but
underpowered evidence from the 16-month mortality followup in the Oregon
Health Insurance Experiment (OHIE) (Finkelstein et al., 2012).
In this paper, we estimate the effects of the ACA Medicaid expansion on
adult mortality in the first four years following the 2014 Medicaid expan-
sion. A key part of the ACA, the Medicaid expansion removes categorical
exclusions and bases eligibility solely on income at or below 138 percent of
the federal poverty level. The ACA Medicaid reform was originally formu-
lated to occur nationwide but was effectively made a state option by the
2012 Supreme Court ruling National Federation of Independent Business v.
1There is extensive evidence pertaining to these outcomes: Currie and Gruber
(1996a,b); Card and Shore-Sheppard (2004); Long et al. (2005); Finkelstein et al. (2012);
DeLeire et al. (2013); Sommers et al. (2014); Taubman et al. (2014).
2The effects of the modern Medicaid program on adult health and mortality have been
examined in Finkelstein et al. (2012), Baicker et al. (2013), Sommers (2017), Miller et
al. (2019), Black et al. (2019), and Goldin et al. (2019). Goodman-Bacon (2018b) shows
significant mortality reductions from the initial roll out of Medicaid in 1965. We compare
our estimates to the emerging literature on the effects of the ACA expansion in Section 2.4.
The lack of health insurance is associated with worse health and higher mortality (Wilper
et al., 2009), but causality is not clear (Kronick, 2009; Black et al., 2017).
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Sebelius. As a result, just over half of the United States chose to adopt the
initial expansion (Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2017). Cover-
age became effective on January 1, 2014, and over 9 million new individuals
between the ages of 19 and 64 enrolled by the end of 2015, accounting for 60
percent of the immediate increase in coverage that resulted from the ACA
(Frean et al., 2017).
Our primary analysis compares the post-expansion changes in mortality
between counties in states that expanded Medicaid in 2014 with changes in
those that did not adopt the expansion. To account for pre-existing differ-
ences between these counties and improve the efficiency of our estimation,
we use propensity-score reweighting based on economic, demographic, and
political characteristics. Two key features of the implementation of our re-
search design serve to discipline the analysis and add credibility to the find-
ings. First, we use the double-lasso method to specify the propensity score
model (Belloni et al., 2014a; Urminsky et al., 2016). This data-driven model-
selection procedure prevents overfitting, thereby increasing power relative to
research designs assessed in Black et al. (2019) (hereafter BHNS). Second,
we perform a cross-validation exercise in which we hold out mortality out-
comes in the four years before the reform from the propensity score model
and check that the reweighted data displays flat pre-trends over this time
period.3 Mortality responses, including age and cause of death, are observed
in restricted-access microdata for all deaths in the U.S. from 1990 to 2017.
Together, this allows us to estimate the marginal impact of public health
insurance coverage for areas that adopted the Medicaid expansion and, fur-
ther, to examine whether changes occur where Medicaid is likely to have the
largest effects.
We find evidence of a reduction in mortality following the ACA Medicaid
expansion, with the strongest results for amenable causes of death, those
most likely to have been avoided through optimal quality healthcare. Point
estimates on aggregate 4-year mortality indicate an improvement in all-cause
mortality among 20-to-64-year-old adults of 11.36 fewer deaths per 100,000
people, a 3.60 percent decrease in mortality. The event study shows flat pre-
reform trends and an immediate drop in mortality in the first year following
the reform, with evidence of growing effects after that. Changes in aggre-
3We discuss the merits of our strategy relative to the difference-in-differences and triple
difference designs assessed in BHNS in Section 2.3.
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gate mortality rates are largely explained by a reduction equaling 6.64 fewer
deaths per 100,000 people due to amenable causes. We also find a larger
reduction in mortality in areas with low rates of health insurance coverage
before the expansion. Applying estimates of newly covered individuals in
states that expanded Medicaid relative to those that did not, the aggregate
effects equate to one additional death averted for each 310 new Medicaid
recipients. When interpreting these magnitudes, it is important to note that
access to healthcare may have larger effects over longer time horizons than
available in our data, and we find growing effects over time.
An essential aspect of our study is that we examine the effects of the
program on aggregate mortality, thereby capturing mortality responses for
the entire population along all margins. These aggregate mortality results
complement two recent papers, Miller et al. (2019) and Goldin et al. (2019),
which provide evidence on the effects of the ACA Medicaid expansion for
the low-income and uninsured population. Our individual-level treatment-
on-the-treated (ITOT) estimates fall within the range of estimates from this
emerging literature, although they are subject to some uncertainty regarding
the size of the affected population. Using our first-stage estimate of a 4.15
percent decrease in uninsurance in our sample and adjusting for the higher
mortality of the Medicaid population implies that the expansion prevented
30 percent of deaths in this population, a large reduction in mortality.4 This
ITOT extrapolation relies, however, on several strong assumptions, espe-
cially, that the beneficial effects of the expansion were confined to those mea-
sured as switching from uninsurance to Medicaid. This assumption would
be violated, for example, if there were responses among those who switch
onto Medicaid from other sources of insurance, Medicaid affects prospective
recipients through presumptive eligibility and retroactive coverage, or if the
benefits of health insurance affect households or communities. A number of
program features are consistent with the first two violations, while a growing
literature documents responses consistent with diffuse benefits of Medicaid
on, for example, financial outcomes (Hu et al., 2016; Miller et al., 2018),
crime (Vogler, 2017; He and Barkowski, 2020), and hospital closures (Lind-
4Large TOT estimates for the effects of public insurance coverage on mortality appear
across several research designs, such as the age 64 vs age 65 contrast in Huh and Reif
(2017); also see Sommers et al. (2017) and Dunn and Shapiro (2019). Randomized trials
for the most effective drugs, such as statins, show short-term mortality reductions around
half as large (Baigent et al., 2005; Chou et al., 2016).
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rooth et al., 2018). There is also little evidence of negative spillovers through
congestion effects (Carey et al., 2018). If instead we scale our estimates to
the increase in Medicaid coverage regardless of previous insurance, our esti-
mates imply a 17 percent reduction in mortality. The uncertainty in these
calculations leads us to conclude that the evidence is most informative about
the reduced-form, aggregate mortality effects of the expansion. We discuss
these issues further in Section 2.4.
At the end of the paper, we examine the relationship between the estimated
mortality effects and the cost-effectiveness of the ACA Medicaid expansion.
Specifically, we compare program costs to the value of mortality gains us-
ing age-specific estimates of the Value of a Statistical Life (VSL) in Aldy
and Viscusi (2008). We calculate the benefits of expansion under two sets
of assumptions: first, by applying our point estimate for all-cause mortality
to the ages 20 to 64 (taking our results at face value); and second, under a
conservative scenario in which our results apply only to amenable cause mor-
tality for the 55 to 64 age group (where previous researchers suggest results
are most likely to be found, and our results are most robust). These results
imply that the mortality benefits offset one-third of the expenditures asso-
ciated with Medicaid expansion. An economic cost-benefit analysis should
weigh the mortality benefits against the efficiency costs of the program, i.e.
deadweight loss associated with the crowd out from private insurance and
raising tax revenue. Evidence from the OHIE suggests that approximately
60 percent of Medicaid expenditures are transfers, for example, to hospitals
through a reduction in unpaid bills (Finkelstein et al., 2019).5 Applying this
figure to the ACA Medicaid expansion would imply that the mortality-related
savings may cover the entire net cost of the ACA Medicaid expansion. A full
accounting of the social welfare effects of the Medicaid expansion should also
include benefits to other outcomes, such as quality of life improvements from
changes in morbidity and reductions in financial distress among beneficiaries.
5The authors use a model-based approach to estimate the welfare benefit of Medicaid
per dollar of government spending. While the model is based on the OHIE, the authors
note their estimates are informative for the ACA expansions given the use of national
survey data in the model and the similar coverage standard between the OHIE and ACA.
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2.2 Data
We use information from the Kaiser Family Foundation (2018) to identify
states that expanded Medicaid in the first half of 2014. We include Wisconsin
as treated although their expansion was limited to adults within 100 percent
of the federal poverty level. We exclude counties in six states (PA, IN, NH,
AK, MT, LA) that implemented the Medicaid expansion after the first half
of 2014. Results that include these states are presented as robustness checks.
Mortality data come from the National Vital Statistics System through the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). These restricted access
mortality data contain detailed information on age, sex, race, cause of death,
and county of residence for every death in the U.S. The CDC assigns the
cause of death by examining death certificates collected from around the
country. We follow Sommers (2017) to classify amenable conditions using
the ICD-10 codes included in the mortality data. Amenable conditions are
presented in Appendix Table C.1. Despite the care taken by the CDC in
constructing the data, it is important to note that the classification of cause of
death into amenable and non-amenable may be imperfect due to difficulty in
ascertaining cause of death, differences in how death certificates are filled out
by coroners, and the inherent challenges in determining which causes would
have been prevented by access to optimal-quality healthcare. Therefore, we
use all-cause mortality as the focal outcome in our model selection procedure
and report amenable cause mortality as a secondary outcome.
The mortality data are paired with population denominators by county,
age group, sex, and race from the U.S. Census and then merged with county-
specific economic and demographic variables, such as the unemployment rate,
the poverty rate, and real median income. These data were obtained from the
Small Area Unemployment Statistics (SAUS) program through the Bureau of
Labor Statistics and the Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates Program
(SAIPE) through the U.S. Census. We also gathered county-level uninsured
data from the U.S. Census Small Area Health Insurance (SAHIE) database.
70
2.3 Conceptual Framework and Empirical Strategy
Theoretically, the ACA Medicaid expansion could impact mortality in either
direction. On the one hand, reductions in mortality are most likely to oc-
cur through increases in healthcare use. Research has shown the Medicaid
leads to increases in visits to physicians, overnight hospital stays, emergency
department visits, and rates of diagnosis for medical conditions (Finkelstein
et al., 2012; Taubman et al., 2014; Wherry and Miller, 2016; Duggan et
al., 2019). On the other hand, Medicaid could increase mortality through
increases in ex ante moral hazard; although, Simon et al. (2017) find no
evidence that the ACA Medicaid expansions have increased moral hazard
behavior. A third channel through which Medicaid could impact mortality
in either direction is an income effect. Indeed, research has shown the ACA
Medicaid expansions have reduced financial risk for beneficiaries (Hu et al.,
2016). The literature pertaining to the relationship between income and
risky health behavior is inconclusive (Cawley and Ruhm, 2011); however,
it is possible that the reduction in financial risk may induce overeating or
greater consumption of unhealthy goods, such as alcohol and cigarettes. At
the same time, the income effect could reduce mortality if the financial gains
are allocated toward the consumption of healthy goods and behaviors. Thus,
the empirical question includes the direction as well as the magnitude of the
effects.
Medicaid expansion states and counties differ in level and trend before
the expansion, meaning that any direct comparison of expansion with non-
expansion groups will be biased. In Figure C.1 we illustrate this issue. The
figure depicts estimates from an event-study model using a sample of all
counties from 2009-2017, where the outcome variables include the annual,
county-level all-cause and amenable mortality rates among adults between
20 and 64 years of age. The figure shows an obvious pre-trend in all-cause
and amenable-cause mortality rates in expansion counties relative to non-
expansion counties in the years prior to 2014. When we investigated this
issue in more detail with specific causes of deaths, the confounding pre-
trends are largely explained by differences in cardiovascular and respiratory
mortality.
To address these pre-existing differences, we use event study and difference-
in-differences models in conjunction with propensity score reweighting. The
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combination of these techniques provides important advantages relative to
either technique in isolation, in both bias and efficiency (Smith and Todd,
2005; Imbens and Rubin, 2015). In our setting, the comparison of mortality
before and after the reform provides compelling within-county variation in
treatment status that lends itself to a difference-in-differences approach. Es-
timating causal effects is, however, complicated by pre-expansion differences
in mortality trends between counties which did or did not expand Medicaid.
With this in mind, we use the propensity-score model to select a group of
treatment and control counties in a way that balances pre-treatment charac-
teristics and outcomes. Thus, by eliminating control units that are observa-
tionally different than treated units, the propensity-score step improves the
across-county comparison, in terms of both bias and efficiency (Hirano et
al., 2003). For use in assessing whether we have created a compelling control
group, we exclude four years of pre-period outcomes from the propensity-
score model. This exclusion avoids mechanically creating parallel trends in
the outcome between treatment and control and allows us to interpret the
evolution of mortality in this held-out period as a test of quality of the control
group. We focus the analysis on the county-level treatment-on-the-treated
(county-TOT) effect to answer the question “Did the ACA Medicaid expan-
sion save lives?”6
2.3.1 Propensity-Score Model
Our first step is to address pre-expansion differences between treatment and
control counties by constructing a sample of counties in non-expansion states
that are similar to counties in expansion states. To do so, we fit a propensity-
score model that predicts whether a county is located in a state that adopted
the Medicaid expansion. The model is estimated using a rich set of demo-
graphic, economic, and political characteristics of the states in the years
before 2014. Given the large number of potential predictors of treatment
and the resulting possibility of overfitting the propensity score, we use the
double lasso procedure described in Belloni et al. (2014a) and Urminsky et
al. (2016) to select the relevant variables to be included in the model. This
6We use the term county-TOT to refer to the treatment effect on county-level mortality
estimated in our empirical specifications. This should not be confused with the individual-
TOT (ITOT) that can be calculated if given the size of the affected population.
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method identifies variables for inclusion in the propensity score model in two
steps: 1) fitting a lasso regression that predicts the outcome of interest, i.e.
the mortality rate for adults ages 20-64, and 2) fitting a lasso regression that
predicts the focal independent variable, i.e. expanding Medicaid in 2014.7
The union of the variables estimated to have non-zero coefficients in these
steps is then included in the final propensity score model.8 As discussed
above, we hold out mortality outcomes from the four years preceding the
2014 expansion from the set of potential predictors in the propensity score.
This allows us to perform a cross-validation exercise by examining pre-trends
in this window. In addition to preventing the overfitting of the propensity
score model, the procedure allows for an imperfect selection of controls in the
prediction of treatment through the inclusion of predictors of the outcome in
the “first-stage” propensity score.
Once we have selected our variables, the propensity score is estimated using
the following logistic regression model:
Logit(Pr(MedicaidExpansionc)) = β0 + β1Xc, (2.1)
where the dependent variable is an indicator of whether county c expanded
Medicaid in 2014. The vector Xc includes the predictors of expansion selected
by the data-driven procedure. Observations with propensity scores that are
7Besides preventing overfitting, there is an additional advantage of using the double
lasso procedure compared to arbitrary variable selection approaches (e.g. Sommers (2017))
or conventional lasso methods. Specifically, excluding variables that have a non-zero rela-
tionship with the outcome of interest, either by researcher choice or because these variables
are often underestimated using conventional lasso methods, can create substantial regu-
larization and omitted variable bias that adversely affects both estimation and inference
(Urminsky et al., 2016). This bias is especially problematic when the excluded variables
are important predictors of the focal independent variable. The double lasso procedure
is designed to alleviate these biases by choosing variables that predict both the outcome
and/or the focal independent variable.
8We estimate each step using the square-root lasso described in Belloni et al. (2014a)
and Belloni et al. (2014b). We allow the selection procedure to choose from a rich set of
pre-expansion county-level variables, including the unemployment rate, the poverty rate,
logged real median income, logged population, population density, the Obama vote share
in 2008, the Obama vote share in 2012, an indicator of whether the state governor was
a Democrat in 2010, logged average state health and welfare expenditures between 2005-
2013, the pre-expansion uninsured rate for non-elderly adults, the percentage of population
in five age groups distributed between 20 and 64 years of age, the percentage that is male,
the percentage that is white, the percentage that is black, and the percentage that is
Hispanic. We also include the all-cause mortality rates for adults 20 to 64 for each year
between 2005 and 2009 as well as the average all-cause, amenable, and non-amenable
mortality rates between 2005 and 2013.
73
outside the overlap region are trimmed from the sample. Trimming should
serve to increase the internal validity of our estimates at the cost of changing
the estimand to apply to the set of matched counties. This cost arises because
we cannot infer counterfacutal outcomes for counties that are not matched,
although we do investigate alternative trimming thresholds. As pointed out
by Imbens and Rubin (2015), excluding unmatched units should improve the
asymptotic variance and robustness properties of our estimator. Moreover,
the trimmed units tend to be units with high leverage, whose presence makes
estimators sensitive to outliers (Young, 2018).
There are several reasons for constructing counterfactuals at the county
level as opposed to at the state level. First, the chief advantage relative to
a state-level analysis is that we can achieve more precise estimates by mod-
eling sub-state variation. Fine geographic data allows us the flexibility to
adjust for potentially confounding changes in mortality that would otherwise
be unaccounted for when using a broader geographic unit. For instance, sup-
pose that opioid-related mortality is rising in rural counties at the same time
as the Medicaid expansion takes place. By re-weighting the non-expansion
counties to have a similar rural share to expansion counties, we can reduce the
bias associated with this pre-existing difference in mortality trends. County-
level data provide richer variation for the re-weighting procedure to account
for pre-existing differences in mortality trends. Second, the county level is
the smallest geographic unit for which detailed data are available for most
variables of interest. The availability of data also enables us to examine het-
erogeneity by county-level characteristics, such as pre-expansion uninsurance
levels. Thus counties maximize the size of potential controls, enabling us to
trim outliers, select a closely comparable control group, and retain a large
sample. Finally, existing evidence pertaining to the mortality effects of Med-
icaid has relied largely on county-level analysis. This puts our findings on
similar ground to those reported in earlier studies, such as Sommers (2017)
and BHNS.
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2.3.2 Event-Study and Difference-in-differences
After constructing the analysis sample and weights, we run event-study mod-
els of the form:
Ycst = αc + γt +
2017∑
τ=2009,τ 6=2013
βτ (MedicaidExpansioncs × 1[τ = t])
+ βXcst + εcst,
(2.2)
where Ycst indicates deaths per 100,000 people in each observation cell in-
dexed by county c in state s and year t. Included in the model are a full
set of county and year fixed effects, indicated by αc and γt, respectively.
Time-varying control variables, represented by Xcst, are selected using the
double lasso procedure for panel data (Belloni et al., 2016).9 These controls
reduce standard errors and offer additional controls for any time-varying dif-
ferences between treatment and control unaccounted for by the reweighting
procedure. The coefficients of interest are the βτ ’s on the interaction between
the indicator for Medicaid expansion and indicator function 1[τ = t]. The
event-study model enables us to both test for the presence of pre-trends and
capture the evolution of the treatment effect over time.
We then report pooled difference-in-differences results, including models
which focus on outcomes for specific age groups, pre-expansion insurance
coverage, and cause of death. The pooled model effectively averages the
year-specific effects estimates in the event study into a single contrast of pre-
and post-expansion differences between treatment and control counties. The
baseline model is specified as follows:
Ycst = αc + γt + β1MedicaidExpansioncs + βXcst + εcst, (2.3)
where the coefficient on MedicaidExpansion represents the change in mortal-
ity (per 100,000 people) among counties in states that expanded Medicaid in
9We allow the selection procedure to choose from time-varying demographic, racial, and
economic controls. These include population percentages in five age groups (20-24, 25-34,
35-44, 45-54, and 55-64), three racial groups (white, black, and other), two sex groups
(male and female), and the percentage of population that is Hispanic. We also include
logged total county population, the logged population among adults between 20 and 64
years of age, and logged population variables for each age, racial, and sex group. Finally,
we include county poverty rates, unemployment rates, and median household incomes.
Selected controls are indicated in the table notes.
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2014 relative to counties in states that did not. Our preferred specification
includes the time-varying controls selected by the double lasso procedure.
Throughout the analysis we cluster standard errors by state to account for
the fact that our variation comes from state-level adoption decisions. We
weight our regressions by the county population 20 to 64 years of age multi-
plied by T + (1− T )× p
(1−p) , where T is an indicator for treatment and p is
the estimated propensity score. Weighting in this way provides a consistent
estimator of the average county-TOT (Imbens, 2004).
The empirical strategy and data we use differ from the models evaluated in
the power calculations in BHNS in three key ways. First, we focus on a fully-
specified, data-driven propensity-score model, which has the advantages in
both bias and efficiency we have discussed above.10 In contrast, BHNS eval-
uates models with evident pre-trends, which they acknowledge significantly
reduces power. Second, we use two additional years of data relative to the
power calculations in the most recent version of BHNS. Given the growing
effects, this increases the likelihood of detecting an effect both due to an
increase in the precision and likely magnitude of the effects. Finally, we re-
port reduced-form estimates for uninsurance and mortality while remaining
agnostic as to our ability to estimate precise treatment-on-the-treated esti-
mates. In contrast, BHNS draw their strongest conclusions (especially in the
introduction of their paper) when using a first-stage estimate that is likely
considerably smaller than the group of individuals actually affected by the
reform. We discuss the magnitude and interpretation of our estimates at the
conclusion of Section 2.4.
To summarize, we do not believe the power calculations in BHNS are
informative about the estimates from our model.11 We provide permutation
10Although BHNS reports empirical estimates from a propensity score model, the au-
thors do not perform their power calculation exercise for this model. Additionally, the
empirical procedure in their propensity score model differs substantially from ours by: ex-
cluding a number of important predictors, such as political variables, from the propensity
score; declining to use any variable selection procedure, thereby leading to the inclusion
of spurious predictors in the propensity score; and, declining to assess overlap or trim on
the propensity score. These differences in the estimation are likely to increase bias and
variance relative to the model here.
11There are other notable differences between the papers. For example, BHNS use a
large set of time-varying controls in almost all specifications, which likely absorbs some
effect of the reform. Instead, we use the panel-lasso model to select an appropriate set
of parsimonious controls in those specification in which we include them. For example,
BHNS switch between a 5-year pre-period in their difference-in-differences models and a
10-year pre-period in the event study. Geographic mortality trends have evolved a great
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tests to assess our design in Section 2.5.
2.3.3 Propensity Score Estimates
We first report predictors of expansion selected by the double lasso proce-
dure. The procedure selects county age, race, economic measures, political
variables, and pre-expansion morality rates as predictors of expansion. Coun-
ties with large population percentages in the 45-to-54 and 55-to-64 age groups
are more likely to implement the expansion. For males and Hispanics, higher
population shares are positive predictors of expansion, while higher shares
of blacks are negative predictors. Expansion counties had higher median in-
comes, but also higher unemployment rates. The pre-expansion non-elderly
uninsured rate negatively predicts expansion. Having Democratic governors
at the time of the passage of the ACA and having high 2008 and 2012 Obama
county vote shares are both strong predictors. Finally, having higher non-
elderly mortality rates in the years prior to the ACA is a modest predictor of
expansion, with small and mainly insignificant estimates across these years.
The full set of coefficient estimates appear in Appendix Table C.2.
The resulting propensity-score distributions of the 2,823 treatment and
control counties display significant overlap for nearly the entire distribution,
except that there are few non-expansion counties in the very upper tail. We
trim the sample at areas in the tails where there is no overlap (propensity
scores outside of 3.8 and 97.1 percent). Trimming removes 563 counties
from the sample, 78 in expansion states and 485 in non-expansion states.
After trimming, our final sample consists of 2,260 counties, 1,174 and 1,086
in expansion and non-expansion states, respectively. The distribution of
the propensity-score and a map of counties appear in Appendix Figure C.3
and Appendix Figure C.4, respectively. Summary statistics are presented in
Table 2.1. Treatment counties generally have slightly lower baseline mortality
rates. Treatment and control counties are similar among the independent
variables except that treatment counties are more likely to be located in a
state with a Democratic governor in 2010. For comparison, we also present
deal since 1999, likely leading to imprecision in, and possibly bias from, the estimates
of the county effects in a longer panel. Empirically, pre-trend performance is poor in
these early years, especially in their triple-difference model. When we re-run our model
with a 10-year pre-period, we find standard errors are more than 50 percent larger when
extending the pre-period to 10 years.
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summary statistics for the trimmed counties in Appendix Table C.3. The
trimmed counties differ greatly from the counties that remain in the sample,
particularly in terms of the baseline mortality rates, income, uninsured rates,
and the political variables included in the propensity-score model.
2.4 Main Results
2.4.1 Medicaid and Mortality
We begin by assessing pre-trends in mortality outcomes, as reported in Fig-
ure 2.1. In Figure 1(a), point estimates for all-cause mortality are near
zero and flat through 2013. Recall that year-by-year mortality outcomes
in 2010 to 2013 are not included in the propensity score model, so the flat
pre-trends in this time frame serve as a crucial check on the ability of the
propensity score model to construct balanced treatment and control groups.
When we disaggregate all-cause mortality to examine amenable causes in
Figure 1(b), we again find flat pre-trends. We conclude from these figures
that the propensity-score model selects a comparison group with similar pre-
expansion mortality patterns. Given that the ACA was passed in 2010, and
some changes went into effect before 2014, the patterns indicate that any
effects before 2014 were uncorrelated with the later Medicaid expansion.
Moving to the post-expansion period, we see a notable reduction in all-
cause mortality within the first four years of the expansion. Mortality falls
in the first year after expansion and is lower by approximately 10 deaths
per 100,000 inhabitants by 2015 and 2016. In 2017 we find an even larger
reduction in mortality of over 15 deaths per 100,000 inhabitants. The timing
of the effect aligns with the expansion and shows mortality reductions became
larger over time. Disaggregating the post-expansion effects by causes of death
that may be amenable to healthcare reveals that amenable causes account
for the majority of the effects in aggregate mortality.
Table 2.2 reports difference-in-differences estimates for the full sample,
by gender and age group, and by pre-expansion uninsured levels. These
results effectively pool together the 2014 to 2017 estimates reported in the
event study. In column 1, we find that all-cause mortality drops by 14.83
deaths per 100,000 inhabitants. Adding controls in column 2 only slightly
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reduces the point estimate to 11.36 deaths per 100,000 averted, a 3.60 percent
decrease in mortality. The reduction in effect size may occur due to time-
varying differences between treatment and control captured by the controls;
however, we cannot rule out that the difference reflects statistical noise. Both
estimates are statistically significant at or below the conventional 5 percent
level. We proceed with the model with controls as our preferred specification.
In columns 1 and 2 of Panel B, we see that the majority of the aggregate
mortality effect is accounted for by changes in amenable causes of death,
i.e., those which may be influenced by access to optimal healthcare. The
estimated reduction in amenable cause mortality is 7.79 and 6.64 deaths per
100,000 people with and without controls, respectively. Confidence intervals
around these estimates rule out no response. The effects on amenable cause
mortality are the strongest evidence of mortality reduction following the re-
form. Non-amenable causes of death make slightly smaller and statistically
insignificant contributions to the total and are substantially less robust to the
inclusion of controls compared to amenable causes of death (coefficient=-7.04
se=4.45 without controls, coefficient=-4.72 se=2.54 with controls). We tested
whether the coefficients for amenable and non-amenable mortality are statis-
tically different from one another. The results indicate that we cannot reject
the null hypothesis that the coefficients are the same (p-value=0.48). There
are reasons to interpret evidence on non-amenable mortality with caution—
due to the difficulty in classifying deaths, non-amenable causes of death may
also respond to the Medicaid expansions. For instance, Doyle Jr (2005)
and Howell et al. (2010) show health insurance is associated with reductions
mortality after automobile accidents and external injuries among individuals
below 20 years of age, respectively.
In the middle columns of Table 2.2 we report results by gender and age
group.12 In columns 3 and 4, the reported results imply that mortality effects
are nearly equal between men and women in levels, but smaller in percent-
age terms for men, given their higher baseline mortality rates. As with the
combined effect, we find larger and more precisely estimated reductions in
amenable causes of death for each gender, which can explain the estimated
12We caution against drawing strong conclusions from individual sub-analyses for several
reasons. First, our research design and focal hypothesis test intends to estimate all-cause
population mortality effects, as opposed to sub-groups. Second, there is potential for
multiple hypothesis testing issues as we disaggregate the analysis.
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effects on all-cause mortality for both genders. We also find flat pre-trends for
male and female mortality rates, as shown in Appendix Figures C.5 and C.6.
We cannot reject equality between the male and female mortality reductions
for all-cause (p-value=0.95) and amenable deaths (p-value=0.45). The analy-
sis of effects by age groups finds the largest effects for individuals approaching
Medicare eligibility, in the 55-to-64 age group. Importantly, we find no ev-
idence of differences in all-cause or amenable mortality trends for the near
elderly and the 45-to-54 age group prior to the expansions taking effect. We
do, however, find differential pre-trends for adults 20-to-24, 25-to-34, and 35-
to-44 years of age. Although the younger adults contribute a modest amount
the total all-cause and amenable mortality effects we estimate, we neverthe-
less refrain from making a strong causal interpretation of the estimates for
the adults under 45 years of age. Comparing estimates across age groups,
we can reject equality of all-cause mortality reductions for the 55-to-64 age
group and adults 20 to 24 years of age (p-value=0.02). For amenable causes,
we can reject equality of mortality reductions for the 55-to-64 age group and
adults in age groups below 45 years of age (p-values=0.00). We cannot, how-
ever, reject equality in all-cause and amenable mortality impacts across other
age groups.
In columns 10 and 11 we report results in counties with high and low rates
of uninsured individuals. To derive these results, we first calculate the me-
dian uninsured rate for non-elderly adults in expansion counties between the
years 2005 and 2013. We then separate expansion counties by whether they
are above or below the median rate, 17.04 percent, and match the counties in
both groups to the pool of all non-expansion counties using variables selected
by double lasso.13 We then estimate mortality effects for both samples by
reweighting our regressions with the estimated propensity scores multiplied
by county populations. Our estimates imply a reduction of 12.40 deaths per
100,000 residents in expansion counties above the median baseline uninsured
rate. This estimate is largely accounted for by a drop in amenable cause
mortality. For expansion counties with relatively low rates of uninsured indi-
viduals, the all-cause and amenable mortality impacts are small and neither
13An earlier version of this paper split the sample by the full-sample uninsurance rate, re-
sulting in 69 percent of treatment counties assigned to the low uninsurance group. Results
from this specification also showed larger mortality losses in high-uninsurance counties,
though the gap was smaller.
80
is significant at the 5 percent level. Event-study figures illustrated in Ap-
pendix Figure C.7 display relatively-flat pre-trends and sharp breaks in the
all-cause and amenable mortality trends for high uninsured counties, consis-
tent with the pattern of the main estimates. The figures for low uninsured
counties, however, exhibit more noisy pre-trends and no clear response in the
post-expansion period.
We report results for the detailed cause-of-death analysis in Appendix Ta-
ble C.5. We include common causes of death among adults 20 to 64 years
of age, as indicated by Appendix Figure C.8. For many of the groups we
analyze, namely younger adults, mortality rates for specific causes of death
are very low and we may not be adequately powered to estimate the mortal-
ity responses. We find reductions in cardiovascular and respiratory-related
mortality (e.g. due to heart attacks, strokes, chronic obstructive pulmonary
disease, asthma). We do not find evidence that cancer-related deaths have re-
sponded to the expansions, although the estimate for the near-elderly is nar-
rowly insignificant. Event-study plots, illustrated in Appendix Figures C.9,
C.10, and C.11, show flat pre-trends for models that aggregate ages 20 to
64 together as well as for the specific age-groups that explain most of the
aggregate mortality reductions, namely adults 45 to 54 years of age for cardio-
vascular diseases and 55 to 64 years of age for respiratory- and cancer-related
deaths. These results echo previous research that has shown fewer uninsured
cardiac surgery patients and improved predicted risk scores and morbidity
rates among cardiovascular related illnesses in states that expanded Medicaid
(Charles et al., 2017) as well as substantial increases in the use of cardiovas-
cular and respiratory related prescription medications (Ghosh et al., 2017).
Most people with cardiovascular or respiratory diseases experience very large
benefits from access to the correct medication, such as statins for cardiovas-
cular disease. There is persuasive evidence that connects higher Medicaid
prescription drug spending reduces mortality, particularly among cardiovas-
cular, circulatory, and respiratory diseases (Clayton, 2019). Furthermore,
the medical literature finds these medications work quickly, consistent with
the immediate drop in mortality we find. For example, statins used to treat
or prevent cardiovascular diseases generally take 4 to 6 weeks to stabilize a
patient’s cholesterol levels (NHS, 2018). Thus, responses on these disease
margins are consistent with the potential for large gains from effective treat-
ments that could be accessed through Medicaid (Centers for Disease Control
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and Prevention, 2011).
We also examine the effect of Medicaid expansion on diseases of despair, in-
cluding suicide, opioid overdoses, and drug and alcohol poisonings.14 These
causes of death, particularly opioid overdoses, have risen over the previ-
ous two decades. While the connection between these causes of death and
Medicaid is more complex than with cardiovascular diseases and respiratory
disease, access to healthcare may also influence them. For suicide, the re-
sults suggest reductions in the 25-to-34 and 55-to-64 age groups, although
the event-study figure for the latter age group displays differential pre-trends.
This finding is consistent with evidence from Maclean et al. (2017), who show
that Medicaid expansion states experienced significant increases in mental
health services and psychotropic prescriptions. Opioid overdoses and drug
and alcohol poisonings show little response, although we conclude that there
is insufficient statistical power to evaluate the effect of the Medicaid expan-
sion on these causes of death.
We caution against drawing strong conclusions from individual sub-analyses.
Our research design and focal hypothesis test intends to estimate all-cause
population mortality effects. There is also potential for multiple hypothesis
testing issues as we disaggregate the analysis.
2.4.2 Interpretation of Results and Relation to Other
Estimates in Literature
By any measure, these point estimates imply meaningful reductions in mor-
tality have resulted from the ACA Medicaid expansion. Comparisons of the
magnitudes to other estimates in the literature depends, however, on the
definition of the affected, or “treated,” population. To place the estimates in
context, we begin by relating them to the measured change in uninsurance
before considering broader groups of affected individuals in this and other
studies.
If we assume that all effects are concentrated among individuals who switch
from uninsurance to Medicaid, ITOT effects can be calculated based on a 4.15
percent gain in health insurance among all non-elderly adults we estimate
using county-level health insurance as the outcome for the same sample,
14Event-study plots for these causes of deaths appear in Appendix Figures C.12, C.13,
and C.14.
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specification, and weights as the primary mortality regression.15 Similarly,
we can calculate ITOT effects for adults 55 to 64 years of age, the age group
that largely explains the aggregate mortality reductions, based on a 2.77
percent gain in insurance.16 Calculating the ITOT additionally requires an
adjustment for the higher mortality of our estimates by the ratio of affected
to average mortality, as many studies find evidence that individuals in worse
health are more likely to enroll in Medicaid (e.g. Kenney et al. (2012),
Marton and Yelowitz (2015), Miller et al. (2019)). Specifically, we combine
the first-stage estimates with national mortality data that includes mean
individual incomes, deaths, and population counts from Chetty et al. (2016).
Adjusting for the higher mortality rates among the Medicaid population
relative to average, the estimated ITOT effects imply a 30 percent reduction
in mortality risk for adults aged 20 to 64 years as well as the near-elderly
population. Taken together, these calculations imply that one death was
averted for every 310 newly-covered individuals 20 to 64 years of age and 180
newly-covered individuals aged 55 to 64 years.17
15Results for the full population and those with incomes below 138 percent of the poverty
level appear in Appendix Table C.4. The results are consistent with the findings reported
in Miller and Wherry (2019a); see Figure 1, panel a. BHNS report a 1.1 percentage point
decrease in uninsurance in the first 3 years following the reform. For differences between
their approach and ours, see Section 2.3. The citations they provide to support this finding
are to the first-year effects of the ACA expansion, which are much smaller than the total
4-year effect.
16SAHIE does not provide data for each age group we analyze but it does provide
data for adults 50 to 64 years of age. While not perfect, this data closely overlaps the
near-elderly population we study. Survey datasets, such as the National Health Interview
Survey, provide an alternative source of insurance information by age. Research shows,
however, that insurance enrollment data from survey data suffers from under-reporting
Miller et al. (2019).
17The Chetty et al. (2016) data is limited to ages 40 and older, so we included the
ages 40 to 64 in 2013. Without the mortality scaling, our estimated effect size combined
with the estimated first-stage implies an 86 percent reduction. The mean mortality rate
in this age range is approximately 344 deaths per 100,000 people. We then calculate
the average mortality rate for individuals with incomes at or below 138 percent of the
federal poverty level. This corresponded to about 1,037 deaths per 100,000 using the
income threshold for individuals and 967 deaths per 100,000 using the threshold for a
household of two. The adjusted mortality effect for adults 20 to 64 is then between
0.86× 3441,037 = 0.29 and 0.86×
344
967 = 0.31. For the per beneficiary effects, a 4.15 percent first
stage implies 4,436,350 newly covered individuals based off a population in expansion states
of approximately 106,900,000. Using the death rates for the total (344) and expansion
(1,037) population, a 3.60 percent reduction in mortality corresponds to 14,345 reduced
deaths, and 4,436,35014,345 = 310.
For individuals 55 to 64 years of age, our estimated effect size combined with the es-
timated first-stage implies a 90 percent reduction in mortality without adjusting for dif-
ferences in mortality rates among those who are Medicaid eligible. The death rate for
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While these ITOT calculations provide one scaling of the results, we prefer
to interpret the results as reduced-form estimates of the policy. The concern
is that the ITOT scaling hinges on the size of the affected population, which
may extend significantly beyond the measurable change in uninsurance in
standard datasets.18 There are numerous ways in which the ACA Medicaid
expansion plausibly affects a larger population than is reflected by the net
change in uninsurance. First, federal law mandates coverage of medical bills
up to three months before the application to join Medicaid. This exposes
virtually all low-income individuals to treatment in some form. Second, the
ACA gives hospitals the ability to grant “presumptive eligibility,” temporary
Medicaid enrollment, to patients who have incomes that are low enough to
qualify for the program. Thus, in the most critical life-saving situations,
the ACA Medicaid expansion guarantees reimbursement for care provided
to nearly all targeted individuals. Third, individuals may cycle off and on
Medicaid. This type of churn has been documented previously and would
mean that a snapshot measure of coverage will understate the affected group.
Fourth, Medicaid induces higher rates of healthcare use, through lower levels
of cost-sharing, compared to private insurance plans. Several studies find
that larger amounts of cost-sharing, a common feature for bottom-of-the-
market insurance plans, is associated with less healthcare spending and worse
health outcomes, particularly for low-income individuals (Manning et al.,
1987; Haviland et al., 2011; Wharam et al., 2013). Therefore, it is plausible
that low-income individuals who switched from private insurance plans to
Medicaid experienced health gains. Fifth, there have been documented effects
on financial well-being, crime, and quality of care, all of which likely creates
spillovers onto ineligible individuals. For all of these reasons, we interpret
the evidence as consistent with effects accruing in a broader population than
those who receive insurance as a result of Medicaid expansion.
Despite the uncertainty in the ITOT scaling, our estimated treatment ef-
fects fall within the range of most estimates derived from previous studies
individuals with incomes at or below 138 percent of the federal poverty level is 1,700 per
100,000 people. The adjusted mortality effect is then 0.90× 5641700 = 0.30. For the per bene-
ficiary effect, a 2.77 percent first stage implies 592,226 newly covered individuals based off
a near-elderly population of approximately 21,380,000. Using the death rates for the total
(564) and expansion (1,699) population, a 2.60 percent reduction in mortality corresponds
to 3,309 reduced deaths, and 592,2263,309 = 180.
18Our discussion borrows from Miller et al. (2019), who provide a detailed discussion of
the policy environment and issues with survey-based measures of uninsurance.
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that investigate the relationship between Medicaid and mortality. Among
the pre-ACA Medicaid studies, our paper most closely aligns with Sommers
(2017), who studies mortality effects following expansions in Arizona, Maine,
and New York in the early 2000s. The TOT effect presented by Sommers
is about twice as large compared to our preferred county-TOT estimate (-
19.1 vs. -11.36 deaths per 100,000 people).19 Our estimated reduction in
individual mortality risk of 30 percent, however, falls well within the range
estimated by Sommers (between -38 and -25 percent).20 Our findings are also
comparable to the pre-ACA mortality estimates produced by the OHIE. The
authors find a 0.0013 percentage point decrease in the probability of death
compared with the control group. This estimate, however, is very impre-
cise. The 95 percent confidence interval includes effect sizes between -0.0066
and +0.0040. Based off a baseline mortality rate of 0.008, their estimates
imply an individual-level mortality change of -16.3 percent, with confidence
intervals that include a -82 and +50 percent change. The -30 percent ITOT
effect we find is approximately twice as large as the effect derived from the
OHIE. This comparison is imperfect, however, given that the OHIE first-
stage estimate corresponds to the change in Medicaid coverage, as opposed
to the total change in insurance coverage among Medicaid and non-Medicaid
eligible individuals. If we use the 8.18 percent change in Medicaid coverage
as an alternative first stage, our ITOT estimate is reduced to -17 percent.
Similarly, our work can be compared to more recent work that has ex-
amined the mortality impacts of the ACA expansion. First, Swaminathan
et al. (2018) examine the impact of the ACA Medicaid expansions on the
one-year survival rate of patients with end stage renal disease. Individuals
in this population have a substantially higher risk of mortality relative to
19To make an apples-to-apples comparison and replicate, with modifications, the analysis
reported in Sommers (2017), we re-estimate our model using the early-2000s Medicaid
expansions in Arizona, New York, and Maine. Details of this analysis appear in Appendix
D. We generate short-and long-run estimates by restricting the follow-up period to the first
four and eight years following these earlier reforms, and estimate effects on aggregate and
amenable mortality. Although mortality falls following the reforms (our point estimates
are approximately one-half the size of the prevailing estimates of the effects of Medicaid
on mortality), it is difficult to distinguish these improvements in mortality from a trend
extrapolated from before the reforms, particularly for amenable causes of death. Evidence
of pre-trends suggests that we cannot draw strong causal conclusions from these reforms.
20To calculate the per-beneficiary estimates, our approach (described above) differs from
that of Sommers in that he uses a per-beneficiary calculation is derived using a model
that interacting the indicator for whether a state expanded Medicaid with the endogenous
change in insurance coverage.
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the average adult. The researchers report that expansions lead to a 8.5 per-
cent reduction in mortality for these individuals, an effect size much larger
than the percentage reduction in all-cause mortality we find. Second, our
results differ from the empirical estimates in BHNS, who find a statistically
insignificant reduction of 3 deaths per 100,000 using a triple-difference strat-
egy that estimates changes in mortality among the near-elderly population
using a separate control group of adults ages 65 to 74 years. In addition
to the triple-difference approach, BHNS also report similar results using a
propensity-score reweighting design. As discussed in section 2.3.1, method-
ological choices likely explain an important portion of the differences in our
findings. In addition, our data includes an extra year of mortality outcomes
as compared to BHNS. As our year-by-year point estimates are growing over
time, an extra year of outcome data contributes precision for reasons beyond
the increase in sample size.
Two papers released since our first working paper have provided additional
evidence on the effect the ACA Medicaid expansion on mortality reductions
in low-income populations. Both papers possess strong claims to internal
validity. First, Miller et al. (2019) examines the mortality of ACS respon-
dents through a link to administrative Census data. Their estimates imply
ITOT effects of 23 and 64 percent reductions in mortality for adults 20 to
64 and 55 to 64 years of age, respectively. The authors also advocate for
a similar reduced-form interpretation of the results in light of the reasons
we discuss above. Second, a recent working paper by Goldin et al. (2019)
evaluates an intervention where in 2017, the Internal Revenue Service sent
informational letters to nearly 4 million randomly chosen taxpayers who had
previously paid an income tax penalty for lacking health insurance cover-
age under the individual mandate provision of the ACA. The purpose of the
letters encouraged take-up of health insurance in some form, either through
the individual marketplace or public insurance programs like Medicaid. The
authors find the intervention increased insurance take-up among individu-
als who were uninsured for some portion of the year prior to receiving a
letter by 1.3 percentage points in the year following the intervention, a 2.8
percent increase compared to individuals that met the criteria to receive a
letter but did not. The coverage effects are largest among individuals who
lacked any coverage and among older, non-elderly adults. Using the treat-
ment group assignment as an instrument for coverage, the authors estimate
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that the average per-month effect of the coverage induced by the intervention
on two-year mortality was approximately -0.17 percentage points for adults
45 to 64 years of age, an 11.9 percent reduction. Consistent with our findings,
the authors find no evidence that the intervention reduced mortality among
younger adults. Comparing our results to this study is challenging because
we focus on the relationship between mortality and Medicaid, not mortality
and insurance more generally. If we assume, however, the mortality esti-
mates reported in Goldin, Lurie, and McCubbin do apply to those covered
by Medicaid, we can scale their estimates to make a more direct comparison.
Gordon et al. (2019) finds the typical duration of Medicaid coverage lasts for
approximately one year, so multiplying the reported per-month estimate of
-0.17 by 12 yields an effect of annual coverage on mortality of -2 percentage
points.21 If we also double the reported two-year baseline mortality rate of
1.4 percent to match our four-year follow-up (2.8 percent), the -2 percentage
point reduction in two-year mortality implies an annual coverage reduction
in four-year mortality of 71 percent, with confidence intervals that include
our estimated 30 percent reduction in individual mortality risk.
2.5 Robustness
In this section, we first discuss results from a wide range of alternative spec-
ifications. We then present and discuss results from a permutation test de-
signed to gauge the likelihood that our model is indeed powered to estimate
causal mortality effects. We conclude this section by discussing mortality
estimates using elderly adults as an additional control group.
2.5.1 Alternative Specifications
We conduct a substantial range of robustness analyses, reported in Table 2.3.
In the first row, we report results derived from our preferred specification. In
the next five rows we use a number of alternative methods for the propensity
score adjustment. First, we report results where we exclude pre-treatment
21We note that this scaling is imperfect because Goldin et al. (2019) find evidence of
a concave relationship between coverage and mortality, so multiplying the reported per-
month estimate by 12 likely over-estimates the effect of annual coverage on mortality.
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outcomes in the double-lasso procedure. We then report results derived from
implementing the data-driven method outlined in Imbens and Rubin (2015)
to select variables for the propensity-score model. Next, we show estimates
where we replace the double-lasso method with ridge regression for model
selection. Finally, we present estimates using 1-to-1 and 2-to-1 nearest-
neighbor matching (with replacement) in place of reweighing. We implement
double lasso to select variables for these matching models. In all alternative
specifications for model-selection, we find results that are very similar to our
preferred estimates in both magnitude and precision.
We next consider robustness to the definition of treatment that focuses on
initial adopters of the 2014 expansion. To do so, we add back the few states
(PA, IN, NH, AK, MT, LA) that implemented the Medicaid expansion after
the first half of 2014. We then exclude five states that are included in our
main analysis (DC, DE, MA, NY, and VT) but chose to expand Medicaid
or similar coverage to low-income adults from 2009 through 2013 (Miller and
Wherry, 2017). The results from these specifications again do not differ from
our preferred estimates. Finally, we move from estimating the county-TOT
to estimating average treatment effects (county-ATE). The county-TOT es-
timates we present apply to the group of counties that were treated. The
county-ATE effects should be interpreted as effects among the population
that, in principle, could have been treated. This includes both expansion
and non-expansion counties. Here we weight our regression by population
multiplied by p
1−p , where p is the estimated propensity score. The aver-
age treatment effects show moderately larger effect sizes, suggesting that
non-expansion states may have benefited more from the Medicaid expansion
than those that adopted. This finding is consistent with the high-low unin-
surance findings reported above. Counties in non-expansion states had higher
baseline uninsured rates in addition to other characteristics that would be
expected to correlate with higher rates of uninsurance.
We also include county-specific linear trends to address concerns pertain-
ing to county-level unobserved characteristics that may be evolving over time
and correlated with mortality (e.g. changes in population compositions be-
tween counties with different ex ante insurance rates), potentially biasing
our results. Including the time trends does little to change the estimates,
reinforcing evidence that our model is not confounded by unobserved trends
between expansion and non-expansion counties. We then estimate our model
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using logged deaths as opposed to death rates. We first add one death to
each observation to avoid excluding (the very small number of) counties that
experienced no deaths. The results using logged deaths closely mirror our
estimates using mortality rates as the outcome, with estimates suggesting a
3 percent reduction in all-cause and amenable mortality. Finally, we explore
how estimates change when we use an alternative trimming of our sample.
This exercise also serves to remove units that tend to carry high leverage
and make estimators sensitive to outliers. While the trim helps discipline
our estimates, it comes at the cost of changing the estimand to reflect causal
effects for the matched (i.e. not trimmed) counties. We trim counties with
propensity scores that are less than 0.1 or greater than 0.9, the extreme end
of values suggested by Imbens and Rubin (2015). The results for all cause
mortality are notably smaller than our preferred estimates (and less precise).
Even with a more conservative trim, we again find decreases in the causes of
mortality most likely to be influenced by the ACA Medicaid expansion. The
results for amenable causes are slightly smaller than our preferred estimates
but remain statistically significant with and without controls.
We also explore how results change when we vary the penalty parameter
during the double lasso selection procedure. Appendix Figure C.15 shows
results for all-cause mortality across several values of the penalty. As we in-
crease the penalty, fewer variables are selected for inclusion into the propen-
sity score model. A penalty of zero corresponds to all variables selected for
inclusion in the model while the largest value, “limit,” corresponds to zero
variables selected for inclusion. The optimal penalty is labeled “205*” and
corresponds to our main result for all-cause mortality. As we increase the
penalty level, the estimated mortality effects becoming small and statistically
insignificant. This pattern suggests that as fewer variables are selected for
inclusion, the corresponding estimated propensity scores become more noisy.
As a result, the re-weighting adjustment does less to correct for pre-existing
differences among treatment and control counties and reduces our power to
detect mortality effects.22
22We considered adding a state level synthetic control analysis. However, several con-
siderations lead us to not include this analysis in the paper. First, our method allows us to
estimate effects when treatment occurs across many units. The synthetic control method
was designed for settings that include only one treatment group and many possible con-
trols; the econometric literature on the many-treatment groups case is in development (e.g.
Doudchenko and Imbens (2016) and Robbins et al. (2017)) and there is no agreed-upon in-
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2.5.2 Permutation Tests
In addition to investigating how our mortality estimates change across various
alternative specifications, we also conduct a permutation test to investigate
the likelihood that our model is identifying the causal effects of the ACA
Medicaid expansion on mortality or whether the effects we find are simply
due to chance as a result of potentially confounding issues such as model mis-
specification or lack of power. The permutation test essentially compares our
preferred estimates to a distribution of pseudo-treatment effects.
To conduct the permutation test, we first shift the sample period back four
years and include the time-period from 2005-2013. We then randomly assign
treatment to 27 states, the same number of states that expanded Medicaid
in 2014. States that expanded after the first half of 2014 are again excluded
from the sample. The remainder of the states make up the control group.
After the random assignment to treatment, we follow the same estimation
procedure described in section 2.3. Specifically, we estimate propensity scores
using variables selected by double lasso, i.e. variables that predict the mor-
tality rate for adults ages 20-64 and variables that predict treatment status
outcomes. We then estimate the effect of treatment, which begins in 2009 for
each treated county, on all-cause and amenable rates of mortality by weight-
ing the regressions by the county population 20 to 64 years of age multiplied
by T + (1 − T ) × p
(1−p) . We repeat this procedure 1000 times and compare
the psuedo-treatment effects to our preferred estimates.
The distribution of results from the permutation test is illustrated in Fig-
ure C.18. The figures show binned histograms with our preferred estimates
represented by the dashed vertical lines. The 5th and 95th percentiles of the
distributions are represented by the solid vertical lines. For all-cause and
amenable mortality, our preferred estimates are in the extreme left tail of
the distribution of pseudo-treatment effects and fall well outside of the 5th
and 95th percentiles. This pattern is similar when we compare the estimated
t-statistics to the distribution of pseudo-treatment t-statistics, as shown in
ference theory for these methods (for recent developments, see Li (2017) and Chernozhukov
et al. (2018)). Second, the county-level analysis offers far greater scope for heterogeneity
analysis, which is both informative about mechanisms and an important source of ro-
bustness. Finally, when we estimated synthetic control models using state-level mortality
rates, the results, though consistent with our main analysis, appear less robust, a result
due to poor matching of treatment states to the relatively small number of states in the
control group (Ben-Michael et al., 2018).
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Figure C.19. Table C.6 presents summary statistics from the test. For each
cause of death, the mean treatment effects are small and generally positive
in sign. There are also few estimates that are statistically significant at the
conventional 5 percent level, the majority of which are greater than zero.
The results of this test provide strong evidence that the mortality effects
we estimate for the ACA Medicaid expansion are very unlikely to be due to
chance.
2.5.3 Investigating the Importance of Leverage and Outliers
We perform two additional checks that supplement the permutation analysis
discussed above. First, we investigate the concentration of leverage in our
analysis, i.e. a measure of the degree to which individual observations on
right-hand side variables take on extreme values and are influential in the
regression analysis (Young, 2018). A concentration of leverage in a few ob-
servations makes coefficients and standard errors extremely volatile, as their
value becomes dependent upon the realization of a small number of residu-
als. To test whether our results are contingent on concentrated leverage, we
first estimate the difference-in-differences model for all-cause and amenable
mortality (with and without controls) and calculate the average residuals for
each state. In each specification, we then drop the state that has the highest
average residual and re-ran the model. Second, we conducted a “leave-one-
out” analysis, where we remove each state, one at a time, from the regression
analysis. In both tests, we find consistent effect sizes to our preferred esti-
mates, as illustrated in Appendix Table C.7 and Appendix Figure C.20.
2.5.4 Triple Difference with the Elderly Population
Estimating unbiased causal effects using a difference-in-differences design re-
quires that treatment and control units would have followed parallel trends in
the absence of treatment. In our setting, we have shown expansion and con-
trol counties did not follow parallel trends in mortality prior to the expansions
becoming effective in 2014, which suggests that the unadjusted difference-in-
difference would be biased. We have employed the commonly-used method of
propensity score re-weighting in combination with model selection techniques
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from machine learning to address this issue. Our strategy has been effective
at constructing a balanced treatment and control group, as measured by par-
allel pre-trends reported in Figure 2.1. An alternative strategy would have
been to employ a triple-difference strategy using a separate control group
that is unlikely to be affected by the Medicaid expansion. BHNS follow
Finkelstein and McKnight (2008) in using ages 65 to 74 as an additional
control group.
To assess this alternative design, we follow BHNS and estimate a triple-
difference model using mortality among adults ages 55 to 74 years of age with
our re-weighted sample of counties. An advantage of the triple-difference
model is that it allows us to include state-by-year effects. To make com-




The underlying assumption of this design is that changes in the relative
outcomes for the elderly and the non-elderly would evolve similarly in expan-
sion and non-expansion states in the absence of expansion. Unfortunately,
even after reweighting the sample using our propensity score model, we find
evidence of above-trend mortality in the pre-period in the expansion states for
the above-65 age group (see Appendix Table C.16).23 Although the presence
of pre-trends in the elderly group suggests this control group is problematic,
when we (effectively) average these pre-trends by the inclusion of the inter-
acted fixed effects, there is less evidence of bias (Appendix Figure C.17). The
point estimates shown in Appendix Table C.8 imply just above a 1 percent
reduction in all-cause and amenable causes of mortality for adults 55 to 64
years of age compared to the above-65 age group.24 Thus, the DDD analysis
provides evidence of mortality reductions that are consistent with our main
23In addition to the pre-trends, we found additional evidence that suggests the elderly
population may themselves have been impacted by the ACA Medicaid expansion. Specif-
ically, we examine changes in household composition among adults 65 years of age and
older who live with a Medicaid recipient between 20 and 64 using data from the American
Community Survey. Our findings reveal the percentage of elderly living with a Medicaid
recipient increases disproportionately in expansion states after 2014 by 2.3 percentage
points. Living together (or in close proximity) is likely the most important channel that
connects finances of the newly insured Medicaid population to the elderly. While the
full implications of this result extend beyond the scope of our paper, it is evidence that
the expansions may have important financial implications for elderly, potentially leading
to health improvements that are consistent with studies of earlier Medicaid reforms (e.g.
Sommers et al. (2012)).
24We reran the DDD analysis by estimating propensity scores using all-cause, amenable,
and non-amenable death rates for the above-55 sample and found similar results.
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findings that the Medicaid expansions reduced mortality for the near-elderly
population, albeit by a smaller magnitude due to the pre-trends.
2.6 Social Welfare Gains
We consider two scenarios that provide us with annual welfare gains asso-
ciated with the estimated mortality reductions. This exercise compares the
estimated annual lives saved, put in dollar terms using standard VSL tech-
niques, to the value of annual total Medicaid expenditures associated with
the expansion. In our primary scenario, we focus on amenable causes of
mortality among people 55 to 64 years of age, the group where we find the
strongest evidence of a mortality response. Since the amenable-cause mor-
tality reductions in this age range do not account for the total estimated
effect, however, we interpret this welfare estimate as a lower bound. We
provide a second estimate using the all-cause mortality reduction for adults
20 to 64 years of age. It is important to note that our calculations consider
only welfare gains from the estimated mortality reductions and do not repre-
sent the total welfare gains of the Medicaid expansions. In particular, we do
not consider potential welfare gains associated with increases in individual
or household financial stability, labor supply, and reductions in costly social
activity such as crime.
To obtain the primary welfare estimate, we first calculate a “per-county”
mortality reduction by multiplying the estimated amenable-cause percent-
age response in Table 2.2 for the 54-to-65 age-group by the relevant baseline
mortality rate and population (in 100,000s) for the same age-group in expan-
sion counties. We then multiply this value by the total number of expansion
counties, 1,252, and by age-specific VSL estimates gathered from Aldy and
Viscusi (2008). The procedure for the secondary estimate follows the same
approach except that we calculate the “per-county” mortality reduction using
the estimated all-cause percentage response of 3.60 percent and the popula-
tion of individuals 20 to 64 years of age. The VSL estimate for the 20-to-64
category consists of the age-specific VSL estimates, weighted by the ratio of
the age-specific mortality rate relative to the average.
Results from the welfare calculations are presented in Table 2.4. We esti-
mate annual welfare gains (in 2017 dollars) at between $25.1 and $106 billion.
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These estimates equate to between 35 and 150 percent of the $70 billion in
expenditures associated with the Medicaid expansion in 2017 (Center for
Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2017). Given that an estimated 60 percent
of Medicaid expenditures are transfers to implicit insurance providers, as
opposed to new costs to society, our estimates imply the mortality-related
savings may cover the entire net cost of the expansion (Finkelstein et al.,
2019). This calculation sets aside several known issues in valuing mortality
reductions. For example, the welfare benefits of mortality reduction could be
adjusted for social welfare weights and VSL specific to the target population
(see Finkelstein et al. (2019) for longer discussion), as well as harvesting ef-
fects (see Deryugina et al. (2019)). The calculation also does not take into
account quality of life improvements from changes in morbidity. Neverthe-
less, even if we were to discount heavily the welfare gains from mortality, our
point estimates would still imply that mortality reduction can significantly
impact the program’s cost effectiveness.
2.7 Conclusion
The results we report in this paper add to a growing body of literature on
the effects of public health insurance, Medicaid, and the ACA on health out-
comes. Findings from our study indicate that the ACA Medicaid expansion
reduced mortality in the portion of the population that is between 20 and
64 years of age by 11.36 deaths per 100,000, a 3.60 percent reduction, within
the first four years of the reform. Considering that the Medicaid expansion
covered over 10 percent of the population in these states, and induced a
4.15 percent net increase in insurance coverage, these estimates imply that
the program likely affected mortality through channels beyond the access to
healthcare among newly-insured individuals. Improvements in welfare due to
the mortality responses we find may cover all annual expenditures associated
with the Medicaid expansion.
We believe the estimates derived from the ACA Medicaid expansion pro-
vide us with several important advantages relative to the quasi-experiments
available to previous researchers. First and most fundamentally, the ACA
expansion affected a much larger share of the population than earlier policy
reforms. Previous studies of Medicaid expansions have examined at most
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three state-level reforms. The preeminent study on the effects of Medicaid
is the OHIE, the only large-scale randomization of access to Medicaid; how-
ever, OHIE lacks sufficient statistical power to detect mortality effects of the
magnitude we document here (Baicker and Finkelstein, 2011; Finkelstein et
al., 2012). Second, the nationwide treatment and other details of the ACA
reduce the likelihood that concurrent changes in state policy and mortality
trends bias the results. Previous reforms were initiated by individual states
and may have been accompanied by other changes in policy, or were moti-
vated by specific mortality trends (Kaestner, 2012). In contrast, the federal
government covered 100 percent of the initial costs of Medicaid expansion
(and promised to cover 90 percent of the costs starting in 2020), greatly re-
ducing the role of state health and budgetary conditions in the decision to
expand. Third, we can conduct several important secondary analyses and
robustness checks that do not appear in the previous work. Most notably,
we assess pre-reform trends and outcomes in an event study framework, and
examine the statistical performance of the model using permutation analysis.
Finally, our study serves to update analyses of earlier Medicaid reforms to
account for the changing mortality environment. A substantial portion, 20
percent, of the effects of early-2000s Medicaid expansions on mortality came
through reductions in HIV-related mortality (Sommers, 2017). Since then,
medical innovations have greatly reduced mortality due to HIV, while other
causes of death have risen, in both relative and absolute terms (Okie, 2010;
Phillips, 2014; Case and Deaton, 2015). Our findings suggest that the ACA
Medicaid expansion resulted in meaningful reductions in mortality, despite
the changing mortality environment.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
Expansion Counties Matched Counties
Variables Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
Baseline Mortality Rates
All Cause Mortality (per 100,000 people) 315.17 (94.69) 359.06 (117.06)
Males 394.31 (120.53) 449.76 (149.54)
Females 237.43 (75.79) 271.23 (94.93)
Ages 20-24 82.03 (46.25) 95.89 (62.41)
Ages 25-34 96.64 (46.99) 114.01 (54.57)
Ages 35-44 160.49 (65.42) 184.84 (80.28)
Ages 45-54 379.59 (119.13) 434.35 (147.28)
Ages 55-64 795.59 (196.38) 885.72 (236.04)
Amenable Cause Mortality (per 100,000 people) 200.78 (61.56) 226.80 (78.03)
Males 239.45 (76.33) 272.11 (98.36)
Females 162.88 (52.74) 183.08 (66.75)
Ages 20-24 11.69 (13.35) 13.18 (19.27)
Ages 25-34 23.83 (15.18) 27.84 (20.07)
Ages 35-44 71.68 (31.64) 83.48 (42.64)
Ages 45-54 238.82 (80.31) 273.46 (100.40)
Ages 55-64 607.86 (158.58) 668.63 (189.14)
Cardiovascular Mortality (per 100,000 people) 63.25 (25.32) 72.03 (32.06)
Respiratory Mortality (per 100,000 people) 17.47 (10.24) 21.17 (13.44)
Cancer Mortality (per 100,000 people) 90.81 (24.30) 98.58 (31.64)
Suicides (per 100,000 people) 15.28 (7.45) 18.19 (8.77)
Opioid Overdoses (per 100,000 people) 2.66 (3.89) 3.67 (4.30)
Drug & Alcohol Poisonings (per 100,000 people) 13.23 (9.26) 12.95 (9.12)
Independent Variables
% Population Ages 20-25 0.12 (0.03) 0.12 (0.04)
% Population Ages 25-34 0.23 (0.03) 0.22 (0.03)
% Population Ages 35-44 0.22 (0.02) 0.22 (0.02)
% Population Ages 45-54 0.24 (0.02) 0.24 (0.02)
% Population Ages 55-64 0.20 (0.03) 0.20 (0.04)
% Male 0.50 (0.01) 0.49 (0.02)
% Hispanic 0.19 (0.16) 0.16 (0.19)
% White 0.78 (0.14) 0.79 (0.13)
% Black 0.11 (0.11) 0.15 (0.12)
Unemployed Rate 0.09 (0.02) 0.08 (0.02)
Poverty Rate 0.15 (0.05) 0.16 (0.05)
Real Median Income ($10,000) 5.95 (1.46) 5.33 (1.49)
Uninsured Rate 0.19 (0.06) 0.24 (0.07)
Obama 2008 Vote share 0.46 (0.12) 0.38 (0.13)
Obama 2012 Vote share 0.43 (0.13) 0.35 (0.14)
Democratic Governor 0.76 (0.43) 0.49 (0.50)
Notes: The above table presents population weighted means and standard deviations
of baseline variables, measured for 2009-2013, in counties within states that expanded
Medicaid in 2014 and counties in non-expansion states.
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Table 2.2: Effect of ACA Medicaid Expansion on Mortality
Full Sample Gender Age Groups Uninsured
Base Controls Males Females 20-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 High Low
Model and Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Panel A: All Cause Mortality
Expansion -14.83** -11.36*** -11.36*** -11.60*** -0.95 -5.19 -7.93** -15.35* -20.65* -12.40*** -3.96
(6.12) (3.59) (4.27) (3.31) (2.61) (3.99) (3.42) (8.51) (11.09) (4.22) (4.42)
% Effect Relative to Baseline -4.71 -3.60 -2.88 -4.89 -1.16 -5.37 -4.94 -4.04 -2.60 -3.81 -1.30
Panel B: Amenable Cause Mortality
Medicaid Expansion -7.79*** -6.64*** -5.94*** -7.41*** 0.29 1.07 -2.44* -8.12* -20.22*** -7.89*** -2.88*
(2.15) (1.93) (2.13) (2.15) (0.39) (1.21) (1.37) (4.86) (6.55) (2.69) (1.49)
% Effect Relative to Baseline -3.88 -3.31 -2.48 -4.55 2.48 4.49 -3.40 -3.40 -3.33 -3.84 -1.74
Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 40 38
Observations 20340 20340 20340 20340 20340 20340 20340 20340 20340 18882 11214
Notes: Observations include annual county-level mortality rates for adults aged 20 to 64
years. Columns (1) and (2) include results for the full sample with and without controls.
In columns (3) and (4) we report results for males and females, respectively. In columns
(5) through (9) we report results for five separate age groups. In columns (10) and (11)
we report heterogeneous effects by county baseline uninsured levels, where High/Low
uninsured counties are defined as being above/below the median baseline uninsured rate
for individuals aged 19 to 64 years. Coefficients indicate deaths per 100,000 people.
Standard errors are clustered at the state level. All models include year and county fixed
effects. Controls include the county unemployment rate, the percentage of population
that is white, the percentage of population that is between 55 and 64 years of age, the
logged county population of adults between 20 and 64 years of age, the logged county
population of adults between 35 and 44 years of age, and the logged county population
of females between 20 and 64 years of age.
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Table 2.3: Alternative Specifications: Effect of Medicaid Expansion on
Mortality
All Cause Amenable
No Controls Controls No Controls Controls
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
Preferred Estimates -14.83** -11.36*** -7.79*** -6.64***
(6.12) (3.59) (2.15) (1.93)
No Pre-treatment Outcomes -12.97** -10.12*** -7.10*** -6.35***
(6.05) (3.58) (1.99) (1.95)
Imbens Selection Procedure -14.52** -11.73*** -7.22*** -6.27***
(6.27) (3.75) (2.08) (2.03)
Ridge Regression -10.76* -10.55*** -6.42*** -6.61***
(6.04) (3.22) (2.07) (1.81)
1:1 Nearest Neighbor Matching -14.98*** -9.37** -7.22*** -5.48**
(5.17) (3.71) (1.83) (2.27)
2:1 Nearest Neighbor Matching -15.98*** -11.54*** -8.05*** -6.36***
(5.59) (3.56) (2.32) (2.04)
Adding Late Expanding States -11.22** -10.10*** -6.77*** -6.60***
(5.57) (3.16) (1.95) (1.55)
Exclude Early Expanding States -12.74** -9.13** -6.70*** -5.48***
(6.43) (3.82) (2.23) (1.80)
Average Treatment Effect -17.15*** -14.36*** -8.80*** -7.60***
(5.91) (3.15) (2.27) (1.93)
County-Specific Trends -14.75** -12.06*** -7.74*** -6.96***
(6.46) (3.91) (2.27) (2.06)
Logged Deaths -0.031*** -0.030*** -0.026*** -0.028***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Trim propensity score .1/.9 -6.66 -7.42* -5.96*** -5.52**
(5.68) (4.16) (2.17) (2.15)
Controls No Yes No Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Observations include annual county-level mortality rates for adults ages 20 to 64 for the years
2009-2017. Coefficients indicate deaths per 100,000 people. Standard errors are clustered at the state
level. All models include year and county fixed effects. Controls selected using double lasso. In the first
row, we show estimated mortality effects derived using our preferred specification. In the second row,
we show estimated mortality effects without including pre-treatment outcome variables in the matching
procedure. In the third row, we present estimated mortality effects using the Imbens variable selection
procedure. In the fourth row, we present estimates where we use ridge regression to select variables
for the propensity score. In rows five and six we present estimate using 1:1 and 2:1 nearest-neighbor
matching, respectively. In row seven we include states that expanded Medicaid after 2014 (AK, IN, NH,
PA and MT). In row eight we excluded states that expanded Medicaid prior to 2014 (DC, DE, MA,
NY and VT). In row nine we present estimates of the average treatment effect. In row 10 we include
county-specific linear time trends to the regressions. In row 11 we define the outcome variables as logged
deaths. In the final row, we trim the sample of counties with propensity scores below 0.1 or above 0.9.
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Table 2.4: Estimated Welfare Gains
Welfare Mortality Reduction Expansion VSLY Total Gains
Projections Per County Counties ($) ($)
Ages 55-64 Amenable 4.13 1252 $4,867,840 $25,166,253,430
Ages 20-64 All-Cause 9.64 1252 $8,783,488 $106,056,588,370
Notes: VSL values calculated as using estimates from Aldy and Viscusi (2008). All mon-
etary values are reported in 2017 dollars. Ages 55-64 Amenable captures only amenable-
cause mortality reductions among the population aged 55-64 years. Ages 20-64 All-Cause
calculates welfare-gains using the all-cause mortality estimate of 3.60 percent for the pop-
ulation 20 to 64 years of age.
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Notes: The above figure shows event-study plots of Medicaid expansion on (a) all-cause
mortality and (b) amenable causes of mortality for adults aged 20 to 64 year. The vertical
line indicates the year prior to the effective date of when expansion. Bands indicate 95%
confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Models include year
and county fixed effects. Controls include the county unemployment rate, the percentage
of population that is white, the percentage of population that is between 55 and 64
years of age, the logged county population of adults between 20 and 64 years of age,
the logged county population of adults between 35 and 44 years of age, and the logged
county population of females between 20 and 64 years of age.
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CHAPTER 3
ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE AND
CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR: EVIDENCE FROM
THE ACA MEDICAID EXPANSIONS
3.1 Introduction
Access to health care and criminal activity are two of the most important
policy issues in the United States. In 2010, an estimated 50 million people did
not have health insurance, a total representing over 16 percent of the total
population (DeNavas-Walt et al., 2012). In the same year, the FBI reported
over 13 million arrests nationwide. The socioeconomic costs associated with
high rates of uninsurance have been well documented. Studies have shown
being uninsured reduces productivity and financial stability as well as use of
health care services.1 Crime also generates large costs to society. Criminal
activity accounts for over $15 billion in economic losses annually for victims
and $180 billion in police, judicial, and correctional costs (McCollister et al.,
2010). When including less visible costs associated with fear and agony as
well as the opportunity cost of time lost, the annual implicit cost of crime
has been estimated to be as high as $3.2 trillion (Anderson et al., 2012).
While high rates of uninsurance and criminal behavior separately impose
heavy burdens on individuals and communities, statistics also indicate that
the issues are closely related. One study estimated that, prior to 2010, 90
percent of the individuals entering local and county jails in the United States
were uninsured (Wang et al., 2008). In addition to being uninsured, a large
number of individuals involved in the criminal justice system are poor and
lack stable employment, circumstances that historically have created sub-
stantial barriers to health insurance (James, 2017). Despite this observed
correlation, the causal relationship between health care and crime is not well
1There is extensive evidence on these outcomes: Currie and Gruber (1996a,b); Card
and Shore-Sheppard (2004); Long et al. (2005); Finkelstein et al. (2012); DeLeire et al.
(2013); Sommers et al. (2014); Taubman et al. (2014); Dizioli and Pinheiro (2016); Hu et
al. (2016); Brevoort et al. (2017).
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understood
In this paper, I fill an important gap in the literature by providing causal
estimates pertaining to the impact of health insurance on criminal behavior.
My empirical strategy combines plausibly exogenous variation in insurance
eligibility generated by state decisions to expand Medicaid coverage begin-
ning in 2014 with state-level panel data of reported crimes between the years
2009 and 2018. The state option to expand coverage was one of the main com-
ponents included in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA).
Prior to the passage of the ACA, Medicaid eligibility was restricted to certain
low income groups, including children, single mothers, pregnant women, the
disabled, and the elderly. The categorical restrictions excluded millions of
low-income adults from qualifying for the program. Many of these individ-
uals, particularly single-adults without dependent children, are at especially
high risk of committing crimes (Gates and Rudowitz, 2014).
Using a difference-in-differences approach, the analysis reveals that ex-
panding health insurance eligibility reduces reported crime rates. Specifically,
I find that reported violent crime rates decreased by 5.3 percent in states that
chose to expand Medicaid coverage relative to states that did not expand.
The event-study plots show flat pre-reform trends and a gradual drop in
crime during the initial five years after reform. The aggregate effect is ex-
plained by reductions in reported aggravated assaults, the most commonly
occurring violent crime, and is robust to multiple alternative specifications
and falsification tests. Using age-specific arrest data, I also find the reduction
in violent crime corresponds to reductions in arrests for aggravated assaults
committed by younger individuals. This result is consistent with the baseline
estimates and stylized facts regarding which individuals are most likely to
commit crime. While I find do not find a significant response in aggregate
property crime, I do find suggestive evidence that burglaries decreased. This
estimate, however, is less robust across alternative specifications.
Applying estimates of newly covered individuals in states that expanded
Medicaid relative to those that did not, the crime reductions equate to one
additional assault being averted for every 114 new Medicaid recipients. A
back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests the annual social cost savings asso-
ciated with the estimated violent crime reduction is approximately $4 billion.
This figure equates to nearly 3 percent of annual crime-related expenditures
in the United States. This result also implies that the crime benefits offset
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14 percent of the net costs associated with the Medicaid expansion.
There are several mechanisms through which expanding health insurance
eligibility may lead to reductions in violent crime. The first is treatment for
health conditions that may facilitate criminal behavior. States that expanded
Medicaid have experienced disproportionate increases in health treatment use
for services targeting substance use disorders (SUD) and mental health (MH)
illness (Maclean et al., 2017; Wen et al., 2017b; Maclean and Saloner, 2019).
Multiple studies report strong associations between treatment for these con-
ditions and violent crime, particularly for individuals with SUD (Gumpert et
al., 2010; Durbeej et al., 2015). The second mechanism is a positive income
effect. Recent work has shown that the Medicaid expansions reduced the
number of unpaid bills and increased credit scores for the low-income and
previously uninsured (Hu et al., 2016; Brevoort et al., 2017). While intu-
ition suggests positive income shocks align with a reduction in financially-
motivated offenses, income shocks can also reduce violent crime by raising the
opportunity cost of committing crime and reducing financial-related stress
(Aizer, 2010; Carr and Packham, 2019a). Violent crime could also decrease
through increased savings accrued by states that expanded Medicaid. As
many of the beneficiaries are able to secure Medicaid coverage through the
expansion, states can now fund programs and services with federal dollars.
The savings, in turn, can be used to finance other programs that could them-
selves be crime reducing, including behavioral health programs and health
care services for incarcerated individuals.
This paper contributes to the economic literature as an investigation into
the causal relationship between health insurance and crime. More generally,
this study provides evidence that broad public policy can serve as a means of
criminal deterrence and improving public safety. Without empirical evidence,
it is unclear whether investments in health care lead to reductions in crime.
Few studies have examined this relationship, most notably Wen et al. (2017a),
Bondurant et al. (2018), and He and Barkowski (2020). The former two
studies focus specifically on the link between treatment for SUD and criminal
behavior. Both find increases in treatment rates significantly reduces criminal
behavior at the local level. He and Barkowski (2020) also examine the effects
of health insurance on crime following the ACA Medicaid expansions using
data from 2010 through 2016. The author finds similar results to those
presented here, although several of the results the authors present are not
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robust with the inclusion of an additional three years of data.2
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 3.2, I pro-
vide background information on the Medicaid program and the ACA, and
discuss key mechanisms through which expanding insurance eligibility can in-
fluence criminal behavior. In section 3.3, I describe the data. In section 3.4,
I present the empirical strategy in detail. In section 3.5, I present results
from the main analysis. In section 3.6, I show results derived using several
alternative specifications and falsification tests. I also show heterogeneous
treatment effects by states and age. In section 3.7, I present implied indi-
vidual treatment-on-the-treated estimates and estimated social cost-savings
associated with the reduction in crime. In section 3.8, I compare my re-
sults to the related literature and describe major policy implications. I offer
concluding remarks in section 3.9.
3.2 Background and Conceptual Framework
3.2.1 Medicaid and the ACA
Medicaid is a publicly-funded health insurance program for low-income fam-
ilies and individuals in the United States. Founded in 1965, Medicaid is
the largest means-tested social insurance program in the country. Prior to
2014, the program covered nearly 60 million individuals with an estimated
combined cost to state and federal governments totaling $390 billion (Buch-
mueller et al., 2015). States have historically had a great deal of autonomy
when it comes to determining program generosity. As a consequence, there
has always been considerable heterogeneity in Medicaid eligibility require-
ments across states. However, one consistent policy across states has been
categorical restrictions that limit coverage to the disabled, the elderly, chil-
dren, and members of families with dependent children. This requirement
has historically meant that millions of low-income individuals in the United
States are ineligible for Medicaid.
In the years prior to the ACA, several states attempted to provide Medi-
caid benefits to otherwise ineligible low-income adults, mainly through fed-
2This paper was made available after dissemination of a working paper version of my
study.
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eral waivers and expanding in-state health care programs. Ultimately these
expansions failed to result in widespread reductions in the uninsurance rate,
largely due to restricted income eligibility and coverage that was limited to
only a small subset of conditions (Maclean and Saloner, 2019). It was not
until the ACA that eligibility for Medicaid benefits extended more broadly to
low-income adults. In addition to establishing health insurance marketplaces
and an individual mandate, the ACA expands Medicaid benefits to all adults
with incomes at or below 138 percent of the federal poverty level.3 The Medi-
caid reform was originally formulated to occur nationwide, but was effectively
made a state option by a 2012 Supreme Court ruling on the constitutionality
of the ACA.
In states that have chosen to expand Medicaid eligibility, the categorical
restrictions have been removed and eligibility is now based solely on income.
Newly eligible individuals receive coverage for a wide range of treatments
for chronic diseases, SUD, and MH illnesses. Table 3.1 shows the states
that chose to adopt the Medicaid expansions. By the end of 2018, 31 states
and the District of Columbia expanded their Medicaid programs. Coverage
became effective on January 1, 2014 in most expansion states.
Using data from the Small Area Health Insurance Estimates produced by
the US Census, Figure 3.1 illustrates the trends in the average state uninsured
rate before and after the Medicaid expansions became effective, both for total
state populations in 1(a) and separately among the Medicaid eligible state
populations in 1(b), i.e. those who are 18 to 64 years of age with incomes
at or below 138 percent of the federal poverty level. In both plots there is
an obvious break in the percentage of individuals with no coverage following
the implementation of the key provisions of the ACA. However, states that
expanded Medicaid eligibility experienced a more sizable decrease in their
uninsured population. Using the same data, Table E.1 shows results from
a simple fixed effects differences-in-differences regression of state uninsured
rates on indicators for whether the state expanded Medicaid. The results
indicate that expansion states experienced greater decreases in uninsured
individuals across their entire populations (as shown in Panel A) with even
larger estimated effects for the population that meets the new eligibility
3This level corresponds to having an annual individual income of approximately $16,000
or less.
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requirements for Medicaid (as shown in Panel B).4
3.2.2 Conceptual Framework: Health Insurance and Crime
The relationship between expanding Medicaid eligibility and crime is am-
biguous, a feature that motivates this study. The net effect depends on how
insurance changes health care use and individual behavior. Reductions in
crime are likely to result from increasing treatment use, particularly for SUD
and MH illnesses. The majority of people that have previously been arrested
or incarcerated suffer from SUD, MH illnesses, and/or serious physical med-
ical conditions (Bronson et al., 2017; Bronson and Berzofsky, 2017). Prior
to the ACA, most health plans covered mental and behavioral health con-
ditions at the same level as physical health conditions. The ACA went a
step further by requiring all health plans in the individual and small-group
markets to provide a package of “Essential Health Benefits” (EHB) that in-
clude MH/SUD services (Bailey, 2017).5 Importantly, people covered by the
Medicaid expansion must also receive the EHB. Expanding health insurance
through relaxed Medicaid eligibility requirements is a key mechanism that
can facilitate use of needed care. Research has shown that the Medicaid ex-
pansions have resulted in increases in access to care and medication targeting
MH/SUD conditions (Maclean et al., 2017; Wen et al., 2017b; Maclean and
Saloner, 2019).
The associations between SUD, mental illness, and crime are well docu-
mented in the criminology and medical literature. This relationship is par-
ticularly strong for crimes that are committed impulsively, which tend to be
more violent in nature (Aslim et al., 2019). While research points toward a
tenuous link between mental illness and violence (see Frank and Glied (2006)
and Elbogen and Johnson (2009)), multiple studies find a much stronger as-
4These estimates are comparable to findings by Courtemanche et al. (2017), who show
that the proportion of residents with health insurance rose by 5.9 percentage points com-
pared to a 3.0 percentage point increase in non-expansion states the first year after the
ACA was implemented. The authors also find coverage gains were concentrated largely
among a population newly eligible for Medicaid, namely young low income adults, minori-
ties, and the unmarried.
5It is plausible that the ACA provision led to reductions in crime across the country,
with larger impacts occurring in Medicaid expansion states as a result of a larger number
of people receiving care. Behavioral health coverage increased nationwide after the ACA
provision took effect and these gains were especially pronounced in states that expanded
Medicaid under the ACA (HHS, 2017).
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sociation between SUD treatment and violent crime (Gumpert et al., 2010;
Durbeej et al., 2015). This link is also consistent with recent work in the
economic literature that finds evidence of a causal effect between SUD treat-
ment and reduced local-level violent criminal activity (Wen et al., 2017a;
Bondurant et al., 2018).
A second mechanism through which the Medicaid expansions may trans-
late into reductions in crime is a positive income effect. Economic theory
posits that gaining insurance reduces expected medical expenditures, which
leads to gains in disposable income for the newly insured. Intuition and
empirical evidence suggests positive income shocks align with a reduction in
financially-motivated crimes (Carr and Packham, 2019b). However, income
shocks also can affect violent crimes through changes in financial-related
stress. Specifically, if violence increases an offender’s utility function as a
way to relieve stress, positive income shocks for financially-constrained in-
dividuals, such as those eligible for Medicaid, can lead to fewer instances of
violence. There is convincing evidence that positive income shocks do lead
to reductions in violent crime (Aizer, 2010; Carr and Packham, 2019a).
There are other potential mechanisms through which the expansions may
translate into reductions in crime. For example, insurance coverage should,
in principle, increase quality of life. As a result, the opportunity cost of com-
mitting crime should also increase, though perhaps not uniformly. Violent
crime tends to result in longer jail and prison sentences. Thus, the opportu-
nity cost of commuting such offenses is presumably larger as well. Another
mechanism relates to state funding for health care. Historically, many states
have used their own funds to support programs and services for the uninsured,
including mental and behavioral health programs, public health programs,
and health care services for incarcerated individuals (Bachrach et al., 2016).
As many of the beneficiaries are able to secure Medicaid coverage through
the expansion, states can now fund these programs and services with federal
dollars. Many studies report that states that expanded Medicaid have ex-
perienced hundreds of millions of dollars in fiscal savings, including savings
in behavioral health and criminal justice expenditures, revenue gains, and
increases in overall economic growth.6 Medicaid’s role in financing SUD ser-
vices, in particular, has grown as federal Medicaid dollars have replaced block
6See Antonisse et al. (2018) for a review of the literature.
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grants and state spending previously used to fund services for uninsured in-
dividuals. The increased savings, in turn, can be used to finance other state
spending priorities, including activities that could be crime reducing.
On the other hand, crime could increase as a result of expanding health in-
surance eligibility. This is most likely to occur among crimes directly related
to substance use. Nearly 60 percent of all arrestees test positive for some
illicit substance at the time of arrest (Bondurant et al., 2018). Expanding
health insurance eligibility makes it easier to access prescription medications
that may facilitate criminal behavior, including opioids (Hansen et al., 2011;
Florence et al., 2016; Dave et al., 2018), stimulants (Gossop et al., 2000;
Tiihonen et al., 2015), and benzodiazepines (Hagg̊ard-Grann et al., 2006).
Moreover, substance use might increase as a result of an income effect from
lower out-of-pocket spending on health care. Many studies have found evi-
dence that positive income shocks can increase consumption of complements
to crime, including alcohol and illicit drugs (Carpenter, 2005; Dobkin and
Puller, 2007; Carr and Koppa, 2016; Castellari et al., 2017). Substance use
might also increase through ex ante moral hazard behavior brought about by
a reduction in health risks, although research has found no evidence of this
behavior occurring following the ACA (Simon et al., 2017; Courtemanche et
al., 2018).
Finally, expanding insurance eligibility may not translate into any changes
in crime if those newly enrolled continue to face substantial barriers to treat-
ment. These individuals may lack adequate knowledge of the health care
system needed to obtain regular access to a primary care physician. Ac-
cording to one study, only 12 percent of adults in the United States have
proficient health literacy (Somers and Mahadevan, 2010). Newly enrolled
individuals may also face barriers to treatment due to supply side capacity
constraint. For example, Medicaid’s low provider payment rates may create
a disincentive for physicians to take on newly enrolled patients, particularly




Annual, state-level crime data was obtained from the FBI’s Uniform Crime
Reports (UCR) for the years 2009 through 2018. (UCR, 2018). The UCR
program provides national standards for the classification of crimes and ar-
rests. In particular, the UCR crime definitions are distinct from federal or
state laws. This is important given that each law enforcement agency has
its own policies and procedures for recording instances of crime, making it
very difficult to compare statistics across agencies without using the UCR.
The data includes state-wide counts of the most commonly reported violent
and property crimes, including criminal homicide, robbery, forcible rape,
aggregated assault, burglary, larceny theft, and motor vehicle theft. The
construction of this data is based on the number of crimes reported to the
police by all law enforcement agencies operating within a given state during
an entire calendar year.
While the UCR data is quite comprehensive, it also has several limitations
that warrant discussion. First, participation in the UCR program among
police agencies in the United States is voluntary. To avoid under-counting
crime totals, the FBI provides annual estimated offense volumes for each
state. These estimates are imperfect and likely induce some bias to the
analysis. For example, agencies that tend to under-report could also tend to
have high/low crime rates. Including certain controls in the regressions, such
as state fixed-effects, help correct for consistent differences in misreporting
bias across states. The magnitude of bias from using the estimated crime
data, however, is likely far smaller compared to the degree of bias induced
from analyzing the un-adjusted data, where non-reporting is quite common.
According to my analysis of the local-level UCR data, one-third of all county
agencies reported zero months of data during my sample period.
Second, the UCR data includes only instances of crimes known to law
enforcement, as opposed to all crime that has actually occurred. It is well
known from victimization surveys that not all crimes are reported to law
enforcement. For example, Langton and Truman (2014) report that only
50 percent of all violent crime that occurred in the United States between
the years 2004 and 2013 was reported to police. For property crime, the
reporting rate is even less at 40 percent. Therefore, the results in this paper
should be interpreted in the context of reported crime and not all crime that
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occurs in the United States
Summary statistics for state-level reported crime rates are provided in
the top panel of Table 3.2. Property crimes make up the large majority of
reported crimes in both expansion and non-expansion states. The average
reported property crime rate is slightly larger in states that did not expand
Medicaid, while the average reported violent crime rate is larger in states
that chose to expand. Figure 3.2 presents aggregate trends in reported crime
rates averaged across expansion and non-expansion states. There are two key
observations to make regarding these figures. First, the trends in reported
crime rates appear to be trending similarly between expansion and non-
expansion states prior to 2014. Second, the figures show the trend in violent
crime diverge in 2014, the first year that the majority of Medicaid expansions
became effective. In particular, it appears the average reported violent crime
rate decreased in expansion states while the trend for non-expansion states
slightly increased. There is does not appear to be a noticeable change in
trends for rates of property crimes.
3.4 Empirical Strategy
3.4.1 State-Level Analysis
I begin my main empirical analysis by estimating the impact of expanding
health insurance eligibility on state-level reported crime rates. Specifically, I
estimate the following difference-in-differences regression model:
Yst =β1Expansionst + Xstγ1 + αs + δt + θrt + εst. (3.1)
The outcome variable Yst is defined as the natural log of reported crimes
measured per 100,000 people in state s and year t.7 The main coefficient of
interest is β1 on the variable Expansionst, which takes the value 1 if state s
expanded Medicaid coverage in time t, and equals 0 otherwise.8
7One concern with defining the outcome as a rate is that population may be endogenous
to the Medicaid expansions. Goodman (2017) has shown, however, that migration from
non-expansion states to expansion states did not increase after 2014 relative to migration
in the reverse direction.
8I code treatment for New Hampshire to begin in 2015 because the reform did not
become effective until the second-half of 2014. Similarly, I code treatment to begin in
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In my baseline specification, I include a full set of state and year fixed
effects, denoted by αs and δt respectively, in order to capture time-invariant
state-specific unobservables and national time trends. I also include region-
by-year fixed effects, denoted by θrt to capture annual, region-specific shocks
that may impact criminal behavior (e.g. weather or pollution shocks) as well
as control for the strong convergence in crime rates across the United States
(Cook and Winfield, 2013, 2015).9 In addition to the fixed effects, I include
vectors of state-specific demographic and economic covariates indicated by
Xst. Demographic covariates include the fraction of the population that
is white, black, and Hispanic, the fraction of the population that is male,
and the fraction of the population in seven age bins (0-9, 10-19, 20-29, 30-
39, 40-49, 50-59, and 60+). Economic controls include state unemployment
rates, median per-capita income, and the fraction of the population below
the poverty line.10 Finally, εst represents the error term. Standard errors are
clustered at the state-level to allow for serial correlation within states.
The difference-in-differences framework presented in equation 3.1 relies on
the identifying assumption that trends in reported crime rates between ex-
pansion and non-expansion states would be un-changed in the absence of
treatment. One way to test this assumption is to check whether crime trends
between expansion and non-expansion states are parallel in the period prior
to treatment. In addition, the empirical strategy assumes the decision to
expand Medicaid was independent of trends in crime rates, i.e. the Medicaid
expansion lead to changes in criminal outcomes, rather than trends in crim-
inal outcomes leading to the decision to expand Medicaid. This concern is
not likely to be an confounding problem considering the decision to expand
Medicaid benefits was based largely on the partisan composition of state
governments and the generosity of the Medicaid program in a given state
prior to 2010 (Barrilleaux and Rainey, 2014; Lanford and Quadagno, 2016).
Nevertheless, I present an event-study specification that tests for confound-
ing pre-trends and captures heterogeneous treatment effects over time. The
2016 and 2017 for Alaska and Louisiana, respectively, as these expansions did not become
effective until late 2015 and 2016.
9Census regions include Northeast, Midwest, South, and West.
10Population, racial composition, and age distribution data were gathered from the
SEER database provided by the National Cancer Institute. Unemployment data were
gathered from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Income and poverty data were obtained
from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
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λtExpansionst + Xstγ1 + αs + δt + θrt + εst. (3.2)
The coefficients of interest are the λt’s on the variable Expansionst. The
model includes five years of pre-expansion and post-expansion coefficients,
with the year before the policy change normalized to zero. The rest of the
controls included in the model are the same as in equation 3.1.
3.5 The Effect of the ACA Medicaid Expansions on
Crime
In this section, I discuss results based on the empirical strategy presented
above. Table 3.3 shows the estimated effects of the Medicaid expansions on
state-level reported crime rates. Looking first at columns (1) and (2), I find
no impact of the ACA Medicaid expansions on total reported crime rates.
The estimate with the full set of controls is near-zero and does not approach
statistical significance. In columns (3) and (4), I show results for violent
crime. I find a 5.3 percent reduction in reported violent crime rates. Includ-
ing controls does not change the estimate, suggesting that the fixed effects
in the model absorb a substantial amount of confounding variation. Both
estimates are statistically significant at the 5 percent level. The estimate
derived from my baseline specification with controls implies a reduction of
21 instances of violent crime per 100,000 individuals based on the baseline
mean violent crime rate in expansion states. Turning to reported property
crime in columns (5) and (6), the estimates are very similar to the total crime
results. These results are not surprising given that property crime accounts
for nearly 90 percent of all reported crime.
In Figure 3.3, I show event-study plots derived using equation 3.2. These
figures show how reported crime rates evolve over time in the periods before
and after the Medicaid expansions became effective. For violent crime, the
pattern exhibits flat pre-trends and a noticeable reduction in the years after
the expansions became effective. The trend break during the first post-
treatment period supports the identifying assumption that trends in reported
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crime would have remained similar between the expansion and non-expansion
states in the absence of the policy changes. The figures corresponding to
total and property crime are consistent with the estimates reported above.
The patterns show no discernible change in reported crime during the first
three years following the expansions. The longer-run estimates do indicate
a reduction in crime, but the confidence intervals are wide and include zero
effect.11
Table 3.4 presents estimated effects for specific crime categories. This
exercise is performed to not only gain a more precise understanding of which
types of crimes are most responsive to expanding insurance eligibility, but
also because the social costs associated with crime vary greatly across crime
types (McCollister et al., 2010).12 Turning first to violent crimes in columns
(1) through (4), the estimates indicate that the decrease in violent crime
is explained by reductions in reported aggravated assaults. Specifically, I
find a 6.7 percent reduction, approximately 17 incidents per 100,000 people.
The estimates for homicide, robbery, and forcible rape are not statistically
significant. Estimates for property crime appear in columns (5) through (7). I
find a 4.4 percent reduction in the rate of reported burglaries, corresponding
to 28 reported instances per 100,000 people. This estimate is statistically
significant at the 5 percent level. The estimated impacts on rates of larceny
and motor vehicle thefts are not statistically significant.
In Figures 3.4 and 3.5, I present event-study plots for specific violent and
property crime categories. Starting with violent crimes in Figure 3.4, the
pattern for aggravated assaults mirrors that of total violent crime. The fig-
ure shows flat pre-trends with a noticeable break in the trend during the
first year of the expansion. Like aggregated violent crime, the negative point
estimates appear to grow over time. The patterns for homicide, robbery, and
forcible rape appear flat before and after the expansions, consistent with the
insignificant point estimates derived from the pooled difference-in-differences
model. Turning next to property crimes in Figure 3.5, the figure correspond-
11I report the point-estimates corresponding to the event-study plots in Appendix Ta-
ble E.2.
12The authors estimate (after adjusting for inflation to 2018 dollars) the total social
costs associated with an incident of criminal homicide to be $10.4 million, $124,000 per
incident of aggravated assault, $49,000 for robbery, and $280,000 per incident of forcible
rape. Incidents of property crime range in costs between $4,100 (larceny) and $16,900
(burglary).
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ing to reported burglaries depicts flat pre-trends and an obvious decreas-
ing pattern in the post-expansion estimates. For larceny and motor vehicle
theft, the post-expansion estimates show no discernible pattern and are not
statistically significant. For each specific crime category, the corresponding
event-study estimates are presented in Appendix Table E.3.
3.6 Robustness and Alternative Specifications
In this section I test the robustness of the baseline findings. I begin by
presenting results that are derived from several alternative specifications.
The results for total, violent, and property crime are shown in Appendix
Table E.4. In column (1), I present estimates derived from my baseline
specification. In column (2), I show results where I weight regressions by
annual, state-level population. This is done to reflect the expansion-crime
effect on a representative population. In column (3), I show estimates where
I exclude Delaware, Massachusetts, New York, Vermont, and the District of
Columbia from the analysis. These states chose to expand Medicaid but al-
ready had similar Medicaid eligibility requirements to those mandated under
the ACA (Ghosh et al., 2017). In column (4), I add pre-policy coefficients to
the regression in order to condition for potential endogeneity of state expan-
sion decisions, thus minimizing concerns regarding reverse causality biasing
the estimated average treatment effects. In column (5), I accommodate the
count-nature of the crime data by showing results derived from a Negative
Binomial regression with annual, state population defined as the exposure
variable.
Lastly, I present results in column (6) that are derived from a synthetic
control analysis. This exercise follows the method pioneered by Abadie et
al. (2010) and other papers that study the effects of the ACA Medicaid ex-
pansions on health and labor market outcomes (Courtemanche et al., 2017;
Kaestner et al., 2017). The intuition behind the synthetic control method is
to evaluate the impact of the ACA Medicaid expansion on crime by construct-
ing a “synthetic” counterfactual state using a weighted convex combination
of pre-expansion covariates from the group of non-expansion states. This ap-
proach makes it possible to compare the distribution of the estimated placebo
effects with the estimated treatment effect from the actual treated states. I
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allow the method to select among the group of non-Medicaid expansion states
that best matches the expansion states based on a rich set of characteristics,
including total population, the percent of population in seven age groups
(0-9, 10-19, 20-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, 60+), the percent of population in
three racial groups (white, black, other), the percent of population that is
Hispanic, logged median household income, state unemployment rates, state
poverty rates, and logged total expenditures on policing and corrections.13
These variables are averaged across the years 2009 to 2013. I also include
the logged crime rate of interest for each year from 2009 through 2013. As
there were multiple states that expanded Medicaid, I average the estimated
treatment effects across all treatment states to obtain an estimated aver-
age treatment effect.14 To conduct statistical inference, I follow Abadie et
al. (2010), who propose a placebo approach where treatment status is re-
assigned for each state in the control donor pool and treatment effects are
then estimated using the synthetic control methodology.
The results derived using the alternative specifications for each crime I
investigate are very similar to the baseline estimates. To summarize, I find
significant reductions in reported violent crime rates that range from 4.8 to
5.7 percent, the largest result being estimated using the synthetic control
method. The estimates for total and property crime rates are near zero and
not statistically significant. In Appendix Tables E.5 and E.6, I show results
for specific crime categories. For violent and property crimes, the baseline
estimates are similar to results using alternative specifications. In particu-
lar, I find significant reductions in reported rates of aggravated assaults by
approximately 6 percent and suggestive evidence of reductions in burglar-
ies that range between 2.5 and 4.4 percent. One notable exception is the
synthetic-control estimate for burglaries, which is much smaller than the ef-
fect derived using my baseline model. This finding is could be a result of the
relatively small number of states in the control group and may reflect a sub-
optimal bias-variance trade-off in the synthetic control model (Ben-Michael
et al., 2018). Nevertheless, the trends in treated states and the synthetic
control for violent crimes, aggravated assaults, and burglaries shown in Ap-
13State government expenditures on policing and corrections were compiled from the
Annual Survey of State Government Finances available through by the US Census Bureau.
14The procedure was conducted using the Stata package synth runner (Galiani and
Quistorff, 2017).
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pendix Figures E.1, E.2, and E.3, respectively, are relatively well-matched in
the pre-expansion period, a finding consistent with the event-study analysis.
3.6.1 Placebo Tests
In addition to the alternative specifications, I also conduct a series of placebo
exercises. Specifically, I first add additional pre-expansion years to the anal-
ysis, extending the sample back to 2005. I then repeat the main analysis
where treatment occurs in 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012 for states that ex-
panded Medicaid in 2014, 2015, 2016, and 2017, respectively. If the crime
reductions I find are indeed caused by the Medicaid expansions, I do not
expect to observe statistically significant estimates derived from the placebo
exercise. The placebo results are presented in Appendix Tables E.7, E.8,
and E.9 and reinforce the robustness of the main estimates. The aggregate
crime results are near zero and not statistically significant. Among all the
results, only two estimates are marginally statistically different from zero, a
result that could very well be due to chance.
3.6.2 Heterogeneity Analysis
Effects By State Coverage Laws
States must abide by consistent coverage standards for SUD and MH illnesses
that were created by the ACA. Specifically, the ACA required that all health
plans in the individual and small-group markets must provide a package of
EHB, including coverage for MH and SUD that is at parity with medical
and surgical benefits. While all state EHB rules require some inpatient and
outpatient behavioral health services and SUD treatment, there is state vari-
ation in the specific services and treatments that are required to be covered.
This flexibility could, in principle, result in heterogeneous treatment effects
on crime across states. For example, one might expect larger crime reduc-
tions in expansion states that do not exclude any services for SUD or MH
illnesses from their EHB relative to expansion states with exclusions.
To the analyze potential heterogeneity due to EHB flexibility, I collected
data from the EHB Benchmark Plans for each state from the Centers from
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Medicare and Medicaid Services for the years 2014 to 2017. These are insur-
ance plans that each state uses to define EHB rules for individual and small
group plans. There are a few key takeaways. First, there is indeed substantial
variation across states in terms of which services are excluded from coverage,
as shown in Appendix Table E.10. In total, 26 states exclude certain types
of services for SUD from their EHB plans and 28 states exclude certain MH
services. While most states exclude benefits in some form, there is also sub-
stantial variation in terms of which benefits are excluded. For example, most
of the states that exclude benefits do not cover services performed and billed
by residential treatment centers. Other exclusion states, such as Maryland,
exclude services by pastoral, marital, and drug/alcohol counselors.
The substantial “within” variation of benefit exclusions makes it challeng-
ing to compare and contrast exclusion states. Therefore, to test whether
variations in benefit exclusions lead to differences in crime outcomes, I esti-
mate two variations of equation 3.1. First, I interact the indicator for whether
a state expanded Medicaid with a dummy variable for whether a state ex-
cludes SUD coverage in some form from their EHB. Second, I interact the
treatment variable with a dummy variable for whether a state excludes MH
coverage in some form from their EHB. The results are shown in Appendix
Tables E.11, E.12, and E.13. I find find suggestive evidence of larger crime
reductions in Medicaid expansion states with no benefit restrictions for SUD
and MH illnesses, namely for homicides and burglaries. However, I caution
against drawing strong conclusions from the analysis given that most of the
estimated interaction terms are not statistically different from zero, including
the estimates for violent crime and aggravated assaults.
Effects By Age Groups
Crime is committed most often by younger individuals. More than 60 percent
of known criminal offenders are under the age of 30 (Kearney et al., 2014). It
is informative to investigate which age groups explain the crime reductions
I discuss above. To estimate effects by age, I gathered age-specific arrest
data available from the UCR for the years 2009 through 2017. In principle,
this analysis is useful for understanding the relationship between insurance
and crime. The age-specific arrest data, however, have limitations that are
important to discuss. While the FBI provides estimated offense volumes for
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each state to avoid under-counting, similarly adjusted estimates for offenses
by age are not available. As a result, I must aggregate data directly from the
agency and county data, which are also un-adjusted.
To address under-reporting, I analyze violent and property arrests sepa-
rately and include only data provided by county agencies that report arrest
counts for each type of offense. To construct the violent-crime sample, I only
include agency-year observations that report arrest counts for homicide, ag-
gravated assaults, robbery, and forcible rape. To construct the property crime
sample, I only include agency-year observations that report arrest counts for
burglary, larceny, robbery, and vehicle theft. I then parse the data into four
age groups (18 to 24, 25 to 29, 30 to 39, and 40 to 49) and aggregate to the
state-level. Importantly, I also use population counts aggregated from the
agency level so that arrest rates are consistent with the agencies included in
the samples. Finally, I estimate the model presented in equation 3.1 where
the outcome variable is defined as log arrests in each age group per 100,000
people.
The results are presented in Appendix Tables E.14, E.15, and E.16. The
estimates for aggregated crime are consistent with the baseline analysis. For
violent crime, the results suggest that the Medicaid expansions lead to reduc-
tions in arrest rates. The point estimates are similar across all age groups,
but only the effects among adults 25 to 29 and 30 to 39 years of age are sta-
tistically different from zero. When I examine specific violent crime types, I
find evidence of reductions in arrests for aggravated assaults among adults
between 18 and 39 years of age, with the largest and most precise percentage
effect corresponding to adults 25 to 29 years of age. I also find evidence of
reductions in burglary-related arrests among adults 25 to 29 years of age.
I find no evidence that property crime arrests responded to the expansion
at the aggregate level and when I separate by specific crime type. In sum,
although the data is imperfect, the reductions in arrests for violent crime are
explained largely by reductions in arrests for aggravated assaults commit-
ted by younger individuals. These results are consistent with the baseline
estimates and stylized facts regarding who commits crimes.
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3.7 Interpretation of Results
3.7.1 Individual Treatment-on-the-Treated Effects
Using the reduced-form estimates, it is possible to calculate an implied indi-
vidual treatment-on-the-treated effect (ITOT), i.e. the number of individuals
newly enrolled in Medicaid needed for there to be a reduction in one reported
crime per 100,000 people. To calculate the ITOT, I focus on reductions in
aggravated assaults as this type of crime appears most responsive (and most
robust) to the expansion. If I assume that all crime reductions are concen-
trated among individuals who switch from being uninsured to covered by
Medicaid, the ITOT can be calculated based on an estimated 1.9 percent
gain in health insurance among all non-elderly adults, a total population
of 181 million, and the estimated average treatment effect of 6.7 percent.
Calculating the ITOT additionally requires an adjustment by the ratio of
affected to average crime rates, as research has found evidence that lower in-
come is positively correlated with higher rates of criminal behavior (Chetty
et al., 2018; Looney and Turner, 2018). Specifically, I combine the first-stage
estimate with findings from Looney and Turner (2018), who report individ-
uals with earnings in the bottom quintile of the income distribution, a proxy
for the Medicaid eligible threshold, are nearly three times more likely to be
incarcerated relative to the average population.15 Adjusting for the higher
crime rate among the Medicaid population relative to average, the estimated
ITOT effects imply that one crime was averted for every 114 newly-covered
non-elderly individuals.
One concern with the ITOT figure is that it does not adjust for uncertainty
in the estimated first stage. Specifically, if the first stage used in the ITOT
calculation is less than the actual affected population, the ITOT estimate will
be biased downward. There are many plausible channels through which the
impacts of the expansion could extend beyond the observed newly insured,
including substantial health gains accrued from switching from private to
public insurance, mandated presumptive eligibility in expansion states, and
15In a related analysis, Rabuy and Kopf (2015) use survey data from state prisoners
collected by the Bureau of Justice Statistics and find that incarcerated individuals had a
median annual income prior to incarceration that is 41 percent less than non-incarcerated
individuals of similar age.
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positive financial and health spillovers onto ineligible individuals.16 One way
to account for these channels is to use a larger estimated first stage. If I
instead use the first-stage estimate that corresponds to the Medicaid eligible
population shown in Appendix Table E.1, 6.2 percent, the ITOT implies
that one additional assault was averted for every 348 newly-covered non-
elderly adults, a 47 percent reduction in crime risk. Recent work by Miller
et al. (2019) reports an even larger first-stage of 13 percent, an estimate
that implies one crime averted for every 667 newly-covered individuals; a
25 percent reduction. In sum, existing evidence indicates a larger affected
population than what is reflected by the net change in the uninsured rate,
although uncertainty in the magnitude of the affected population leads to a
wide-range of possible ITOT effects.
3.7.2 Social-Cost Savings
The results presented above provide evidence that offering broad access to
health care for low-income individuals is an effective tool at reducing crimi-
nal behavior. From an economic evaluation perspective, it is also important
to consider whether the policy is cost-effective. In this section, I present
estimates of the social-cost savings associated with the decreases in reported
crime rates in Medicaid expansion states. I then compare these social-cost
estimates with (1) expenditures associated with crime in the United States
and (2) the cost of the policy intervention, i.e. the Medicaid expansion. To
perform this exercise, I utilize inflation-adjusted cost estimates from Mc-
Collister et al. (2010).17 I combine these cost estimates with the estimated
number of reduced incidents of crime based on pre-expansion means. In my
calculation, I only include crime categories that are estimated to be statis-
tically different from zero using my baseline regression specification, namely
aggravated assaults.
Table 3.5 presents the estimated decrease in instances of crimes in states
16See Borgschulte and Vogler (2019) for a review.
17McCollister et al. (2010) calculate cost estimates that incorporate (1) tangible losses,
including economic losses suffered by victims, system expenditures from local, state, and
federal governments and opportunity costs internalized by offenders, and (2) intangible
losses to victims, such as pain and suffering, decreased quality of life, and psychological
distress. Losses are calculated for more than a dozen major crime categories, including all
specific crime categories included in this study. All estimates adjusted to 2018 dollars.
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that expanded Medicaid eligibility and the corresponding social cost estimate
associated with aggravated assaults. I estimate that the Medicaid expansion
accounts for an annual state-level reduction of 984 incidents of aggravated
assault.18 This amounts to an average annual savings of $122 million in each
state that expanded coverage. After multiplying this figure by the number
of expansion states in the sample, the estimated annual social cost savings
totals nearly $4 billion.
The estimated cost-savings represent 2.66 percent of annual crime-related
expenditures in the United States but equates to nearly 30 percent of to-
tal annual costs internalized by victims of crime (McCollister et al., 2010).
While the cost-savings represent only a fraction of total crime expenditures,
the welfare benefits are substantially larger when compared to victim costs.
This is due to the fact that assaults (and violent crimes in general) generate
much higher costs for victims compared to property crimes. The estimated
$4 billion in savings also represents 5.7 percent of the total expenditures as-
sociated with the Medicaid expansion (Center for Medicare and Medicaid
Services, 2017). Given that an estimated 60 percent of the Medicaid ex-
penditures are transfers to implicit insurance providers, as opposed to new
costs to society, the cost-related savings equate to roughly 14 percent of the
total net expenditures associated with the Medicaid expansion (Finkelstein
et al., 2019). This comparison, however, should not be interpreted as a full
accounting of the social welfare effects of the Medicaid expansion. That anal-
ysis would, ideally, include benefits to other outcomes, such as reductions in
mortality or financial distress among beneficiaries. Nevertheless, the esti-
mated cost figures imply that the crime reductions lead to significant savings
when compared to expenditures associated with the criminal justice system,
victim costs, and the Medicaid expansion program.
3.8 Policy Implications and Comparison to Related
Literature
There are a number of clear policy implications associated with the findings
presented in this paper. First, the results suggest that increasing access
18These estimates are calculated by combining the estimated annual change in reported
crimes per-capita (100,000 people) with the average population covered in expansion states.
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to health care leads to crime-reducing benefits and billions in social-cost
savings. While the primary goals of the Medicaid expansion were to reduce
the uninsured rate and improve health outcomes, the reform complements
a broad list of policies that have been enacted in order to reduce crime.
These policies range from increasing police enforcement (Mello, 2019) and
improving labor market conditions (Yang, 2017b; Ghosh et al., 2020), to
enhancing social welfare programs (Yang, 2017a; Carr and Packham, 2019b;
Tuttle, 2019) and restricting access to guns (Ayres and Donohue III, 2003;
Lott, 2013). While the takeaways are mixed from studies that evaluate the
effectiveness of these policies, the findings presented in this paper add to a
rich and growing literature that find access to health care leads to reductions
in crime at both the local and state-levels. In a study that exploits changes in
insurance coverage for adults with incomes below 200 percent of FPL byway
of the Health Insurance Flexibility and Accountability waivers, Wen et al.
(2017a) find a reduction in county-level crime rates, including aggravated
assaults, robbery, and larceny theft. The authors report that much of the
crime-reduction effect likely occurred through increasing the treatment rate
for SUD and reducing substance use prevalence. Importantly, the authors
estimate that a ten percent increase in such treatment (at an annual cost of
$1.6 billion) yielded an annual benefit between $2.9 to 5.1 billion in crime
reduction.
In a related study, Bondurant et al. (2018) leverages variation driven by
substance-abuse-treatment facility openings and closings measured at the
county level. The results indicate that substance-abuse-treatment facilities
reduce both violent and financially motivated crimes, and that the effects are
particularly pronounced for relatively serious crimes, including homicide, ag-
gravated assaults, and motor vehicle theft. The authors also report that the
social cost savings associated with an additional local treatment facility, $4.2
million, are substantially greater than the annual costs of treatment in a fa-
cility, $1.1 million. Finally, He and Barkowski (2020) also examine the effects
of health insurance on crime following the ACA Medicaid expansions using a
sample of states and contiguous-border counties from 2010-2016. The paper
reports similar results to those presented in the current study, although the
authors also report reductions for other types of crimes, including burglary,
vehicle theft, robbery, and homicides, that are not robust with the inclusion
of an additional three years of data. As a result, their estimated social-cost
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benefits are considerably larger compared to the savings presented in this
paper ($14 billion vs. $4 billion).
A second major policy implication involves targeting the “justice-involved”
population and reducing recidivism rates. Two-thirds of inmates released
from prison are rearrested within three years (Durose et al., 2014). This
pattern leads to billions of dollars in annual expenditures associated with
the criminal justice process and incarceration. Futhermore, the majority of
offenders have serious health care problems. Over 60 percent of inmates in
state prisons and local jails have SUD, and over half of prison and jail inmates
have a history of psychological and MH disorders (Bronson and Berzofsky,
2017; Bronson et al., 2017). While the current study does not examine how
the Medicaid expansion impacted previous offenders, recent work by Aslim
et al. (2019) shows that offering broad access to treatment provides a cost-
effective way to reduce recidivism. The authors exploit variation in state
Medicaid expansion dates after the ACA and find that increased access to
health insurance reduces recidivism for violent crimes, a finding attributed
to the fact that the Medicaid expansion substantially increased access to
treatment for SUD among newly covered previous offenders. In sum, there is
evidence that increasing access to health care reduces criminal behavior and
improves treatment use among individuals that tend to cycle through the
criminal justice system and make up a large proportion of the incarcerated
population.
Lastly, this paper suggests that providing broader access to health care
leads to substantial benefits beyond reducing the uninsured rate and improv-
ing health conditions for the target population. Understanding the spillover
effects that result from public policy is important in terms of measuring of
who benefits from a particular program and the cost-effectiveness of the re-
form. While crime reduction is one benefit, there is additional evidence that
improving access to health care, such as expanding Medicaid eligibility, leads
to positive spillover effects along other dimensions. For example, recent work
has shown that the ACA Medicaid expansions reduced the number of unpaid
bills and increased credit scores for previously uninsured populations (Hu
et al., 2016; Brevoort et al., 2017). Other research has documented health
benefits for groups that, in theory, should not be affected by policy reforms
aimed at increasing access to care. For instance, Sommers et al. (2012) finds
that among persons 65 years of age or older, Medicaid expansions in the early
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2000s were associated with small but significant reductions in the uninsured
rate, cost-related delays in care, and absolute mortality. Thus, increasing ac-
cess to treatment is a policy that research has shown improves public safety
and social welfare in addition to improving public health.
3.9 Conclusion
Low income individuals are both at high risk of committing crimes and are
less likely to have health insurance coverage. The ACA Medicaid expan-
sions have allowed many of these individuals to obtain insurance coverage,
a necessity for most to use effective treatment for health conditions that
may exacerbate criminal behavior. This paper investigated the causal ef-
fects of increasing health insurance coverage on reported crime rates. I find
that in states that expanded Medicaid eligibility, reported violent crime rates
have significantly decreased relative to non-expansion states. The analysis
shows the aggregate reduction in violent crime is explained by decreases in
aggravated assaults, the most commonly occurring violent offense. I also
find evidence that this effect is concentrated among mainly younger adults.
The estimated annual social cost savings attributed to the crime reduction
is approximately $4 billion. This figure represents nearly 3 percent of annual
crime-related expenditures and 14 percent of the net-of-transfers cost of the
Medicaid expansion.
There are several limitations in this study that inspire future research.
First, more work is needed to better understand the key mechanisms. Al-
though challenging, this question appears especially important when it comes
to disentangling crime reductions due to health care treatment vs. an income
effect. Second, the empirical strategy used in this paper does not allow me
to separate the broader intent-to-treat effects at the state and county levels
from the effects on individuals who received coverage. It would be inter-
esting, for instance, to match criminal outcomes with Medicaid enrollment
using detailed individual level data. Finally, this paper focuses on the rela-
tively short-term relationship between health insurance eligibility and crime.
However, a growing body of work suggests there are substantial long-term
impacts of public health insurance on health and labor market outcomes.19
19For example, see Brown et al. (2017); Boudreaux et al. (2016); Miller and Wherry
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The long-term impact of health insurance eligibility on criminal behavior
remains unknown and may prove to be a promising area of research.
(2019b); Cohodes et al. (2016); Thompson (2017).
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Notes: The above table depicts states that expanded Medicaid and the corresponding
dates when the expansions took effect. Expansion dates were obtained from Kaiser
Family Foundation.
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics
Expansion States Non-Expansion States
Variables Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
Dependent Variables
Total Crime Rate (per 100,000 people) 3195.71 (800.45) 3336.92 (724.18)
Violent Crime 395.47 (208.31) 350.64 (140.44)
Criminal Homicide 4.54 (3.38) 4.34 (1.83)
Aggravated Assault 243.46 (113.30) 235.71 (107.94)
Robbery 114.22 (112.27) 78.26 (41.50)
Forcible Rape 33.25 (14.15) 32.33 (9.55)
Property Crime 2800.24 (646.44) 2986.27 (607.11)
Burglary 620.19 (204.42) 702.05 (252.97)
Larceny 1954.24 (436.86) 2088.54 (344.45)
Vehicle Theft 225.81 (127.38) 195.68 (71.91)
Independent Variables
Population (per 100,000) 60.34 (71.90) 62.32 (62.73)
% Age 0-9 0.13 (0.01) 0.14 (0.02)
% Age 10-19 0.13 (0.01) 0.14 (0.01)
% Age 20-29 0.14 (0.02) 0.14 (0.01)
% Age 30-39 0.13 (0.01) 0.13 (0.01)
% Age 40-49 0.14 (0.01) 0.13 (0.01)
% Age 50-59 0.14 (0.01) 0.14 (0.01)
% Age 60+ 0.20 (0.02) 0.19 (0.02)
% Male 0.49 (0.01) 0.49 (0.01)
% Hispanic 0.12 (0.11) 0.09 (0.08)
% White 0.70 (0.18) 0.73 (0.13)
% Black 0.10 (0.11) 0.13 (0.11)
% Unemployed 0.08 (0.02) 0.08 (0.02)
% Poverty 14.36 (3.22) 15.70 (3.01)
Median Income ($1,000 per capita) 58.64 (9.72) 51.82 (6.21)
Notes: The above table presents summary statistics of dependent and independent vari-
ables for states that did and did not expand Medicaid coverage. Statistics based on the
average of the years 2009 through 2013.
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Table 3.3: Effect of the ACA Medicaid Expansion on Reported Crime
Rates
Total Crime Violent Crime Property Crime
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Medicaid Expansion 0.026 -0.007 -0.053** -0.053** 0.033 -0.002
(0.024) (0.019) (0.026) (0.027) (0.025) (0.019)
Mean Baseline Rate 3,195.71 395.47 2,800.24
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Reg x Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 51 51 51 51 51 51
Observations 510 510 510 510 510 510
Notes: The sample includes the years 2009 through 2018. The dependent variable is
defined as the natural log of reported total, violent, and property crimes per 100,000
people, respectively. All specifications include state, year, and region-by-year fixed ef-
fects. Columns (2), (4), and (6) adjust for annual, state-level controls including logged
median household income, average unemployment rates, average poverty rates, total pop-
ulation, the percentage of population that is male, the percentage of state population
in seven age groups (0-9, 10-19, 20-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, and 60+), the percentage of
population in three racial groups (white, black, other), and the percentage of population
that is Hispanic. Robust standard errors clustered at the state-level. ***, **, * represent
significance at the .01, .05, and .10 level, respectively.
128
Table 3.4: Effect of the ACA Medicaid Expansion on Reported Crime
Rates by Type
Homicide Assault Robbery Rape Burglary Larceny MV Theft
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Medicaid Expansion 0.002 -0.067** -0.015 -0.006 -0.044** 0.014 -0.047
(0.050) (0.033) (0.038) (0.032) (0.022) (0.019) (0.039)
Mean Baseline Rate 4.54 243.46 114.22 33.25 620.19 1,954.24 225.81
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Reg x Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 51 51 51 51 51 51 51
Observations 510 510 510 510 510 510 510
Notes: The sample includes the years 2009 through 2018. The dependent variable is de-
fined as the natural log of reported total, violent, and property crimes per 100,000 people,
respectively. All specifications include state, year, and region-by-year fixed effects. The
specifications also adjust for annual, state-level controls including logged median house-
hold income, average unemployment rates, average poverty rates, total population, the
percentage of population that is male, the percentage of state population in seven age
groups (0-9, 10-19, 20-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, and 60+), the percentage of population
in three racial groups (white, black, other), and the percentage of population that is
Hispanic. Robust standard errors clustered at the state-level. ***, **, * represent sig-
nificance at the .01, .05, and .10 level, respectively.
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Table 3.5: Estimated Annual Social Cost Savings
Crime Incidents Cost Per Incident Total Cost
Aggravated Assaults (per state) 984.26 $124,356 $122,397,057.73
Total (31 states + DC) $3,916,705,847.48
Notes: All dollar amounts in 2018 dollars. Per-state cost estimates are calculated by
combining the estimated annual change in per-capita reported aggravated assaults with
the average population in expansion states. The total is calculated by multiplying the
per-state total by the number of 31 states that expanded Medicaid during the sample
period (including the District of Columbia). Data for the estimated cost per incident is
obtained from McCollister et al. (2010).
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Notes: Figure 1(a) shows the average uninsured rate between the years 2010 and 2017
among states that did and did not expand Medicaid. Figure 2(b) shows the average
uninsured rates for adults ages 18 to 64 with incomes at or below 138 percent of the
federal poverty limit between the years 2010 and 2017. Data from the United States
Census Bureau Small Area Health Insurance Estimates.
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Figure 3.2: Crime Trends in Expansion and Non-Expansion States
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Notes: Figures 2(a), 2(b), and 2(c) show the trend in average total, violent, and property
crime rates, measured as instances per 100,000 people, in states that did and did not
expand Medicaid. The vertical represents the year prior to when the expansions became
effective.
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Years Relative to Medicaid Expansion
Notes: The above figure shows event-study plots of the effect of the ACA Medicaid
expansion on (a) log total crime rates, (b) log violent crime rates, and (c) log property
crime rates. The sample includes 50 states and the District of Columbia between the years
2009 and 2018. The dashed vertical line indicates the end of the year before the Medicaid
expansions became effective. Bands indicate 95 percent confidence intervals. Standard
errors are clustered at the state-level. Each model includes year, state, and region-by-
year fixed effects. Annual, state-level controls include logged median household income,
average unemployment rates, average poverty rates, the percentage of state population
that is male, the percentage of state population in seven age groups (0-9, 10-19, 20-29,
30-39, 40-49, 50-59, and 60+), the percentage of population in three racial groups (white,
black, other), and the percentage of population that is Hispanic.
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Years Relative to Medicaid Expansion
Notes: The above figure shows event-study plots of the effect of the ACA Medicaid
expansion on (a) log homicide rates, (b) log aggravated assault rates, (c) log robbery
rates, and (d) log rape rates. The sample includes 50 states and the District of Columbia
between the years 2009 and 2018. The dashed vertical line indicates the end of the year
before the Medicaid expansions became effective. Bands indicate 95 percent confidence
intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the state-level. Each model includes year,
state, and region-by-year fixed effects. Annual, state-level controls include logged median
household income, average unemployment rates, average poverty rates, the percentage
of state population that is male, the percentage of state population in seven age groups
(0-9, 10-19, 20-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, and 60+), the percentage of population in three
racial groups (white, black, other), and the percentage of population that is Hispanic.
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Years Relative to Medicaid Expansion













































































Years Relative to Medicaid Expansion
Notes: The above figure shows event-study plots of the effect of the ACA Medicaid
expansion on (a) log burglary rates, (b) log larceny rates, (c) log motor vehicle rates, and
(d) log forcible rape rates. The sample includes 50 states and the District of Columbia
between the years 2009 and 2018. The dashed vertical line indicates the end of the year
before the Medicaid expansions became effective. Bands indicate 95 percent confidence
intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the state-level. Each model includes year,
state, and region-by-year fixed effects. Annual, state-level controls include logged median
household income, average unemployment rates, average poverty rates, the percentage
of state population that is male, the percentage of state population in seven age groups
(0-9, 10-19, 20-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, and 60+), the percentage of population in three
racial groups (white, black, other), and the percentage of population that is Hispanic.
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Sjögren, Anna, “Graded children: Evidence of longrun consequences of
school grades from a nationwide reform,” Technical Report, Working
paper//IFAU-Institute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation 2010.
Smith, Jeffrey A and Petra E Todd, “Does matching overcome
LaLonde’s critique of nonexperimental estimators?,” Journal of economet-
rics, 2005, 125 (1-2), 305–353.
Solon, Gary, Steven J Haider, and Jeffrey M Wooldridge, “What are
we weighting for?,” Journal of Human resources, 2015, 50 (2), 301–316.
Somers, Stephen A and Roopa Mahadevan, Health literacy implica-
tions of the Affordable Care Act, Center for Health Care Strategies, Incor-
porated, 2010.
Sommers, Benjamin D, “State Medicaid expansions and mortality, re-
visited: A cost-benefit analysis,” American Journal of Health Economics,
2017, 3 (3), 392–421.
, Atul A Gawande, and Katherine Baicker, “health Insurance Cover-
age and Health—What the Recent Evidence Tells Us,” The New England
Journal of Medicine, 2017, 377 (6), 586–593.
, Genevieve M Kenney, and Arnold M Epstein, “New evidence on
the Affordable Care Act: coverage impacts of early Medicaid expansions,”
Health affairs, 2014, 33 (1), 78–87.
, Katherine Baicker, and Arnold M Epstein, “Mortality and access to
care among adults after state Medicaid expansions,” New England Journal
of Medicine, 2012, 367 (11), 1025–1034.
Stensland, Jeffrey, Curt Mueller, and Janet Sutton, An analysis of
the financial conditions of health care institutions in the Appalachian region
and their economic impacts, Citeseer, 2002.
152
Succi, Melissa J, Shoou-Yih Lee, and Jeffrey A Alexander, “Effects
of market position and competition on rural hospital closures.,” Health
Services Research, 1997, 31 (6), 679.
Swaminathan, Shailender, Benjamin D Sommers, Rebecca
Thorsness, Rajnish Mehrotra, Yoojin Lee, and Amal N Trivedi,
“Association of Medicaid expansion with 1-year mortality among patients
with end-stage renal disease,” Jama, 2018, 320 (21), 2242–2250.
Taubman, Sarah L, Heidi L Allen, Bill J Wright, Katherine Baicker,
and Amy N Finkelstein, “Medicaid increases emergency-department
use: evidence from Oregon’s Health Insurance Experiment,” Science, 2014,
343 (6168), 263–268.
Terkelsen, Christian Juhl, Jacob Thorsted Sørensen, Michael
Maeng, Lisette Okkels Jensen, Hans-Henrik Tilsted, Sven Traut-
ner, Werner Vach, Søren Paaske Johnsen, Leif Thuesen, and
Jens Flensted Lassen, “System delay and mortality among patients
with STEMI treated with primary percutaneous coronary intervention,”
Jama, 2010, 304 (7), 763–771.
Thompson, Owen, “The long-term health impacts of Medicaid and CHIP,”
Journal of Health Economics, 2017, 51, 26–40.
Tiihonen, Jari, Martti Lehti, Mikko Aaltonen, Janne Kivivuori,
Hannu Kautiainen, Lauri J Virta, Fabian Hoti, Antti Tanskanen,
and Pasi Korhonen, “Psychotropic drugs and homicide: a prospective
cohort study from Finland,” World Psychiatry, 2015, 14 (2), 245.
Topel, Robert H, “Local labor markets,” Journal of Political economy,
1986, 94 (3, Part 2), S111–S143.
Tuttle, Cody, “Snapping back: Food stamp bans and criminal recidivism,”
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 2019, 11 (2), 301–27.
UCR, “Crime in the United States,” 2018.
Urminsky, Oleg, Christian Hansen, and Victor Chernozhukov, “Us-
ing double-lasso regression for principled variable selection,” 2016.
Vogler, Jacob, “Access to health care and criminal behavior: Short-run
evidence from the ACA Medicaid expansions,” Available at SSRN 3042267,
2017.
Wang, Emily A, Mary C White, Ross Jamison, Joe Goldenson,
Milton Estes, and Jacqueline P Tulsky, “Discharge planning and
continuity of health care: findings from the San Francisco County Jail,”
American journal of public health, 2008, 98 (12), 2182–2184.
153
Weinstein, Russell, “Dynamic responses to labor demand shocks: Evi-
dence from the financial industry in Delaware,” Journal of Urban Eco-
nomics, 2018, 106, 27–45.
Wen, Hefei, Jason M Hockenberry, and Janet R Cummings, “The
effect of Medicaid expansion on crime reduction: Evidence from HIFA-
waiver expansions,” Journal of Public Economics, 2017, 154, 67–94.
, , Tyrone F Borders, and Benjamin G Druss, “Impact of Medicaid
expansion on Medicaid-covered utilization of buprenorphine for opioid use
disorder treatment,” Medical care, 2017, 55 (4), 336–341.
Wharam, J Frank, Fang Zhang, Bruce E Landon, Stephen B
Soumerai, and Dennis Ross-Degnan, “Low-socioeconomic-status en-
rollees in high-deductible plans reduced high-severity emergency care,”
Health affairs, 2013, 32 (8), 1398–1406.
Wherry, Laura R and Sarah Miller, “Early Coverage, Access, Utiliza-
tion, and Health Effects Associated With the Affordable Care Act Medicaid
Expansions: A Quasi-experimental Study,” Annals of internal medicine,
2016, 164 (12), 795–803.
Wilper, Andrew P, Steffie Woolhandler, Karen E Lasser, Danny
McCormick, David H Bor, and David U Himmelstein, “Health
insurance and mortality in US adults,” American journal of public health,
2009, 99 (12), 2289–2295.
Wolfers, Justin, “Did unilateral divorce laws raise divorce rates? A rec-
onciliation and new results,” American Economic Review, 2006, 96 (5),
1802–1820.
Wooldridge, Jeffrey M, Econometric analysis of cross section and panel
data, MIT press, 2010.
Yang, Crystal S, “Does Public Assistance Reduce Recidivism?,” American
Economic Review, 2017, 107 (5), 551–55.
, “Local labor markets and criminal recidivism,” Journal of Public Eco-
nomics, 2017, 147, 16–29.
Yang, Feng-An, “Three Essays on Access to Health Care in Rural Areas.”
PhD dissertation, The Ohio State University 2018.
Young, Alwyn, “Channeling fisher: Randomization tests and the statistical
insignificance of seemingly significant experimental results,” The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 2018, 134 (2), 557–598.
Zou, Ben, “The Local Economic Impacts of Military Personnel,” Journal
of Labor Economics, 2018, 36 (3), 589–621.
154
APPENDIX A: ADDITIONAL TABLES
AND FIGURES OF CHAPTER 1
Table A.1: Hospital Characteristics: Closures vs. Non-Closures
Variable Closed Hospitals Never Closed Hospitals
Total Number of Beds 53.53 80.36
(68.23) (85.06)
Admissions per 100,000 pop. 4,888.30 6,538.30
(7,115.41) (7,575.65 )
Inpatient Days per 100,000 pop. 38,504.38 58,685.71
(70,493.70) (100,205.30)
Full Time Personnel 177.69 424.27
(358.65) (541.15)
Full Time Personnel per Beds 3.70 5.96
(1.77) (4.03)
Expenses Per Inpatient Days 3,547.48 5,793.85
(4,792.86) (40,030.74)
County Population Covered 35,157.54 32,757.09
(29,650.61) (34,735.97)
Number of Hospitals 97 2701
Notes: The table shows means and standard deviations in parentheses. Data are collected
from the AHA Annual Survey for 2003-2017.
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Table A.2: Difference-in-Differences Estimator Decomposition
Log Log Per Capita Unemployed Log Log Total Log Total Log Median Log Median
Employment Income Rate Labor Force Estabs. Population Rents Home Value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Timing Comparisons -0.024 -0.019 0.001 -0.007 0.008 -0.001 -0.004 0.023
[0.022] [0.022] [0.022] [0.022] [0.022] [0.022] [0.022] [0.025]
Always vs. Timing -0.142 -0.110 0.009 -0.119 0.009 -0.009 0.017 0.025
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.004]
Never vs. Timing -0.049 -0.045 0.002 -0.031 -0.018 -0.008 -0.003 -0.010
[0.938] [0.938] [0.938] [0.938] [0.938] [0.938] [0.938] [0.925]
Always vs. Never -1.024 2.605 0.224 0.384 -0.291 0.294 -1.765 -2.691
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Within Comparisons 0.094 0.415 0.003 0.048 0.190 -0.111 -0.276 -0.253
[0.039] [0.039] [0.039] [0.039] [0.039] [0.039] [0.039] [0.046]
Mean Dependent Variable 10,857 12,366 0.065 15,641 817 32,765 650 145,509
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 1829 1829 1829 1829 1829 1829 1819 1289
Observations 27429 27429 27433 27433 27433 27435 26968 18016
Notes: This table shows results from a difference-in-differences estimator decomposition using data from the AHA Annual
Survey between the years 2003 and 2017. Each row corresponds to a 2x2 estimator with corresponding weights reported in
brackets below the estimates. All specifications include county and state-by-year fixed effects. Controls include the county
population percentages of the 1 to 19, 20 to 39, 40 to 64, and over 65 years age ranges, the county population percentages of
two racial groups (white, non-white), the county population percentages of males, and the county population percentages of
Hispanics. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. *, **, and *** indicate significance levels of .10, .05, and .01.,
respectively.
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Table A.3: Robustness: Controls for County Industry Mix
Log Log Per Capita Unemployed Log Log Total Log Total Log Median Log Median
Employment Income Rate Labor Force Estabs. Population Rents Home Value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Hospital Closure -0.039*** -0.035*** 0.002** -0.026*** -0.004 -0.010** -0.009 -0.024**
(0.009) (0.008) (0.001) (0.008) (0.009) (0.005) (0.006) (0.012)
Mean Dependent Variable 10,857 12,366 0.065 15,641 817 32,765 650 145,509
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Mix Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 1712 1712 1712 1712 1712 1712 1701 1242
Observations 23291 23291 23289 23289 23291 23291 22909 16763
Notes: This table shows estimated impacts of rural hospital closures using data from the AHA Annual Survey between the years
2003 and 2017. All specifications include county and state-by-year fixed effects. Controls for industry mix include the fraction
of county employment and earnings for the following industries: education and health, business, natural resources, construction,
manufacturing, trade, finance, and leisure. Demographic controls include the county population percentages of the 1 to 19, 20 to
39, 40 to 64, and over 65 years age ranges, the county population percentages of two racial groups (white, non-white), the county
population percentages of males, and the county population percentages of Hispanics. Standard errors are clustered at the county
level. *, **, and *** indicate significance levels of .10, .05, and .01., respectively.
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Table A.4: Robustness: Balanced Panel
Log Log Per Capita Unemployed Log Log Total Log Total Log Median Log Median
Employment Income Rate Labor Force Estabs. Population Rents Home Value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Hospital Closure -0.041*** -0.024* 0.003** -0.024 -0.011 -0.011 -0.016** -0.014
(0.016) (0.014) (0.001) (0.016) (0.011) (0.007) (0.007) (0.019)
Mean Dependent Variable 10,898 12,423 0.064 15,685 820 32,803 650 146,100
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 1770 1770 1770 1770 1770 1770 1760 1238
Observations 26544 26544 26548 26548 26548 26550 26083 17271
Notes: This table shows estimated impacts of rural hospital closures using data from the AHA Annual Survey between the years
2003 and 2017. All specifications include county and state-by-year fixed effects. Controls include the county population percentages
of the 1 to 19, 20 to 39, 40 to 64, and over 65 years age ranges, the county population percentages of two racial groups (white,
non-white), the county population percentages of males, and the county population percentages of Hispanics. Standard errors are
clustered at the county level. *, **, and *** indicate significance levels of .10, .05, and .01., respectively.
158
Table A.5: Robustness: Population Weighted
Log Log Per Capita Unemployed Log Log Total Log Total Log Median Log Median
Employment Income Rate Labor Force Estabs. Population Rents Home Value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Hospital Closure -0.038*** -0.018** 0.001 -0.034*** -0.009 -0.020*** -0.012* -0.041**
(0.009) (0.009) (0.001) (0.010) (0.009) (0.007) (0.006) (0.017)
Mean Dependent Variable 22,726 12,772 0.067 33,679 1,668 69,553 716 172,220
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 1829 1829 1829 1829 1829 1829 1819 1289
Observations 27429 27429 27433 27433 27433 27435 26968 18016
Notes: This table shows estimated impacts of rural hospital closures using data from the AHA Annual Survey between the years
2003 and 2017. All specifications include county and state-by-year fixed effects. Controls include the county population percentages
of the 1 to 19, 20 to 39, 40 to 64, and over 65 years age ranges, the county population percentages of two racial groups (white,
non-white), the county population percentages of males, and the county population percentages of Hispanics. Standard errors are
clustered at the county level. Regressions and mean dependent variables weighted by county population. *, **, and *** indicate
significance levels of .10, .05, and .01., respectively.
159
Table A.6: Robustness: County-Specific Trends
Log Log Per Capita Unemployed Log Log Total Log Total Log Median Log Median
Employment Income Rate Labor Force Estabs. Population Rents Home Value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Hospital Closure -0.038*** -0.025*** 0.002* -0.019*** -0.002 -0.008** -0.012** -0.018
(0.008) (0.009) (0.001) (0.007) (0.007) (0.003) (0.005) (0.011)
Mean Dependent Variable 10,857 12,366 0.065 15,641 817 32,765 650 145,509
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County-Specific Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 1829 1829 1829 1829 1829 1829 1819 1289
Observations 27429 27429 27433 27433 27433 27435 26968 18016
Notes: This table shows estimated impacts of rural hospital closures using data from the AHA Annual Survey between the years
2003 and 2017. All specifications include county fixed effects,state-by-year fixed effects, and county-specific trends. Controls include
the county population percentages of the 1 to 19, 20 to 39, 40 to 64, and over 65 years age ranges, the county population percentages
of two racial groups (white, non-white), the county population percentages of males, and the county population percentages of
Hispanics. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. *, **, and *** indicate significance levels of .10, .05, and .01.,
respectively.
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Table A.7: Robustness: Propensity-Score Reweighting
Log Log Per Capita Unemployed Log Log Total Log Total Log Median Log Median
Employment Income Rate Labor Force Estabs. Population Rents Home Value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Hospital Closure -0.045*** -0.035*** 0.003*** -0.025*** -0.007 -0.007* -0.010* -0.015
(0.008) (0.008) (0.001) (0.008) (0.007) (0.004) (0.005) (0.010)
Mean Dependent Variable 10,962 11,272 0.072 15,870 800 34,664 643 134,298
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 1738 1738 1738 1738 1738 1738 1730 1214
Observations 26066 26066 26068 26068 26070 26070 25633 16925
Notes: This table shows estimated impacts of rural hospital closures using data from the AHA Annual Survey between the years
2003 and 2017. All specifications include county and state-by-year fixed effects. Controls include the county population percentages
of the 1 to 19, 20 to 39, 40 to 64, and over 65 years age ranges, the county population percentages of two racial groups (white,
non-white), the county population percentages of males, and the county population percentages of Hispanics. Standard errors are
clustered at the county level. Regressions and mean dependent variables weighted by T + (1− T )× p(1−p) , where T is an indicator
for treatment and p is the estimated propensity score. *, **, and *** indicate significance levels of .10, .05, and .01., respectively.
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Table A.8: Robustness: County Border-Pair Design
Log Log Per Capita Unemployed Log Log Total Log Total Log Median Log Median
Employment Income Rate Labor Force Estabs. Population Rents Home Value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Hospital Closure -0.039*** -0.024** 0.002*** -0.024*** -0.004 -0.007* -0.009 -0.006
(0.008) (0.010) (0.001) (0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.006) (0.010)
Mean Dependent Variable 10,869 11,347 0.072 15,801 780 34,611 667 135,838
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Border-Pair x Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 378 378 378 378 378 378 378 218
Observations 11334 11334 11340 11340 11340 11340 11238 6270
Notes: This table shows estimated impacts of rural hospital closures using data from the AHA Annual Survey between the years
2003 and 2017. All specifications include county fixed-effects, state-by-year fixed effects, and county border-pair-by-year fixed
effects. Controls include the county population percentages of the 1 to 19, 20 to 39, 40 to 64, and over 65 years age ranges, the
county population percentages of two racial groups (white, non-white), the county population percentages of males, and the county
population percentages of Hispanics. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the county and border-pair levels. Regressions and
mean dependent variables weighted by number of county appearances in the sample. *, **, and *** indicate significance levels of
.10, .05, and .01., respectively.
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Table A.9: Effects of Urban Hospital Closures
Log Log Per Capita Unemployed Log Log Total Log Total Log Median Log Median
Employment Income Rate Labor Force Estabs. Population Rents Home Value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Hospital Closure -0.009 -0.005 -0.001** 0.007 0.003 -0.006 -0.006 -0.018**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.001) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009)
Mean Dependent Variable 156,884 20,781 0.063 173,703 9,828 344,517 894 203,090
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 682 682 682 682 682 682 660 620
Observations 10230 10230 10218 10218 10230 10230 9833 9201
Notes: This table shows estimated impacts of urban hospital closures using data from the AHA Annual Survey between the years
2003 and 2017. All specifications include county and state-by-year fixed-effects. Controls include the county population percentages
of the 1 to 19, 20 to 39, 40 to 64, and over 65 years age ranges, the county population percentages of two racial groups (white,
non-white), the county population percentages of males, and the county population percentages of Hispanics. Standard errors are
clustered at the county level. *, **, and *** indicate significance levels of .10, .05, and .01., respectively.
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Table A.10: Effects of Urban Hospital Closures: Propensity-Score Reweighting
Log Log Per Capita Unemployed Log Log Total Log Total Log Median Log Median
Employment Income Rate Labor Force Estabs. Population Rents Home Value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Hospital Closure -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 0.007 0.001 0.001 0.003 -0.008
(0.006) (0.006) (0.001) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.010)
Mean Dependent Variable 225,177 23,664 0.065 234,610 13,413 462,801 944 209,883
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 639 639 639 639 639 639 616 578
Observations 9585 9585 9573 9573 9585 9585 9197 8573
Notes: This table shows estimated impacts of urban hospital closures using data from the AHA Annual Survey between the years
2003 and 2017. All specifications include county and state-by-year fixed-effects. Controls include the county population percentages
of the 1 to 19, 20 to 39, 40 to 64, and over 65 years age ranges, the county population percentages of two racial groups (white,
non-white), the county population percentages of males, and the county population percentages of Hispanics. Standard errors are
clustered at the county level. Regressions and mean dependent variables weighted by T + (1− T )× p(1−p) , where T is an indicator
for treatment and p is the estimated propensity score. *, **, and *** indicate significance levels of .10, .05, and .01., respectively.
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Table A.11: Effects of Rural Hospital Closures on the Non-Hospital Sector:
By Number of Hospitals in County After Closure
Log Log Per Capita Log Total
Employment Income Establishments
(1) (2) (3)
0 Hospitals After Closure -0.029* -0.022 -0.025**
(0.016) (0.018) (0.011)
> 0 Hospitals After Closure -0.011 -0.005 0.004
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
State x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 1829 1829 1829
Observations 27416 27418 27433
Notes: This table shows estimated impacts of rural hospital closures on the non-hospital
sector by whether a county loses its sole hospital. Data from the AHA Annual Survey
between the years 2003 and 2017. All specifications include county and state-by-year
fixed effects. Controls include the county population percentages of the 1 to 19, 20 to 39,
40 to 64, and over 65 years age ranges, the county population percentages of two racial
groups (white, non-white), the county population percentages of males, and the county
population percentages of Hispanics. Standard errors are clustered at the county level.
*, **, and *** indicate significance levels of .10, .05, and .01., respectively.
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Table A.12: Effects of Rural Hospital Closures on the Non-Hospital Sector:
By Hospital Share of County Employment
Log Log Per Capita Log Total
Employment Income Establishments
(1) (2) (3)
Above Median -0.057*** -0.035* -0.046***
(0.015) (0.018) (0.010)
Below Median 0.018 0.011 0.018
(0.011) (0.013) (0.013)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
State x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 1829 1829 1829
Observations 27416 27418 27433
Notes: This table shows estimated impacts of rural hospital closures on the non-hospital
sector by whether a closed hospital lies above or below the median contribution to the
local economy. Data from the AHA Annual Survey between the years 2003 and 2017. All
specifications include county and state-by-year fixed effects. Controls include the county
population percentages of the 1 to 19, 20 to 39, 40 to 64, and over 65 years age ranges,
the county population percentages of two racial groups (white, non-white), the county
population percentages of males, and the county population percentages of Hispanics.
Standard errors are clustered at the county level. *, **, and *** indicate significance
levels of .10, .05, and .01., respectively.
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Table A.13: Effects of Rural Hospital Closures on the Non-Hospital Sector:
By Hospital Ownership
Log Log Per Capita Log Total
Employment Income Establishments
(1) (2) (3)
For-Profit Closure -0.015 -0.001 -0.014
(0.017) (0.017) (0.013)
Non-Profit Closure -0.020** -0.018 -0.003
(0.010) (0.012) (0.010)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
State x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 1829 1829 1829
Observations 27416 27418 27433
Notes: This table shows estimated impacts of rural hospital closures on the non-hospital
sector by whether the closing hospital is for-profit or non-profit. Data from the AHA
Annual Survey between the years 2003 and 2017. All specifications include county and
state-by-year fixed effects. Controls include the county population percentages of the 1
to 19, 20 to 39, 40 to 64, and over 65 years age ranges, the county population percentages
of two racial groups (white, non-white), the county population percentages of males, and
the county population percentages of Hispanics. Standard errors are clustered at the
county level. *, **, and *** indicate significance levels of .10, .05, and .01., respectively.
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Table A.14: Effects of Rural Hospital Closures on the Service-Providing
and Goods-Producing Sectors: By Number of Hospitals in County After
Closure
Log Log Per Capita Log
Employment Earnings Establishments
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Private Service-Providing Sector
0 Hospitals After Closure -0.031* -0.014 -0.031**
(0.019) (0.017) (0.013)
> 0 Hospitals After Closure -0.022* -0.017 0.005
(0.011) (0.011) (0.013)
Observations 27361 27366 27431
Panel B: Private Goods-Producing Sector
0 Hospitals After Closure 0.003 0.008 0.019
(0.036) (0.039) (0.019)
> 0 Hospitals After Closure -0.008 0.011 -0.008
(0.023) (0.026) (0.012)
Observations 27320 27314 27425
Controls Yes Yes Yes
State x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 1829 1829 1829
Notes: This table shows estimated impacts of rural hospital closures on the non-hospital
sector by whether a county loses its sole hospital. Data from the AHA Annual Survey
between the years 2003 and 2017. Panel A shows estimates for the private service-
providing sector. Panel B shows estimates for the private good-producing sectors. All
specifications include county and state-by-year fixed effects. Controls include the county
population percentages of the 1 to 19, 20 to 39, 40 to 64, and over 65 years age ranges,
the county population percentages of two racial groups (white, non-white), the county
population percentages of males, and the county population percentages of Hispanics.
Standard errors are clustered at the county level. *, **, and *** indicate significance
levels of .10, .05, and .01., respectively.
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Table A.15: Effects of Rural Hospital Closures on the Service-Providing
and Goods-Producing Sectors: By Hospital Share of Employment
Log Log Per Capita Log
Employment Earnings Establishments
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Private Service-Providing Sector
Above Median -0.056*** -0.020 -0.053***
(0.019) (0.018) (0.012)
Below Median 0.000 -0.007 0.021
(0.013) (0.014) (0.016)
Observations 27361 27366 27431
Panel B: Private Goods-Producing Sector
Above Median -0.056 -0.023 -0.014
(0.036) (0.040) (0.017)
Below Median 0.046* 0.043 0.010
(0.026) (0.029) (0.016)
Observations 27320 27314 27425
Controls Yes Yes Yes
State x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 1829 1829 1829
Notes: This table shows estimated impacts of rural hospital closures on the non-hospital
sector by whether a closed hospital lies above or below the median contribution to the
local economy. Data from the AHA Annual Survey between the years 2003 and 2017.
Panel A shows estimates for the private service-providing sector. Panel B shows estimates
for the private good-producing sectors. All specifications include county and state-by-
year fixed effects. Controls include the county population percentages of the 1 to 19, 20
to 39, 40 to 64, and over 65 years age ranges, the county population percentages of two
racial groups (white, non-white), the county population percentages of males, and the
county population percentages of Hispanics. Standard errors are clustered at the county
level. *, **, and *** indicate significance levels of .10, .05, and .01., respectively.
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Table A.16: Effects of Rural Hospital Closures on the Service-Providing
and Goods-Producing Sectors: By Ownership
Log Log Per Capita Log
Employment Earnings Establishments
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Private Service-Providing Sector
For-Profit Closure -0.024 -0.002 -0.012
(0.019) (0.018) (0.015)
Non-Profit Closure -0.027** -0.025** -0.007
(0.013) (0.011) (0.013)
Observations 27361 27366 27431
Panel B: Private Goods-Producing Sector
For-Profit Closure -0.004 0.015 -0.017
(0.037) (0.037) (0.018)
Non-Profit Closure -0.004 0.006 0.015
(0.024) (0.028) (0.013)
Observations 27320 27314 27425
Controls Yes Yes Yes
State x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 1829 1829 1829
Notes: This table shows estimated impacts of rural hospital closures on the non-hospital
sector by whether the closing hospital is for-profit or non-profit. Data from the AHA
Annual Survey between the years 2003 and 2017. Panel A shows estimates for the
private service-providing sector. Panel B shows estimates for the private good-producing
sectors. All specifications include county and state-by-year fixed effects. Controls include
the county population percentages of the 1 to 19, 20 to 39, 40 to 64, and over 65 years
age ranges, the county population percentages of two racial groups (white, non-white),
the county population percentages of males, and the county population percentages of
Hispanics. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. *, **, and *** indicate
significance levels of .10, .05, and .01., respectively.
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Table A.17: Amenity and Welfare Estimates Under Alternative Preference
Assumptions
Change in Amenities Change in Welfare
Households (1) (2)
Panel A: Baseline si = 0.3, so = 0.6
Young Workers 0.005*** -0.004**
(0.001) (0.002)
Older Residents -0.026** -0.009**
(0.011) (0.004)
Weighted Total Change -0.005**
(0.002)
Panel B: Alternative si = 0.1, so = 0.2
Young Workers 0.007*** -0.001*
(0.002) (0.001)
Older Residents -0.020** -0.003**
(0.010) (0.001)
Weighted Total Change -0.002**
(0.001)
Panel C: Alternative si = 0.5, so = 1
Young Workers 0.003*** -0.006**
(0.001) (0.003)
Older Residents -0.032** -0.015**
(0.014) (0.006)
Weighted Total Change -0.008***
(0.003)
Notes: The above table shows how estimated changes in amenities and welfare for house-
holds vary by different values of the location preference parameters, si and so. Panel
A depicts the baseline estimates when si = 0.3 and so = 0.6. Panel B shows estimates
when when si = 0.1 and so = 0.2. Panel C shows estimates when when si = 1 and
so = 0.5. The rows labeled Weighted Total Change calculated total household welfare
losses weighted by population share of both household types. Standard errors calculated
using the Delta Method. *, **, and *** indicate significance levels of .10, .05, and .01.,
respectively.
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Notes: The above map shows the geographic distribution of rural counties with and
without ZHVI housing data for 2003-2017. Data are collected from Zillow.com.
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2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017
Year
For Profit Not For Profit
Notes: The above figure shows the trends in for-profit and not-for-profit rural hospital
closures for 2003-2017. Data are collected from the AHA Annual Survey of Hospitals.
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Notes: The above figures illustrate the kernel densities and histograms of the propensity
scores for rural closure and non-closure counties.
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Notes: The above figures show event study plots of county-level income, employment,
and establishment effects of rural hospital closures. The sample includes rural counties
for 2003-2017. The longest vertical line indicates the end of the year before a hospital
closure. Bands indicate 95 percent confidence intervals. All specifications include county
and state-by-year fixed effects. Controls include the county population percentages of the
1 to 19, 20 to 39, 40 to 64, and over 65 years age ranges, the county population percentages
of two racial groups (white, non-white), the county population percentages of males, and
the county population percentages of Hispanics. Standard errors are clustered at the
county level.
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Notes: The above figures show event study plots of county-level income, employment,
and establishment effects of rural hospital closures. The sample includes rural counties
for 2003-2017. The longest vertical line indicates the end of the year before a hospital
closure. Bands indicate 95 percent confidence intervals. All specifications include county
and state-by-year fixed effects. Controls include the county population percentages of the
1 to 19, 20 to 39, 40 to 64, and over 65 years age ranges, the county population percentages
of two racial groups (white, non-white), the county population percentages of males, and
the county population percentages of Hispanics. Standard errors are clustered at the
county level.
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APPENDIX B: DERIVATIONS OF MODEL
IN CHAPTER 1
(1) Worker’s Problem: The maximization problem can be written in terms
of a Lagrangian function:
Lict =αlnhict + βlnXict + lnAct + εict + λ(wct − rcthict − pctXict).
























= wct − rcthict − pctXict = 0.
Plugging the first-order conditions for hict and Xict into the utility function
yields the indirect utility of each worker shown by equation 1.8.
(2) Older Resident’s Problem: The maximization problem can be writ-
ten in terms of a Lagrangian function:
Loct =αlnhoct + βlnXoct + lnAct + εoct + λ(wc − rcthoct − pctXoct).
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= −rcthoct − pctXict = 0.
Plugging the first-order conditions for hoct and Xoct into the utility function
yields the indirect utility shown by equation 1.10.
(3) Establishment’s Problem: Each establishment j chooses the amount
of labor, Njct, and capital, Kjct, that maximizes profits. Taking derivatives





1−y − wct = 0,






= (1− y)pctBjc(Njct)y(Kjct)−y − δ = 0,




By stacking the first-order conditions, the Marginal Rate of Substitution











Substituting the MRS equation into the production function for Kjct and
178
taking the logs yields each establishment’s demand for labor
lnXjct = lnNjct + (1− y)lnwct + aj,
where aj is a constant equal to lnBjc + (1− y)[ln(1− y)− ln(y)− lnδ].
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APPENDIX C: ADDITIONAL TABLES
AND FIGURES OF CHAPTER 2
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Table C.1: List of Amenable Health Conditions
Conditions ICD-10 Codes
Infectious & Parasitic Diseases A00-B99
Neoplasms (ALL) C00-D48
Disorders of thyroid gland E00-E07
Diabetes Mellitus E10-E14
Epilepsy G40-G41
Chronic rheumatic heart diseases I05-I09
Hypertensive diseases I10-I13, I15
Ischemic heart diseases I20-I25
Cardiomyopathy I42
Atrial fibrillation and flutter I48
Other cardiac arrhythmias I49
Heart failure I50
Cerebrovascular diseases I60-I69
All respiratory diseases J00-J98
Gastric and duodenal ulcers K25-K27
Gastrojejunal ulcers K28
Diseases of appendix K35-K38
Hernia K40-K46
Diseases of gallbladder and biliary tract K80-K83
Acute pancreatitis K85
Infections of the skin and subcutaneous tissue L00-L08
Infectious arthropathies M00-M02
Glomerular diseases N00-N07
Renal tubulo-interstitial diseases N10-N15
Renal failure N17-N19
Unspecified contracted kidney, small kidney unknown cause N26-N27
Hyperplasia of prostate N40
Pregnancy, childbirth and the puerperium O00-O99
Congenital malformations originating in the perinatal period P00-P96
Misadventures to patients during surgical and medical care Y60-Y69, Y83-Y84
Notes: In the above table we report amenable health conditions with their associated
ICD-10 codes.
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Table C.2: Propensity-Score Regression: Estimated Probability of
Expanding Medicaid
Variable Estimated Coefficient
% Age 20-24 3.46
(2.34)
% Age 45-54 10.35**
(4.38)














Pre-2014 Uninsured Rate -12.20***
(1.73)
2008 Obama County Election Share 3.74***
(1.42)




2005 All Cause Mortality Rate -0.0013**
(0.0006)
2006 All Cause Mortality Rate -0.0010
(0.0007)
2007 All Cause Mortality Rate -0.0000
(0.0007)
2008 All Cause Mortality Rate 0.0000
(0.0007)
2009 All Cause Mortality Rate 0.0011*
(0.0006)
Observations 2823
Notes: In the above table we report estimates from a propensity-score Logit model. The
outcome is an indicator for Medicaid expansion in 2014 for each county in the sample.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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Table C.3: Summary Statistics: Trimmed Counties
Expansion Counties Matched Counties
Variables Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
Baseline Mortality Rates
All Cause Mortality (per 100,000 people) 299.11 (82.38) 411.55 (123.02)
Males 377.21 (106.32) 512.07 (160.95)
Females 222.41 (66.55) 314.42 (101.15)
Ages 20-24 78.21 (51.37) 103.65 (67.38)
Ages 25-34 93.27 (48.41) 129.75 (59.06)
Ages 35-44 148.16 (57.22) 220.38 (85.79)
Ages 45-54 331.54 (94.65) 514.71 (151.25)
Ages 55-64 700.45 (144.16) 1053.90 (242.02)
Amenable Cause Mortality (per 100,000 people) 188.14 (54.95) 261.87 (86.55)
Males 226.12 (70.49) 312.29 (111.42)
Females 150.81 (46.42) 213.29 (74.96)
Ages 20-24 9.79 (17.54) 14.92 (21.03)
Ages 25-34 18.52 (16.34) 34.82 (26.36)
Ages 35-44 62.21 (30.27) 104.58 (52.94)
Ages 45-54 201.74 (65.24) 331.35 (112.38)
Ages 55-64 530.91 (117.78) 794.04 (197.18)
Cardiovascular Mortality (per 100,000 people) 53.90 (22.77) 87.10 (36.80)
Respiratory Mortality (per 100,000 people) 16.27 (9.45) 24.94 (14.97)
Cancer Mortality (per 100,000 people) 95.41 (23.89) 104.87 (35.45)
Suicides (per 100,000 people) 14.79 (8.12) 17.22 (8.89)
Opioid Overdoses (per 100,000 people) 2.02 (2.03) 2.07 (2.75)
Drug & Alcohol Poisonings (per 100,000 people) 16.25 (8.12) 9.13 (6.68)
Independent Variables
% Population Ages 20-25 0.11 (0.03) 0.13 (0.05)
% Population Ages 25-34 0.20 (0.03) 0.24 (0.03)
% Population Ages 35-44 0.21 (0.02) 0.22 (0.02)
% Population Ages 45-54 0.26 (0.02) 0.23 (0.02)
% Population Ages 55-64 0.22 (0.04) 0.19 (0.03)
% Male 0.50 (0.01) 0.50 (0.02)
% Hispanic 0.10 (0.13) 0.18 (0.16)
% White 0.89 (0.06) 0.70 (0.17)
% Black 0.04 (0.03) 0.25 (0.17)
Unemployed Rate 0.09 (0.04) 0.08 (0.02)
Poverty Rate 0.12 (0.04) 0.20 (0.05)
Real Median Income ($10,000) 6.43 (1.53) 4.65 (0.80)
Uninsured Rate 0.09 (0.06) 0.28 (0.06)
Obama 2008 Vote share 0.59 (0.10) 0.35 (0.16)
Obama 2012 Vote share 0.55 (0.10) 0.33 (0.18)
Democratic Governor 0.99 (0.11) 0.01 (0.08)
Notes: The above table presents population weighted means and standard deviations
of baseline variables, measured for 2009-2013, in trimmed counties within states that
expanded Medicaid in 2014 and counties in non-expansion states.
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Table C.4: First Stage: Medicaid Expansion and Percent Uninsured
All Income All Income ≤ 138% ≤ 138%
Levels Levels FPL FPL
Medicaid Expansion -4.20*** -4.15*** -8.33*** -8.18***
(1.13) (0.95) (2.28) (1.89)
Controls No Yes No Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 45 45 45 45
Observations 20,337 20,337 20,337 20,337
Notes: Observations include annual county-level uninsured rates for adults aged 19 to 64
years. Data is from the Small Area Health Insurance Program through the U.S. Census.
Columns (1) and (2) include results for uninsured rates for all income levels. In columns
(3) and (4) we report results for adults with incomes at or below 138 percent of the federal
poverty level. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. The regressions use the
same county weights as those used in our baseline mortality specification. All models
include year and county fixed effects. Controls selected using double lasso procedure
include the percentage of population that is white, the percentage of population between
25 and 34 years of age, the percentage of population between 55 and 64 years of age, and
the logged county population of adults between 45 and 54 years of age.
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Table C.5: Effects of Medicaid Expansion on Detailed Causes of Mortality
Full Sample Gender Age Groups
Base Controls Males Females 20-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64
Model and Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: Cardiovascular Mortality
Medicaid Expansion -2.46*** -2.18** -1.60 -2.78*** 0.35** 1.10 -1.40* -4.93** -5.29*
(0.88) (0.87) (1.29) (0.94) (0.18) (0.79) (0.77) (2.35) (2.76)
% Effect Relative to Baseline -3.89 -3.45 -1.80 -7.34 15.28 17.30 -5.87 -6.22 -2.81
Panel B: Respiratory Mortality
Medicaid Expansion -2.86*** -2.51*** -2.33*** -2.70*** 0.42 -0.09 -0.26 -1.40* -8.16***
(1.11) (0.67) (0.66) (0.71) (0.31) (0.16) (0.34) (0.80) (2.04)
% Effect Relative to Baseline -16.37 -14.37 -12.33 -16.78 26.75 -3.63 -5.09 -7.89 -14.55
Panel C: Cancer
Medicaid Expansion -1.32*** -0.84 -0.70 -0.99 -0.01 0.47 -0.22 -0.39 -4.45
(0.47) (0.57) (0.72) (0.71) (0.29) (0.58) (0.83) (2.00) (2.75)
% Effect Relative to Baseline -1.45 -0.93 -0.73 -1.15 -0.21 5.27 -0.77 -0.37 -1.56
Panel D: Suicides
Medicaid Expansion -0.85 -0.49 -0.65 -0.32 -0.70 -1.70*** 0.54 0.24 -1.24**
(0.69) (0.62) (0.89) (0.38) (0.85) (0.56) (1.29) (0.88) (0.59)
% Effect Relative to Baseline -5.56 -3.21 -2.74 -4.64 -5.34 -12.82 3.58 1.32 -7.62
Panel E: Opioid Overdoses
Medicaid Expansion -0.19 -0.03 -0.14 0.07 0.57** 0.12 -0.28 0.01 -0.32
(0.36) (0.27) (0.46) (0.15) (0.26) (0.46) (0.36) (0.34) (0.27)
% Effect Relative to Baseline -7.14 -1.13 -4.42 3.26 35.63 5.17 -9.96 0.27 -12.55
Panel F: Drug and Alcohol Poisonings
Medicaid Expansion -3.37 -1.90 -3.01 -0.91 -1.39 -5.25 -3.61 -1.78 2.10
(4.58) (3.01) (4.79) (1.36) (1.87) (5.07) (3.53) (3.72) (1.37)
% Effect Relative to Baseline -25.47 -14.36 -16.78 -10.54 -15.36 -41.27 -25.51 -10.02 18.36
Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45
Observations 20340 20340 20340 20340 20340 20340 20340 20340 20340
Notes: Observations include annual county-level mortality rates for adults aged 20 to
64 years. Columns (1) and (2) include results for the full sample with and without
controls. In columns (3) and (4) we report results for males and females, respectively.
In columns (5) through (9) we report results for five separate age groups. Coefficients
indicate deaths per 100,000 people. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. All
models include year and county fixed effects. Controls include the county unemployment
rate, the percentage of population that is white, the percentage of population between
55 and 64 years of age, the logged county population of adults between 20 and 64 years
of age, the logged county population of adults between 35 and 44 years of age, and the
logged county population of females between 20 and 64 years of age.
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Table C.6: Summary Statistics Of Permutation Test
Std. 5th/95th Signif. Effects Signif. Effects
Mean Effect Dev. Percentiles <0 >0
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All Cause Mortality (No Controls) 2.26 7.47 -8.66/14.84 35 125
All Cause Mortality (Controls) 1.51 4.45 -5.34/8.77 37 131
Amenable Mortality (No Controls) 1.58 4.32 -4.57/9.59 29 115
Amenable Mortality (Controls) 1.09 2.74 -1.73/2.77 29 119
Notes: The above table reports summary statistics from 1000 permutation tests.
Columns (1)-(3) report means, standard deviations, and 5th/95th percentiles. Columns
(4) and (5) present the number of results (out of 1000) that are statistically significant
at the 5 percent level.
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Table C.7: Dropping States with Largest Average Residuals
All Cause Amenable
Model and Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Medicaid Expansion -14.74** -11.45*** -7.79*** -6.64***
(6.15) (3.58) (2.15) (1.93)
Controls No Yes No Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 44 44 44 44
Observations 20331 19863 20313 20313
Observations include annual county-level mortality rates for adults ages 20 to 64 for the
years 2009-2017. Each specification drops the state with the highest average residuals de-
rived using regression for the full sample with and without controls. Coefficients indicate
deaths per 100,000 people. All models include year and county fixed effects. Standard
errors are clustered at the state level.
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Table C.8: Triple Difference: Ages 55-64 vs. 65-74
All Cause Amenable
Model and Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Expansion x Post x Under 65 -0.011* -0.011* -0.012** -0.013**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Controls No Yes No Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
State x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age x State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 45 45 45 45
Observations 40602 40602 40602 40602
Notes: Observations include annual county-level mortality rates for adults ages 55 to
74 years of age for the years 2009-2017. Columns (1) and (2) include results for the
full sample with and without controls. In columns (3) and (4) we report results for
amenable causes of mortality. Coefficients indicate logged deaths per 100,000 people
(plus 1). Standard errors are clustered at the state level. All models include year and
county fixed effects, state-by-year fixed effects, age-by-year fixed effects, and age-by-state
fixed effects. Controls selected using double lasso for each model.
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Notes: The above figure shows event-study plots of Medicaid expansion on (a) all-cause
mortality and (b) amenable causes of mortality for adults aged 20 to 64 year. The vertical
line indicates the year prior to the expansion. Bands indicate 95% confidence intervals.
Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Models include year and county fixed
effects and are weighted by the 20-64 year old county population. Controls include the
county unemployment rate, the percentage of population that is between 55 and 64 years
of age, the logged county population of adults between 45 and 54 years of age, and the
logged county population of females between 20 and 64 years of age.
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Notes: Figure (a) shows the average mortality rates for adults 20 to 64 years of age
between the years 2009 and 2017 among states that did and did not expand Medicaid.
Figure (b) shows the average amenable-cause mortality rates for adults 20 to 64 years of
age between the years 2009 and 2017 among states that did and did not expand Medicaid.
The dashed vertical line indicates the year prior to when the expansions became effective.
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Notes: The above figures illustrate the kernel densities and histograms of the propensity
score for both expansion and non-expansion counties.
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Figure C.4: State and County Expansion Maps









Notes: Map (a) shows state Medicaid expansion decisions. Expansion States are states
that expanded Medicaid in the first half of 2014. States classified as Later Expansion are
those that expanded Medicaid after the first half of 2014. Non-Expansion states have
not expanded Medicaid. Map (b) depicts county classifications after the propensity-score
estimation procedure.
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Notes: The above figure shows event-study plots of Medicaid expansion on all-cause mortality for adults
20 to 64 years of age. The vertical line indicates the year prior to the expansion. Bands indicate 95%
confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Models include year fixed effects,
county fixed effects, and controls.
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Notes: The above figure shows event-study plots of Medicaid expansion on amenable-cause mortality for
adults 20 to 64 years of age. The vertical line indicates the year prior to the expansion. Bands indicate
95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Models include year fixed
effects, county fixed effects, and controls.
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Figure C.7: Event Study: ACA Medicaid Expansion and Mortality by
Uninsured Rates






















































































































































Notes: The above figure shows event-study plots of Medicaid expansion on all-cause
mortality and amenable causes of mortality by county baseline uninsured levels, where
High/Low uninsured counties are defined as being above/below the median baseline
uninsured rate for individuals aged 19 to 64 years. The vertical line indicates the year
prior to the expansion. Bands indicate 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are
clustered at the state level. Models include year and county fixed effects. Controls include
the county unemployment rate, the percentage of population that is white, the percentage
of population that is between 55 and 64 years of age, the logged county population of
adults between 20 and 64 years of age, the logged county population of adults between
35 and 44 years of age, and the logged county population of females between 20 and 64
years of age.
195
















Notes: The above figure depicts shows the share of total deaths among adults 20
to 64 years of age living in Medicaid expansion and non-expansion states. The
data is from National Vital Statistics System through the Centers from Disease
Control and Prevention for the years 2009 through 2013.
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Notes: The above figure shows event-study plots of Medicaid expansion on cardiovascular-related mor-
tality for adults 20 to 64 years of age. The vertical line indicates the year prior to the expansion. Bands
indicate 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Models include year
fixed effects, county fixed effects, and controls.
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Notes: The above figure shows event-study plots of Medicaid expansion on respiratory-related mortality
for adults 20 to 64 years of age. The vertical line indicates the year prior to the expansion. Bands
indicate 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Models include year
fixed effects, county fixed effects, and controls.
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Notes: The above figure shows event-study plots of Medicaid expansion on Cancer-related mortality for
adults 20 to 64 years of age. The vertical line indicates the year prior to the expansion. Bands indicate
95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Models include year fixed
effects, county fixed effects, and controls.
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Notes: The above figure shows event-study plots of Medicaid expansion on suicides for adults 20 to 64
years of age. The vertical line indicates the year prior to the expansion. Bands indicate 95% confidence
intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Models include year fixed effects, county fixed
effects, and controls.
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Notes: The above figure shows event-study plots of Medicaid expansion on opioid overdoses for adults
20 to 64 years of age. The vertical line indicates the year prior to the expansion. Bands indicate 95%
confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Models include year fixed effects,
county fixed effects, and controls.
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Figure C.14: Event Study: ACA Medicaid Expansion and Drug and
Alcohol Poisonings







































































































































































































































































































Notes: The above figure shows event-study plots of Medicaid expansion on drug and alcohol poisonings
for adults 20 to 64 years of age. The vertical line indicates the year prior to the expansion. Bands
indicate 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Models include year
fixed effects, county fixed effects, and controls.
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Notes: The above figure depicts estimated all-cause mortality effects as a function of
the penalty level employed in the lasso variable selection procedure. The level “205*”
corresponds to our preferred estimates. The level (”limit”) corresponds to no variables
selected for inclusion in the propensity score model. Bands indicate 95% confidence
intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.
203













































































Notes: The above figure shows event-study plots of Medicaid expansion on (a) all-cause
mortality and (b) amenable causes of mortality for adults aged 65 to 74 years. The
vertical line indicates the year prior to the expansion. Bands indicate 95% confidence
intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Models include year and
county fixed effects. Controls include the county unemployment rate, the percentage
of population that is white, the percentage of population that is between 55 and 64
years of age, the logged county population of adults between 20 and 64 years of age,
the logged county population of adults between 35 and 44 years of age, and the logged
county population of females between 20 and 64 years of age.
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Notes: The above figure shows event-study plots of Medicaid expansion on (a) all-cause
mortality and (b) amenable causes of mortality for adults 55 to 64 years of age relative
to adults 65 to 74 years of age. The outcome variable is defined as the logged deaths
per 100,000 people (plus 1). The vertical line indicates the year prior to the expansion.
Bands indicate 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.
Models include year and county fixed effects. Controls include the county unemployment
rate, the percentage of population that is white, the percentage of population that is
between 55 and 64 years of age, the logged county population of adults between 20 and
64 years of age, the logged county population of adults between 35 and 44 years of age,
and the logged county population of females between 20 and 64 years of age.
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Estimated Amenable-Cause Mortality Effects
Notes: Figures shows histograms of the estimated mortality effects from 1000 simulations
where treatment is randomly assigned to 27 states. The solid vertical lines indicate the
5th and 95th percentiles of the distributions. The dashed vertical lines indicate all-cause
and amenable mortality estimates from columns (1) and (2) in Table 2.2.
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Estimated Amenable-Cause T-Statistics
Notes: Figures shows histograms of the estimated t-statistics from 1000 simulations where
treatment is randomly assigned to 27 states. The solid vertical lines indicate the 5th and
95th percentiles of the distributions. The dashed vertical lines indicate t-statistics that
correspond to the all-cause and amenable mortality estimates from columns (1) and (2)
in Table 2.2.
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Estimated Amenable-Cause Mortality Effects
Notes: Figures shows histograms of the estimated mortality effects from regressions where
each state is dropped from the sample, one at a time. The dashed vertical lines indicate
all-cause and amenable mortality estimates from columns (1) and (2) in Table 2.2.
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APPENDIX D: COMPARISON WITH
PRE-ACA EXPANSIONS
To facilitate the comparison of our results with previous findings, we re-
estimate our model using three early-2000s Medicaid expansions in New York,
Arizona, and Maine as the treatments. We estimate both short- and longer-
run impacts on mortality using post-treatment windows of 4 and 8 years. We
limit the follow-up to 8 years (end of year 2009) to avoid overlapping with
the implementation of the ACA and drop 2001 from the sample to adjust for
the September 11 attacks. The exercise uses the same approach employed
in our main analysis. We match treatment counties using the sample of all
other counties drawn from the U.S. using double lasso to select variables
that predict the decision to expand Medicaid expansion and/or mortality.
Importantly, we again withhold mortality rates for the 4 years prior to when
the expansions became effective, 1997-2000, from the propensity score model
while including the mortality rates for 1992-1996. Appendix Table D.1 shows
results from the propensity score model. A larger proportion of near-elderly
individuals, higher poverty rates, and higher unemployment rates are impor-
tant predictors of the expansion.20 After matching, we again trim outliers
that have no comparable match and weight the regressions by the county
population 20 to 64 years of age multiplied by T + (1− T )× p
(1−p) where T
is an indicator for treatment and p is the estimated propensity score.
Event-study figures of the analysis (Appendix Figure D.1) show reduc-
tions in mortality in the years following 2000, when the expansions became
effective. We do, however, find modest evidence of pre-treatment differences
in trends between expansion and non-expansion counties for all-cause and
amenable causes of death. Although mortality falls following the reforms,
it would be difficult to distinguish these improvements in mortality from a
trend extrapolated from before the reforms, particularly for amenable causes
20We also included an indicator for Democratic governor in 2000, but this variable
perfectly predicts expansion and is ommitted from the regression due to collinearity.
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of death. Evidence of pre-trends suggests that we cannot draw strong causal
conclusions from these reforms. The point estimates appear in Table D.2,
together with our results from the ACA Medicaid expansion. The estimated
4-year impact of the earlier reforms, shown in column 2, are strikingly similar
to our estimated effects of the ACA expansion. We also find that mortality
reductions from the earlier reforms appear to grow over time, a finding that
echoes the pattern shown in the event-study figures. The 8-year estimates are
approximately 30 percent larger in magnitude relative to the corresponding
impact after 4 years.
Using the estimated 3.60 percent reduction in mortality and an estimated
first stage equaling a 4.15 percent increase in insurance coverage in expan-
sion counties relative to non-expansion counties, our findings for all-cause
mortality imply one death prevented per 310 newly insured individuals. For
the early-2000 expansions, we estimate approximately one death saved per
296 newly covered using coverage data reported in Sommers (2017).21 Taken
together, this suggests the gains in coverage needed to reduce mortality are
slightly larger following the ACA Medicaid expansion compared to earlier
expansions after 4 years. This is consistent with the fact that the mortality
environment has changed over the decade since the earlier reforms. Most
notably, the early reforms became effective during a time when HIV medi-
cations were becoming more widely accessible for those with insurance but
remained very costly to those without insurance (Sommers, 2017). Increases
in “diseases of despair,” such as drug and alcohol poisonings and suicide,
have coincided with the ACA expansions, and Medicaid may be less effective
at addressing these causes of death.
21County-level insurance data from SAHIE is not available prior to 2005. Therefore the
per-beneficary calculation is based off estimates of 497,000 covered in Arizona, Maine, and
New York four years following the Medicaid expansions and population of adults aged 20
to 64 years of 15.8 million in these states. An estimate of -10.62 per 100,000 people implies
newly covered people per life saved = 1/((10.62/100000) x (15.8/.497)) = 296.
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Table D.1: Propensity-Score Regression Results: Expanding Medicaid in
Early 2000s
Variable Estimated Coefficient
% Age 20-24 -6.87
(4.82)














1992 All Cause Mortality Rate -0.0016
(0.0021)
1993 All Cause Mortality Rate -0.0042**
(0.0021)
1994 All Cause Mortality Rate -0.0023
(0.0021)
1995 All Cause Mortality Rate 0.0002
(0.0020)
1996 All Cause Mortality Rate -0.0044
(0.0021)
Observations 3134
Notes: In the above table we report estimates from a propensity-score Logit model. The
outcome is an indicator for Medicaid expansion for each county in the sample. Standard
errors are reported in parentheses.
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Table D.2: Effect of ACA Medicaid Expansions on Mortality: Comparison
to Early 2000s Reforms
Early 2000s Reforms Early 2000s Reforms
ACA Medicaid Expansion (4-Year Estimates) (8-Year Estimates)
Model and Variable (1) (2) (3)
Panel A: All Cause Mortality
Medicaid Expansion -11.36*** -10.62*** -15.31***
(3.59) (3.60) (4.25)
% Effect Relative to Baseline -3.60 -3.34 -4.85
Panel B: Amenable Cause Mortality
Medicaid Expansion -6.64*** -7.93*** -9.93***
(1.93) (2.31) (2.77)
% Effect Relative to Baseline -3.88 -3.51 -4.39
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 45 51 51
Observations 20340 23865 35794
Notes: Observations include annual county-level mortality rates for adults aged 20 to
64 years. Column (1) reports the estimated effects of the ACA Medicaid expansion on
mortality. In columns (2) and (3) we report estimates of Medicaid expansions in AZ,
NY, and ME during the early 2000s on mortality 4 and 8 years after the policies began.
Coefficients indicate deaths per 100,000 people. In column (1) the standard errors are
clustered at the state level. In columns (2) and (3) the standard errors are two-way
clustered at the county and state-by-year levels. All models include year and county
fixed effects. Controls for each model selected using double lasso method.
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Notes: The above figure shows event-study plots of Medicaid expansion on (a) all-cause
mortality and (b) amenable causes of mortality for adults aged 20 to 64 year. The vertical
line indicates the year prior to the effective date of when expansion. Bands indicate 95%
confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Models include year
and county fixed effects. Controls include the county unemployment rate, the percentage
of population that is white, the percentage of population that is between 55 and 64
years of age, the logged county population of adults between 20 and 64 years of age,
the logged county population of adults between 35 and 44 years of age, and the logged
county population of females between 20 and 64 years of age.
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APPENDIX E: ADDITIONAL TABLES
AND FIGURES OF CHAPTER 3
Table E.1: Effect of ACA Medicaid Expansion on State Uninsured Rates
Total Population Medicaid Eligible
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Medicaid Expansion -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.062*** -0.062***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.012) (0.008)
Mean Baseline Rate 14.81 35.00
Controls No Yes No Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region x Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 51 51 51 51
Observations 459 459 459 459
Notes: The sample includes the years 2009 through 2017. In columns (1) and (2), the
dependent variable is defined as the total state uninsured rate. In columns (3) and (4),
the dependent variable is defined as the uninsured rate among adults age 18-65 with
incomes at or below 138 percent of the federal poverty level. All specifications include
state, year, and region-by-year fixed effects. Specifications in columns (2) and (4) also
adjust for annual, state-level controls including logged median household income, average
unemployment rates, average poverty rates, the percentage of state population that is
male, the percentage of population in seven age groups (0-9, 10-19, 20-29, 30-39, 40-49,
50-59, and 60+), the percentage of population in three racial groups (white, black, other),
and the percentage of population that is Hispanic. Robust standard errors clustered at
the state-level. ***, **, * represent significance at the .01, .05, and .10 level, respectively.
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Table E.2: Event Study Estimates of Aggregated Crime Rates
Total Crime Violent Crime Property Crime
(1) (2) (3)
Expansion x 5 years before -0.006 0.001 -0.008
(0.014) (0.026) (0.014)
Expansion x 4 years before -0.001 0.023 -0.004
(0.013) (0.021) (0.012)
Expansion x 3 years before 0.007 0.003 0.008
(0.011) (0.020) (0.011)
Expansion x 2 year before 0.010 0.005 0.012
(0.009) (0.016) (0.009)
Expansion x 1 year after 0.014 -0.025 0.018
(0.014) (0.019) (0.015)
Expansion x 2 years after 0.004 -0.035 0.009
(0.019) (0.025) (0.020)
Expansion x 3 years after -0.005 -0.029 -0.003
(0.018) (0.029) (0.019)
Expansion x 4 years after -0.038 -0.062* -0.034
(0.024) (0.036) (0.023)
Expansion x 5 years after -0.047 -0.075 -0.042
(0.033) (0.048) (0.031)
Mean Baseline Rate 3,195.71 395.47 2,800.24
Controls Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Reg x Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 51 51 51
Observations 510 510 510
Notes: The sample includes the years 2009 through 2018. The dependent variable is
defined as the natural log of reported total, violent, and property crimes reported per
100,000 people, respectively. All specifications include state, year, and region-by-year
fixed effects. Specifications also adjust for annual, state-level controls including logged
median household income, average unemployment rates, average poverty rates, the per-
centage of state population that is male, the percentage of population in seven age groups
(0-9, 10-19, 20-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, and 60+), the percentage of population in three
racial groups (white, black, other), the percentage of population that is Hispanic. Robust
standard errors clustered at the state-level. ***, **, * represent significance at the .01,
.05, and .10 level, respectively.
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Table E.3: Event Study Estimates of Specific Crime Rates
Homicide Assault Robbery Rape Burglary Larceny MV Theft
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Expansion x 5 years before -0.015 0.022 -0.035 0.007 -0.016 -0.009 0.003
(0.036) (0.035) (0.026) (0.032) (0.026) (0.014) (0.031)
Expansion x 4 years before 0.002 0.038 0.004 0.016 -0.005 -0.011 0.041
(0.047) (0.029) (0.031) (0.031) (0.023) (0.012) (0.031)
Expansion x 3 years before -0.056 0.011 -0.000 0.001 0.020 0.003 0.023
(0.042) (0.027) (0.031) (0.043) (0.022) (0.012) (0.021)
Expansion x 2 year before 0.049 0.002 0.030 -0.006 0.014 0.010 0.032
(0.046) (0.017) (0.026) (0.027) (0.015) (0.009) (0.020)
Expansion x 1 year after -0.040 -0.032 0.017 0.010 0.008 0.024* -0.000
(0.044) (0.023) (0.033) (0.028) (0.020) (0.015) (0.027)
Expansion x 2 years after 0.002 -0.042 0.006 -0.003 -0.030 0.019 -0.006
(0.052) (0.030) (0.036) (0.031) (0.025) (0.021) (0.041)
Expansion x 3 years after -0.013 -0.041 0.011 -0.007 -0.052* 0.005 0.011
(0.061) (0.035) (0.042) (0.041) (0.028) (0.020) (0.045)
Expansion x 4 years after 0.061 -0.071* -0.032 -0.048 -0.093** -0.022 -0.035
(0.092) (0.042) (0.055) (0.046) (0.038) (0.023) (0.059)
Expansion x 5 years after 0.032 -0.084 -0.084 -0.007 -0.114** -0.020 -0.078
(0.090) (0.054) (0.065) (0.065) (0.048) (0.029) (0.070)
Mean Baseline Rate 4.54 243.46 114.22 33.25 620.19 1,954.24 225.81
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Reg x Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 51 51 51 51 51 51 51
Observations 510 510 510 510 510 510 510
Notes: The sample includes the years 2009 through 2018. The dependent variable is
defined as the natural log of the reported indicated crime per 100,000 people. All spec-
ifications include state, year, and region-by-year fixed effects. Specifications also adjust
for annual, state-level controls including logged median household income, average un-
employment rates, average poverty rates, the percentage of state population that is male,
the percentage of population in seven age groups (0-9, 10-19, 20-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59,
and 60+), the percentage of population in three racial groups (white, black, other), and
the percentage of population that is Hispanic. Robust standard errors clustered at the
state-level. ***, **, * represent significance at the .01, .05, and .10 level, respectively.
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Table E.4: Alternative Specifications: Aggregate Crimes
Baseline Pop. Weighted Restricted Policy Leads Neg. Binom Synth. Control
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Total Crime
Medicaid Expansion -0.007 -0.007 0.007 -0.002 0.002 0.007
(0.019) (0.014) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) [0.678]
Panel B: Violent Crime
Medicaid Expansion -0.053** -0.055** -0.048* -0.051** -0.049** -0.057*
(0.027) (0.022) (0.028) (0.023) (0.025) [0.093]
Panel C: Property Crime
Medicaid Expansion -0.002 -0.003 0.012 0.003 0.007 -0.003
(0.019) (0.015) (0.019) (0.018) (0.017) [0.788]
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Region x Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Clusters 51 51 46 51 51 -
Observations 510 510 460 510 510 510
Notes: The sample includes the years 2009 through 2018. Each panel-column is a separate
regression. In columns (1)-(5) and (7), the dependent variable is defined as the natural
log of the reported indicated crime per 100,000 people. In column (6), the dependent
variable is defined as the count of the reported crime. In column (1), I show results
derived using the baseline difference-in-differences specification. In column (2), I show
results where regressions are weighted by annual, state-level population. In column (3),
I exclude five states (NY, DE, DC, VT, and MA) that chose to expand Medicaid but
already had similar Medicaid eligibility requirements to those mandated under the ACA.
In column (4), I show results from regressions that includes pre-policy lead coefficients.
In column (5), estimates are derived using Negative Binomial regression. In column (6),
I show results derived from a synthetic control analysis. Robust standard errors, shown
in parenthesis, are clustered at the state-level. P-values are shown in brackets. ***, **,
* represent significance at the .01, .05, and .10 level, respectively.
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Table E.5: Alternative Specifications: Violent Crimes
Baseline Pop. Weighted Restricted Policy Leads Neg. Binom Synth. Control
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Criminal Homicide
Medicaid Expansion 0.002 -0.008 -0.014 0.005 -0.027 -0.029
(0.050) (0.033) (0.049) (0.054) (0.034) [0.580]
Panel B: Aggravated Assault
Medicaid Expansion -0.067** -0.055** -0.066* -0.058** -0.065** -0.055***
(0.033) (0.027) (0.036) (0.028) (0.030) [0.003]
Panel C: Robbery
Medicaid Expansion -0.015 -0.046* -0.005 -0.014 -0.039 0.143
(0.038) (0.028) (0.039) (0.039) (0.032) [0.224]
Panel D: Forcible Rape
Medicaid Expansion -0.006 -0.035 0.002 -0.003 -0.019 -0.023
(0.032) (0.039) (0.032) (0.029) (0.030) [0.331]
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Region x Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Clusters 51 51 46 51 51 -
Observations 510 510 460 510 510 510
Notes: The sample includes the years 2009 through 2018. Each panel-column is a separate
regression. In columns (1)-(5) and (7), the dependent variable is defined as the natural
log of the reported indicated crime per 100,000 people. In column (6), the dependent
variable is defined as the count of the reported crime. In column (1), I show results
derived using the baseline difference-in-differences specification. In column (2), I show
results where regressions are weighted by annual, state-level population. In column (3),
I exclude five states (NY, DE, DC, VT, and MA) that chose to expand Medicaid but
already had similar Medicaid eligibility requirements to those mandated under the ACA.
In column (4), I show results from regressions that includes pre-policy lead coefficients.
In column (5), estimates are derived using Negative Binomial regression. In column (6),
I show results derived from a synthetic control analysis. Robust standard errors, shown
in parenthesis, are clustered at the state-level. P-values are shown in brackets. ***, **,
* represent significance at the .01, .05, and .10 level, respectively.
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Table E.6: Alternative Specifications: Property Crimes
Baseline Pop. Weighted Restricted Policy Leads Neg. Binom Synth. Control
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Burglary
Medicaid Expansion -0.044** -0.033* -0.025 -0.037 -0.043** -0.008
(0.022) (0.019) (0.022) (0.024) (0.020) [0.715]
Panel B: Larceny
Medicaid Expansion 0.014 0.019 0.026 0.018 0.015 0.015
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.017) [0.607]
Panel C: Vehicle Theft
Medicaid Expansion -0.047 -0.086** -0.016 -0.037 -0.046 0.019
(0.039) (0.042) (0.038) (0.037) (0.037) [0.894]
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Region x Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Clusters 51 51 46 51 51 -
Observations 510 510 460 510 510 510
Notes: The sample includes the years 2009 through 2018. Each panel-column is a separate
regression. In columns (1)-(5) and (7), the dependent variable is defined as the natural
log of the reported indicated crime per 100,000 people. In column (6), the dependent
variable is defined as the count of the reported crime. In column (1), I show results
derived using the baseline difference-in-differences specification. In column (2), I show
results where regressions are weighted by annual, state-level population. In column (3),
I exclude five states (NY, DE, DC, VT, and MA) that chose to expand Medicaid but
already had similar Medicaid eligibility requirements to those mandated under the ACA.
In column (4), I show results from regressions that includes pre-policy lead coefficients.
In column (5), estimates are derived using Negative Binomial regression. In column (6),
I show results derived from a synthetic control analysis. Robust standard errors, shown
in parenthesis, are clustered at the state-level. P-values are shown in brackets. ***, **,
* represent significance at the .01, .05, and .10 level, respectively.
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Table E.7: Placebo Test: Aggregate Crime Rates
Total Crime Violent Crime Property Crime
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Medicaid Expansion 0.004 0.001 0.010 -0.004 0.004 0.002
(0.019) (0.017) (0.041) (0.029) (0.019) (0.017)
Mean Baseline Rate 3,597.65 437.28 3,160.36
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Reg x Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 51 51 51 51 51 51
Observations 459 459 459 459 459 459
Notes: The sample includes the years 2005 through 2013. The dependent variable is
defined as the natural log of reported total, violent, and property crimes per 100,000
people, respectively. Treatment begins in 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012 for states that
expanded Medicaid in 2014, 2015, 2016, and 2017. All specifications include state, year,
and region-by-year fixed effects. All specifications include state, year, and region-by-year
fixed effects. Columns (2), (4), and (6) adjust for annual, state-level controls including
logged median household income, average unemployment rates, average poverty rates,
the percentage of state population that is male, the percentage of population in seven
age groups (0-9, 10-19, 20-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, and 60+), the percentage of popula-
tion in three racial groups (white, black, other), and the percentage of population that
is Hispanic. Robust standard errors clustered at the state-level. ***, **, * represent
significance at the .01, .05, and .10 level, respectively.
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Table E.8: Placebo Test: Violent Crime Rates
Homicide Assault Robbery Rape
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Medicaid Expansion -0.012 -0.021 -0.002 -0.013 0.045 0.028 0.014 0.015
(0.053) (0.035) (0.047) (0.038) (0.039) (0.032) (0.032) (0.027)
Mean Baseline Rate 5.43 267.71 131.26 131.26
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Reg x Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51
Observations 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459
Notes: The sample includes the years 2005 through 2013. The dependent variable is
defined as the natural log of reported total, violent, and property crimes per 100,000
people, respectively. Treatment begins in 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012 for states that
expanded Medicaid in 2014, 2015, 2016, and 2017. All specifications include state, year,
and region-by-year fixed effects. All specifications include state, year, and region-by-
year fixed effects. Columns (2), (4), (6), and (8) adjust for annual, state-level controls
including logged median household income, average unemployment rates, average poverty
rates, the percentage of state population that is male, the percentage of population in
seven age groups (0-9, 10-19, 20-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, and 60+), the percentage of
population in three racial groups (white, black, other), and the percentage of population
that is Hispanic. Robust standard errors clustered at the state-level. ***, **, * represent
significance at the .01, .05, and .10 level, respectively.
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Table E.9: Placebo Test: Property Crime Rates
Burglary Larceny MV Theft
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Medicaid Expansion 0.007 0.011 0.026 0.012 -0.078* -0.062*
(0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.017) (0.041) (0.035)
Mean Baseline Rate 651.72 2,134.39 374.26
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Reg x Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 51 51 51 51 51 51
Observations 459 459 459 459 459 459
Notes: The sample includes the years 2005 through 2013. The dependent variable is
defined as the natural log of reported total, violent, and property crimes per 100,000
people, respectively. Treatment begins in 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012 for states that
expanded Medicaid in 2014, 2015, 2016, and 2017. All specifications include state, year,
and region-by-year fixed effects. Columns (2), (4), and (6) adjust for annual, state-
level controls including logged median household income, average unemployment rates,
average poverty rates, the percentage of state population that is male, the percentage
of population in seven age groups (0-9, 10-19, 20-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, and 60+), the
percentage of population in three racial groups (white, black, other), and the percentage
of population that is Hispanic. Robust standard errors clustered at the state-level. ***,
**, * represent significance at the .01, .05, and .10 level, respectively.
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Table E.10: Exclusion of SUD and MH Coverage From Essential Health
Benefits






























New Hampshire Yes Yes
New Jersey Yes Yes
New Mexico No No
New York No No
North Carolina Yes Yes





Rhode Island Yes Yes
South Carolina Yes Yes







West Virginia No No
Wisconsin No No
Wyoming Yes Yes
Notes: The above table shows states that exclude SUD and MH coverage in some form.
Data from EHB Benchmark Plans through CMS for the years 2014-2017.
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Table E.11: Heterogeneity SUD/MH Coverage Exclusions: Aggregated
Crime Rates
Total Crime Violent Crime Property Crime
SUD MH SUD MH SUD MH
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Medicaid Expansion 0.005 -0.005 -0.049 -0.053 0.008 -0.002
(0.021) (0.022) (0.030) (0.034) (0.022) (0.022)
Medicaid Expansion x Exclusion -0.008 0.011 -0.004 0.004 -0.003 0.016
(0.029) (0.027) (0.030) (0.031) (0.031) (0.029)
Mean Baseline Rate 3,195.71 395.47 2,800.24
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Reg x Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 51 51 51 51 51 51
Observations 510 510 510 510 510 510
Notes: The sample includes the years 2009 through 2018. The dependent variable is
defined as the natural log of the reported indicated crime per 100,000 people. The
variable Medicaid Expansion x Exclusion interacts the Medicaid expansion indicator with
a dummy variable for whether a state excludes SUD/MH coverage in some form from
their EHB benchmark plans. Columns (1), (3), and (5) correspond to SUD exclusions,
while columns (2), (4), and (6) correspond to MH exclusions. All specifications include
state, year, and region-by-year fixed effects. Specifications also adjust for annual, state-
level controls including logged median household income, average unemployment rates,
average poverty rates, the percentage of state population that is male, the percentage
of population in seven age groups (0-9, 10-19, 20-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, and 60+), the
percentage of population in three racial groups (white, black, other), and the percentage
of population that is Hispanic. Robust standard errors clustered at the state-level. ***,
**, * represent significance at the .01, .05, and .10 level, respectively.
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Table E.12: Heterogeneity by SUD/MH Coverage Exclusions: Violent
Crime Rates
Homicide Assault Robbery Rape
SUD MH SUD MH SUD MH SUD MH
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Medicaid Expansion -0.095* -0.085 -0.055 -0.060 -0.045 -0.054 0.007 0.003
(0.051) (0.053) (0.034) (0.038) (0.045) (0.049) (0.039) (0.041)
Medicaid Expansion x Exclusion 0.206*** 0.163*** -0.013 -0.002 0.057 0.067 -0.035 -0.024
(0.046) (0.046) (0.034) (0.034) (0.048) (0.045) (0.049) (0.048)
Mean Baseline Rate 4.54 243.46 114.22 33.35
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Reg x Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51
Observations 510 510 510 510 510 510 510 510
Notes: The sample includes the years 2009 through 2018. The dependent variable is
defined as the natural log of the reported indicated crime per 100,000 people. The vari-
able Medicaid Expansion x Exclusion interacts the Medicaid expansion indicator with a
dummy variable for whether a state excludes SUD/MH coverage in some form from their
EHB benchmark plans. Columns (1), (3), (5), and (7) correspond to SUD exclusions,
while columns (2), (4), (6), and (8) correspond to MH exclusions. All specifications in-
clude state, year, and region-by-year fixed effects. Specifications also adjust for annual,
state-level controls including logged median household income, average unemployment
rates, average poverty rates, the percentage of state population that is male, the percent-
age of population in seven age groups (0-9, 10-19, 20-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, and 60+),
the percentage of population in three racial groups (white, black, other), and the percent-
age of population that is Hispanic. Robust standard errors clustered at the state-level.
***, **, * represent significance at the .01, .05, and .10 level, respectively.
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Table E.13: Heterogeneity by SUD/MH Coverage Exclusions: Property
Crime Rates
Burglary Larceny MV Theft
SUD MH SUD MH SUD MH
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Medicaid Expansion -0.049* -0.068** 0.031 0.023 -0.050 -0.067
(0.029) (0.028) (0.021) (0.021) (0.047) (0.050)
Medicaid Expansion x Exclusion 0.033 0.062* -0.016 0.001 0.003 0.033
(0.039) (0.036) (0.027) (0.025) (0.071) (0.065)
Mean Baseline Rate 620.19 1,954.24 225.81
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Reg x Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 51 51 51 51 51 51
Observations 510 510 510 510 510 510
Notes: The sample includes the years 2009 through 2018. The dependent variable is
defined as the natural log of the reported indicated crime per 100,000 people. The
variable Medicaid Expansion x Exclusion interacts the Medicaid expansion indicator with
a dummy variable for whether a state excludes SUD/MH coverage in some form from
their EHB benchmark plans. Columns (1), (3), and (5) correspond to SUD exclusions,
while columns (2), (4), and (6) correspond to MH exclusions. All specifications include
state, year, and region-by-year fixed effects. Specifications also adjust for annual, state-
level controls including logged median household income, average unemployment rates,
average poverty rates, the percentage of state population that is male, the percentage
of population in seven age groups (0-9, 10-19, 20-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, and 60+), the
percentage of population in three racial groups (white, black, other), and the percentage
of population that is Hispanic. Robust standard errors clustered at the state-level. ***,
**, * represent significance at the .01, .05, and .10 level, respectively.
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Table E.14: Effect of ACA Medicaid Expansion on Arrests by Age
18-24 25-29 30-39 40-49
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Violent Crime
Medicaid Expansion -0.094 -0.118* -0.125* -0.119
(0.060) (0.064) (0.065) (0.093)
Clusters 49 49 49 49
Observations 437 437 436 437
Panel B: Property Crime
Medicaid Expansion 0.049 0.054 0.005 0.012
(0.031) (0.035) (0.035) (0.033)
Clusters 49 49 49 49
Observations 441 441 441 441
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region x Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The sample includes the years 2009 through 2017. In each column, the depen-
dent variable is defined as the log of total number of arrests per 100,000 people for each
indicated age group. In Panels A and B, I show arrest results for violent and property
crime, respectively. All specifications include state, year, and region-by-year fixed ef-
fects. Specifications also adjust for annual, state-level controls including logged median
household income, average unemployment rates, average poverty rates, the percentage
of state population that is male, the percentage of population in seven age groups (0-9,
10-19, 20-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, and 60+), the percentage of population in three racial
groups (white, black, other), and the percentage of population that is Hispanic. Robust
standard errors clustered at the state-level. ***, **, * represent significance at the .01,
.05, and .10 level, respectively.
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Table E.15: Effect of ACA Medicaid Expansion on Violent Crime Arrests
by Age
18-24 25-29 30-39 40-49
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Criminal Homicide
Medicaid Expansion 0.029 0.151 0.030 0.034
(0.078) (0.110) (0.084) (0.121)
Clusters 49 49 49 48
Observations 414 411 410 390
Panel B: Aggravated Assault
Medicaid Expansion -0.143* -0.168** -0.154* -0.124
(0.086) (0.083) (0.080) (0.100)
Clusters 49 49 49 49
Observations 437 435 436 436
Panel C: Robbery
Medicaid Expansion -0.052 -0.111** -0.047 -0.080
(0.068) (0.055) (0.058) (0.073)
Clusters 49 49 49 49
Observations 433 433 432 424
Panel D: Forcible Rape
Medicaid Expansion 0.007 -0.039 -0.074 0.009
(0.106) (0.083) (0.067) (0.095)
Clusters 49 49 49 49
429 416 424 410
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region x Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The sample includes the years 2009 through 2017. In each column, the depen-
dent variable is defined as the log of total number of arrests per 100,000 people for each
indicated age group. All specifications include state, year, and region-by-year fixed ef-
fects. Specifications also adjust for annual, state-level controls including logged median
household income, average unemployment rates, average poverty rates, the percentage
of state population that is male, the percentage of population in seven age groups (0-9,
10-19, 20-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, and 60+), the percentage of population in three racial
groups (white, black, other), and the percentage of population that is Hispanic. Robust
standard errors clustered at the state-level. ***, **, * represent significance at the .01,
.05, and .10 level, respectively.
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Table E.16: Effect of ACA Medicaid Expansion on Property Crime
Arrests by Age
18-24 25-29 30-39 40-49
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Burglary
Medicaid Expansion -0.012 -0.014 -0.065 -0.081
(0.063) (0.064) (0.059) (0.080)
Clusters 49 49 49 49
Observations 441 441 441 441
Panel B: Larceny
Medicaid Expansion 0.053 0.057 0.018 0.029
(0.040) (0.044) (0.039) (0.037)
Clusters 49 49 49 49
Observations 441 441 441 441
Panel C: Vehicle Theft
Medicaid Expansion 0.053 0.057 0.018 0.029
(0.040) (0.044) (0.039) (0.037)
Clusters 49 49 49 49
Observations 441 441 441 441
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region x Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The sample includes the years 2009 through 2017. In each column, the depen-
dent variable is defined as the log of total number of arrests per 100,000 people for each
indicated age group. All specifications include state, year, and region-by-year fixed ef-
fects. Specifications also adjust for annual, state-level controls including logged median
household income, average unemployment rates, average poverty rates, the percentage
of state population that is male, the percentage of population in seven age groups (0-9,
10-19, 20-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, and 60+), the percentage of population in three racial
groups (white, black, other), and the percentage of population that is Hispanic. Robust
standard errors clustered at the state-level. ***, **, * represent significance at the .01,
.05, and .10 level, respectively.
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Years Relative to Expansion
Expansion Synthetic Control
Notes: The above figures show treated and synthetic control trends of (a) log total crime
rates, (b) log violent crime rates, and (c) log property crime rates. The sample includes
50 states (plus District of Columbia) during the years 2010 to 2018. Vertical line indicates
the end of the year before Medicaid expansions became effective.
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Years Relative to Expansion
Expansion Synthetic Control
Notes: The above figures show treated and synthetic control trends of (a) log homicide
rates, (b) log aggravated assault rates, (c) log robbery rates, and (d) log forcible rape
rates. The sample includes 50 states (plus District of Columbia) during the years 2010
to 2018. Vertical line indicates the end of the year before Medicaid expansions became
effective.
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Years Relative to Expansion
Expansion Synthetic Control




































































Years Relative to Expansion
Expansion Synthetic Control
Notes: The above figures show treated and synthetic control trends of (a) log burglary
rates, (b) log larceny rates, and (c) log motor vehicle theft rates. The sample includes 50
states (plus District of Columbia) during the years 2009 to 2018. Vertical line indicates
the end of the year before Medicaid expansions became effective.
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